State v. Cook
Decision Date | 01 September 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 110,110 |
Citation | 338 Md. 598,659 A.2d 1313 |
Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Harold Thomas COOK. , |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Mary Ellen Barbera, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Gary E. Bair, Asst. Atty. Gen., Rachel Marblestone Kamins, Staff Atty., all on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
Victor J. D'Avella, Bel Air, for respondent.
Argued before ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, BELL and RAKER, JJ., and JOHN F. McAULIFFE, Judge (Retired and Specially Assigned).
In the present case, we are asked to review a trial judge's decision in a criminal trial to remove a seated juror and replace him with an alternate juror pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-312. We hold that the defendant is not entitled to a new trial by virtue of the juror replacement.
This case stems from the 1993 conviction in the Circuit Court for Harford County of Harold Thomas Cook on charges of sexually abusing his stepdaughter from the summer of 1974 until December, 1977. 1 At trial, the victim testified that the abuse began on a family vacation in Ocean City and continued until she reported the abuse to an aunt in 1982. Cook's stepdaughter testified at trial as to the nature of the abuse. She stated that Cook showed her pornographic movies, fondled her breasts and genitals, performed cunnilingus, and tried to force the victim to perform fellatio. The victim testified that the abuse occurred on a nightly basis
The victim further testified that her bedroom was right next to her parents' bedroom. She stated that she did not inform her mother of the abuse because Cook told her that her mother was ill and if her mother was told, she would "end up being put in a ... mental institution."
The State rested its case against Cook on July 14, 1993 and the defense case began the following day. A recess was taken shortly after proceedings began on July 15th. At that time, the trial judge (Carr, J.) held a meeting in chambers and shared with counsel the contents of a note sent to the judge by juror number six. The note read:
"Your Onor [sic],
[The victim] stated her stepfather came into her bedroom every night. The mother & stepfather's bedroom right next door. The mother was home in bed some times before he got home from work. If he left there [sic] bedroom and went into the step-daughter[']s bedroom did the mother know it?
Why not right next door?
'If so!' What for?
If the daughter was raped every night, was the mother having sex with him? How often? Working a full time job and 2 nights on a part time job. 'Had to be a good man! ' Strike that! Remark." (Emphasis in original).
The State moved to have the juror stricken, arguing that the note indicated that the juror had The defense argued that the note did not necessarily indicate that the juror had come to any conclusion or had violated the court's instructions about not forming an opinion prior to deliberations. Defense counsel argued that "[F]irst of all I don't know that this man writing this note in and of itself constitutes any sort of impropriety. It constitutes something rather unusual.
* * * * * *
He has in quotes 'had to be a good man' end quotes. As I think the Court can take judicial notice that that remark immediately follows a description of what his view of the testimony is, which is having sexual relations every night with one, perhaps two females. And I think that's what 'had to be a good man' means and doesn't mean anything concerning guilt or innocence. He may mean that he thinks that he is guilty." (Emphasis added).
The trial judge did not dismiss the juror at that time, but noted:
The court considered the issue again at the close of all of the evidence. At this point, the trial judge questioned the juror and permitted counsel to question the juror regarding the meaning of his note:
After questioning the juror, the State again moved to have the juror stricken. The defense argued that the note reflected the juror's desire to hear from a witness again and that the comment that the defendant "had to be a good man" simply reflected that the juror was relating his own experiences to the facts of the case. The court decided to dismiss the juror, noting:
The court then replaced juror number six with an alternate juror and jury instructions and closing argument were given. Following four hours of deliberations, the jury found Cook guilty on all counts.
Prior to sentencing on September 15, 1993, a hearing was held on a motion for a new trial filed by Cook based on alleged error in dismissing the juror. Defense counsel again argued that the juror's note indicated only that the juror had questions about the evidence and that he was relating the evidence to his own experiences. Defense argued that Cook had a right to be tried by the particular jurors selected to try him and that the removal of juror number six was not harmless error. The State argued that the removal of the juror was discretionary and that the juror's explanation for his note was not logical. The court denied the motion for a new trial noting:
"I'll say now, if I didn't say it at that time, that I found [the juror's] explanation [for the comments in his note] somewhat dubious; I guess is the best word.
I base that opinion not only on the words that he used, but also by the way he gave his explanation. He was, to me, somewhat at first hesitant and then came across with an explanation for the reasons ... for his editorial comment in a way that there was more to his answer than what he told us, and I gave it very little credibility.
* * * * * *
If a juror sends out [a note] with an editorial comment and then doesn't have a candid ... rationale or ... rational explanation for what he does; I doubt whether that juror is capable of providing either side with a fair evaluation of what is going on in the case.
And so that is the reason that I struck him."
Cook appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed and held that the removal of juror number six was both improper and prejudicial. Cook v. State, 100 Md.App. 616, 628-29, 642 A.2d 290, 296 (1994). The intermediate ...
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