State v. Cook
| Decision Date | 30 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 91054.,ED 91054. |
| Citation | 273 S.W.3d 562 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jerry D. COOK, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Phil Dormeyer, The Statler Law Firm, L.C., Cape Girardeau, MO, for Appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Mary H. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
Jerry Cook (Defendant) appeals the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County, following a jury trial convicting him of one count of driving while intoxicated, in violation of Section 577.010, RSMo 2000,1 and one count of assault of a law enforcement officer in the third degree, in violation of Section 565.083. Defendant was sentenced as a persistent offender to four years of incarceration for driving while intoxicated, and 30 days of incarceration for assault of an officer. Defendant appeals the trial court's decision to overrule his Motion to Suppress Evidence (Motion to Suppress) and admit evidence, which he asserts resulted from an unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Although Defendant's arrest was unlawful and violated the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, we find the evidence at issue was not the fruit of Defendant's illegal arrest and thus, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress or in admitting the evidence. We affirm.
At approximately 12:40 a.m. on March 17, 2007, Angela Smith (Smith) heard a vehicle accident outside her home on East Cape Rock Drive in Cape Girardeau. Upon proceeding outside, Smith observed a blue Mustang in front of a church near her home. Smith witnessed a man, whom she identified at trial to be Defendant, attempt to move the car, and then exit the car and walk east on East Cape Rock Drive. After checking the car to make sure no one was inside, Smith wrote down the license plate number and called the police.
At approximately 12:47 a.m., Officer James Ritter (Officer Ritter) with the Cape Girardeau Police Department received a call regarding a motor vehicle accident on East Cape Rock Drive. When Officer Ritter arrived, he observed the unoccupied blue Mustang in the ditch approximately two feet off the road. After a records search of the license plate, Officer Ritter determined the vehicle belonged to Krisinda Cook, who lived a block away from the accident location. Krisinda Cook is Defendant's wife.
Officer Ritter proceeded to the Cook residence. He was joined by Officer Jeff Nichols (Officer Nichols), who worked DWI enforcement with the Cape Girardeau Police Department. Both officers arrived at the Cook home less than ten minutes after the accident was reported. After the officers knocked, Defendant answered the door. While standing on the front porch, Officer Ritter asked Defendant if he had been in an accident. Defendant admitted he was involved in an accident approximately two hours prior, but did not call the police, only a tow truck. The officers discerned an odor of alcohol on Defendant's breath, and further observed that Defendant's speech was slurred, his eyes were bloodshot and watery, and his face was flushed. These observations caused the officers to believe Defendant was intoxicated. Officer Ritter then asked Defendant for his identification. Defendant requested permission from the officer to obtain his identification from inside the house and Defendant walked back into his home. The officers followed Defendant into the house through the open door.
As the officers spoke with Defendant on the front porch, Defendant's wife was inside the home. She told the officers that Defendant was drunk and had been threatening the family, and that she wanted Defendant taken to jail. Officer Ritter testified that he entered Defendant's home because he feared Defendant would flee. However, Officer Ritter further testified that he had no intention of arresting Defendant at the time he entered his home. It is unclear from the evidence whether Officer Ritter felt Defendant's wife's statements granted him permission to enter the home. At trial, Officer Ritter first testified that the officers did not have consent to enter the house, though later he testified that he believed Defendant's wife's words gave them permission to enter. Contrary to Officer Ritter's testimony, Officer Nichols testified that they entered the house due to several factors, including statements made by Defendant's wife, the fact that Defendant had admitted his involvement in the accident, and because Defendant was intoxicated. However, Officer Nichols also testified that, at the time he entered Defendant's home with Officer Ritter, he had no intention of arresting Defendant. Officer Nichols further testified that he did not believe Defendant was fleeing when he entered his home, and that the officers had sight of Defendant the entire time he was inside the house.
Upon the officers' entry into Defendant's home, Defendant became upset and asked them to leave. At that point the officers informed Defendant he was under arrest for leaving the scene of an accident and attempted to place Defendant under arrest. Defendant resisted the officers' attempt to arrest him, punching Officer Nichols in the chest and eventually necessitating the officers' use of a taser to subdue him. The officers were able to eventually handcuff and arrest Defendant. However, as Officer Nichols was putting Defendant into the patrol car, Defendant kicked the officer in the mouth.
Officer Nichols took Defendant to the police station and advised him of Missouri's implied consent law. When Defendant refused a breath test, Officer Nichols applied for a search warrant to obtain a sample of Defendant's blood to determine his blood alcohol content. After the search warrant was granted, Defendant was taken to St. Francis Medical Center where a laboratory assistant took a sample of Defendant's blood. Officer Nichols returned to the police station with the blood sample, which was placed into evidence and taken to the crime laboratory. Officer Nichols wrote Defendant a citation for driving while intoxicated and leaving the scene of an accident. An analysis by the Missouri State Highway Patrol Crime Laboratory determined Defendant's blood sample had a blood alcohol content of 0.186% by weight, more than twice the legal limit.
The State of Missouri (State) charged Defendant by Amended Information with four counts surrounding the events of March 17, 2007, including charges for driving while intoxicated, in violation of Section 577.010, and third-degree assault of a law enforcement officer, in violation of Section 565.083. Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress, arguing the evidence obtained against him resulted from an illegal arrest and should be suppressed. The trial court heard and denied Defendant's motion at a suppression hearing on August 14, 2007. Defendant argued his Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Suppress to the trial court prior to the start of trial on January 22, 2008, though the trial court again denied his motion.
At Defendant's trial on January 23, 2008, the State presented evidence from Smith, Officers Ritter and Nichols, the laboratory assistant at St. Francis Medical Center who took Defendant's blood sample on the morning of the arrest, and the criminalist with the toxicology section of the Highway Patrol Crime Laboratory who analyzed the blood sample for alcohol content. The State also presented exhibits including a photograph of Officer Nichols's cut lip, Defendant's blood sample, and the toxicology report prepared by the Highway Patrol Crime Laboratory.
The jury returned guilty verdicts on the charges of driving while intoxicated and assault of a law enforcement officer, and the trial court entered a judgment accordingly. The trial court denied Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, which alleged the court failed to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content. Defendant was sentenced as a persistent offender to four years of incarceration for driving while intoxicated and 30 days of incarceration for assault of a law enforcement officer. This appeal follows.
Defendant asserts one point on appeal. Defendant alleges the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress and admitting evidence from his unlawful arrest, including his post-arrest statements and actions, the officers' testimony regarding events that occurred during and after his arrest, the photograph of Officer Nichols's cut lip, the search warrant for his blood sample, the blood sample, the toxicology report, and the testimony of the laboratory assistant and toxicology criminalist. Defendant argues that this evidence was obtained as a result of a warrantless arrest in his home in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful searches and seizures, and must therefore be excluded from evidence.
In reviewing a defendant's motion to suppress, the State v. Berry, 54 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Mo.App. E.D. 2001); Section 542.296. On appeal, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will be reversed only if it is "clearly erroneous." State v. Sund, 215 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Mo. banc 2007). A trial court's ruling is deemed "clearly erroneous" if we are left with a definite and firm belief a mistake was made. State v. Cromer, 186 S.W.3d 333, 341 (Mo.App. W.D.2006). We will not reverse the trial court's decision if, in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the ruling is plausible, even if we are convinced we would have weighed the evidence differently. State v. Heyer, 962 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Mo.App. E.D.1998). While we give deference to the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations and consider all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light...
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