State v. Copeland, No. 2007 KA 2551 (La. App. 12/23/2008)
| Decision Date | 23 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2007 KA 2551,2007 KA 2551 |
| Parties | STATE OF LOUISIANA v. WALTER J. COPELAND, JR. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
WALTER P. REED, District Attorney, KATHRYN LANDRY, Special Appeals Counsel, Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana.
FRANK SLOAN, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, Walter J. Copeland, Jr.
Before: KUHN, GUIDRY, and GAIDRY, JJ.
The defendant, Walter J. Copeland, Jr., and his codefendant, Michael Wayne Richardson, were charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant pleaded not guilty.1 At the conclusion of a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the responsive offense of manslaughter, a violation of La. R.S. 14:31. The trial court sentenced defendant to imprisonment at hard labor for thirty-five years.
Defendant now appeals, urging the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the confession.
2. The trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the law of accessories after the fact.
3. The sentence imposed was excessive.
Finding no merit in the assigned errors, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
On March 11, 2005, the victim, Toney Dewayne Sylve, was shot and killed inside his residence in Slidell, Louisiana. The victim's girlfriend, Kelly Callender, was present when the shooting occurred. She testified that two masked men wearing gloves and dark clothing entered the residence, held her and the victim at gunpoint, and demanded money. The victim was shot in the chest during the robbery. Michael Richardson and defendant were subsequently convicted as the perpetrators of the homicide.
The record in this case reflects that defendant filed a motion to suppress his statement to the police in connection with the investigation of the victim's murder. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Defendant filed a supervisory writ application with this court seeking review of the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. We reviewed defendant's claim and denied the writ application in an unpublished decision. State v. Copeland, 06-1747 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/2/06). Defendant then filed a supervisory writ application with the Supreme Court, which also was denied. State v. Copeland, 06-2640 (La, 1/19/07), 948 So.2d 156.
By this assignment of error, defendant again seeks review of the trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress. Although the pretrial determination does not absolutely preclude a different decision on appeal, judicial efficiency demands that this court accord great deference to pretrial decisions unless it is apparent, in light of a subsequent trial record, that the determination was patently erroneous and produced an unjust result. See State v. Johnson, 438 So.2d 1091, 1105 (La. 1983). See also State v. Humphrey, 412 So.2d 507, 523 (La. 1981) (on rehearing).
Upon review, we find that the record in this case fully supports our previous decision on the issue presented in the writ application and is devoid of any additional circumstances and evidence that would lead us to change the conclusion we reached therein.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress as he was not properly advised of his rights, because he was not informed of why he was being detained and questioned prior to his interrogation. Defendant argues that under La. C.Cr.P. art. 218.1, he should have been fully advised of the reason for his detention. Absent evidence that he was advised of the reason for his detention, defendant argues, the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying the motion to suppress.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective Dale Galloway of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Office testified that he advised defendant of his Miranda rights, defendant appeared to understand his rights, and he agreed to waive his rights prior to talking with Galloway. Galloway stated that defendant was not made any promises or threatened with anything in exchange for waiving his rights and talking to the police.
Galloway did not arrest or stop defendant; he was already in custody at the time Galloway spoke to him. Galloway did not know how long defendant had been in custody prior to the questioning, but indicated that he did not think defendant had been in custody for very long. Galloway was unsure of the time he personally became involved in the investigation. According to Galloway, he advised defendant of his rights at 2:45 a.m. on March 13, 2005, at the Slidell Law Enforcement Complex. Defendant was also given a rights-waiver form to sign. Galloway conceded that the rights waiver form did not advise defendant why he was being detained and questioned. Galloway admitted that when he advised defendant of his rights, he did not advise defendant of the reason why he was being detained and questioned. He was not present when defendant was initially stopped, so he was unaware of whether defendant was advised of his rights at that time.
Galloway questioned defendant and took his statement only after defendant was advised of his Miranda rights. According to Galloway, the statement was not recorded, as defendant declined to give a recorded statement, but he took notes and then compiled them in a narrative form in his report, which was later given to the case detective.2 Galloway was unaware of any other statements given by defendant.
At the conclusion of the hearing, defense counsel argued that under La. C.Cr.P. art. 218.1, a person who has been detained for questioning shall be advised of the reasons for which he is being detained and advised of his rights. Defense counsel argued that based on the testimony at the hearing, defendant was not advised prior to questioning as to why he was being detained. Defense counsel argued that the state rested and failed to present any other evidence regarding that issue. Defense counsel admitted that defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights, but emphasized that Galloway did not advise defendant of the reason why he was being questioned. Additionally, counsel noted that the reason for the questioning was not stated on the advice of rights form. Defense counsel argued that because of Galloway's failure to advise defendant why he was being detained and questioned, defendant's statement should be suppressed.
The prosecutor countered that suppression of the statement is not a remedy when a person is not informed why they are being detained and questioned. The prosecutor asserted that prior to questioning, defendant was advised of his rights, acknowledged his rights, signed a waiver of those rights, and agreed to speak with Galloway. The prosecutor also noted that defendant later was arrested and charged with armed robbery and murder. The prosecutor claimed that there was nothing to support defendant's contentions that the statement should be suppressed and set forth that there was no remedy for this situation. The court subsequently denied the motion to suppress.
The Louisiana Constitution expressly requires authorities to advise a person "fully of the reason for his arrest or detention" and of his constitutional rights if the person "has been arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or commission of any offense[.]" La. Const, art. I, § 13. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 218.1 also provides:
When any person has been arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or commission of any offense, he shall be advised fully of the reason for his arrest or detention, his right to remain silent, his right against self incrimination, his right to the assistance of counsel and, if indigent, his right to court appointed counsel.
At the motion to suppress hearing, Galloway testified that he was not present when defendant was initially detained. Defendant was already in custody when Galloway spoke to him. The prosecutor stated that defendant was later arrested and charged. Thus, it is clear that defendant was not advised of the reason for his detention by Galloway. Although defendant was advised of his rights and signed a rights waiver form, there was no affirmative evidence presented at the hearing that defendant was fully advised as to why he was being detained and questioned prior to speaking with Galloway.
It is well settled that for a confession or inculpatory statement to be admissible into evidence, the state must affirmatively show that it was freely and voluntarily given without influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises. La. R.S. 15:451. The state must specifically rebut a defendant's specific allegations of police misconduct in eliciting a confession. State v. Thomas, 461 So.2d 1253, 1256 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), writ denied, 464 So.2d 1375 (La. 1985). Additionally, the state must show that an accused who makes a statement or confession during custodial interrogation was first advised of his Miranda rights. State v. King, 563 So.2d 449, 453 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 567 So.2d 610 (La. 1990).
The admissibility of a confession is, in the first instance, a question for the trial judge; his conclusions on the credibility and weight of the testimony relating to the voluntary nature of the statement will not be overturned unless they are not supported by the evidence. State v. Sanford, 569 So.2d 147, 150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 623 So.2d 1299 (La. 1993). See also State v. Patterson, 572 So.2d 1144, 1150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 577 So.2d 11 (La. 1991). Whether or not a showing of voluntariness has been made is analyzed on a case-by-case basis with...
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