State v. Coppes

• Decision Date: 26 July 1956
• Docket Number: No. 48966,48966
• Citation: 78 N.W.2d 10,247 Iowa 1057
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Cecil Fred COPPES, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 10

78 N.W.2d 10

247 Iowa 1057

STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Cecil Fred COPPES, Appellee.

No. 48966.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 26, 1956.

Dayton Countryman, Atty. Gen., Raphael R. R. Dvorak, Asst. Atty. Gen., and William S. Cahill, County Atty., Burlington, for appellant.

Pryor, Hale, Plock, Riley & Jones, Burlington, for appellee.

BLISS, Justice.

Defendant's demurrer was on the following grounds:

'1. That the statute (Section 321.285, Iowa Code of 1954 [I.C.A.]) upon which the information is based so far as it undertakes to create a criminal offense is void in that the statute does not expressly forbid or require any act except by implication.

'2. If any act is required or forbidden thereby then the statute is not sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct will render them liable to its penalties and form the basis for a criminal action.

'3. That the information does not charge the said defendant with any crime.'

Section 321.285 of the 1954 Code of Iowa, I.C.A., provides: 'Speed restrictions. Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of the highway and of any other conditions then existing, and no person shall drive any vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead, such driver having a right to assume, however, that all persons using said highway will observe the law. The following shall be the lawful speed except as hereinbefore or hereinafter modified, and any speed in excess thereof shall be unlawful: 1. Twenty miles per hour in any business district. 2. Twenty-five miles per hour in any residence or school district. 3. Forty miles per hour for any motor vehicle drawing another vehicle. 4. Forty-five miles per hour in any suburban district. * * *'

Section 321.291 of the 1954 Iowa Code, I.C.A., provides that in every charge of violation of sections 321.285 to 321.287, inclusive, the information, also the notice to appear, shall specify the alleged speed driven by the defendant, and also the speed limit applicable in the district or at the location of the violation.

Section 321.482 of said Code, under the heading, 'Criminal Responsibility' provides: 'Penalties for misdemeanor. It is a misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden or to fail to perform any act required by the provisions of this chapter unless any such violation is by this chapter or other law of this state declared to be a felony. * * *' The remainder of the section provides the penalty for conviction of a misdemeanor under this chapter shall be punishment by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than thirty days.

All of the Code sections above noted are found in Chapter 321 of the 1954 Iowa Code, I.C.A., entitled 'Motor Vehicles And Law Of Road', containing 512 sections. The provisions in the chapter were enacted by the Forty-Seventh General Assembly in Chapter 134 of its Acts, entitled 'Motor Vehicle Law', approved April 19, 1937. It repealed Chapter 251 of the 1935 Code of Iowa, entitled 'Motor Vehicles And the Law Of Road', and all amendments thereto. Section 321.285 of the 1954 Code, I.C.A., was section 316 of said chapter 134 of the laws of the Forty-Seventh General Assembly.

The trial court, in its ruling sustaining the demurrer, ably discusses the matters involved. The contentions of defendant in support of the demurrer, as noted in the court's ruling, in substance, were: 1. The Legislature, in the exercise of its power to define or declare crimes, must inform those subject thereto with reasonable precision what it intends to prohibit, so that the accused may have a certain understandable rule of conduct that he may know what acts he shall avoid. He also urged that statutes creating criminal offenses must be strictly construed in favor of the one charged. In support of his position he cited State v. Brighi, 232 Iowa 1087, 7 N.W.2d 9; Am.Jur. (Criminal Law) 773, sec. 19. 2. Section 321.285 does not expressly forbid nor require any act except by implication. Cited in support are Thornbury v. Maley, 242 Iowa 70, 45 N.W.2d 576; Ellis v. Robb, 242 Iowa 875, 47 N.W.2d 246; State v. Brighi, supra. 3. Section 321.285 is not sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct will render them liable to its penalties.

I. The propositions urged by defendant are such that they may be considered together.

The charge against defendant was not by an indictment, nor a county attorney's information, but was designated simply an 'information'. It was subscribed and sworn to before the trial court, by an individual, apparently as a private prosecutor.

Section 773.3 of Iowa Code 1954, I.C.A., provides that a criminal indictment is sufficient if it charges the accused in one or more of the following ways: 1. By using the name given to the offense by statute. 2. By stating so much of the definition of the offense, either in terms of the common law or of the statute, or in terms of substantially the same meaning, 'as is sufficient to give the court and the accused notice of what offense is intended to be charged.' 3. The indictment may refer to the statutory provision creating the crime charged, and regard may be had to such reference in determining the validity or the sufficiency of the charge.

Code section 773.4 provides that no indictment, charging an offense as provided in section 773.3, supra, shall be held to be insufficient on the ground that it fails to inform the defendant of the particulars of the offense.

While the accusation against defendant was by an information and not by an indictment, the rules as to the sufficiency of the charage are in accord with those applying to the statutory indictment.

II. The general rule respecting the sufficiency of the statement of statutory crimes--and there are no other in Iowa--is well expressed in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-392, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, towit: 'That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. International Harvester Co. [of America] v. [Commonwealth of] Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221, 34 S.Ct. 853, 58 L.Ed. 1284 [1287]'.

There is no controversy over the soundness of this legal principle. As said in 14 Am.Jur. (Criminal Law) 773-774, sec. 19: 'The legislature, in the exercise of its power to declare what shall constitute a crime or punishable offense, must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit, so that he may have an understandable rule of conduct, and to know what acts it is his duty to avoid. * * * It is axiomatic that statutes creating and defining crimes cannot be extended by intendment. Purely statutory offenses cannot be established by implication. There can be no constructive offenses. Before a man can be punished, his case must be plainly and unmistakably within a statute.'

This language was quoted with approval in State v. Brighi, 232 Iowa 1087, 1090, 7 N.W.2d 9, supra.

In 25 R.C.L. 810, sec. 62, referring to this fundamental rule governing the validity of a statute it is stated that if it is couched in language 'so vague, indefinite and uncertain that courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intends, or so incomplete or so conflicting or inconsistent in its provisions that it cannot be executed it will be declared to be inoperative and void.'

We mention but a few of the numerous supporting authorities: United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App.D.C. 592, 19 Ann.Cas. 68; 26 Am. & English Encyclopedia of Law, 2d Ed. 656; Diemer v. Weiss, 343 Mo. 626, 122 S.W.2d 922, 923; Tozer v. United States, C.C., 52 F. 917, 919, stating: 'But, in order to constitute a crime, the act must be one which the party is able to know in advance whether it is criminal or not. The criminality of an act cannot depend upon whether a jury may think it reasonable or unreasonable. There must be some definiteness and certainty.' In State v. Anthony, 179 Or. 282, 169 P.2d 587, 590, the court said: "A valid criminal law must definitely show with reasonable certainty what acts or omissions the lawmaking body intended to prohibit and punish. 1 Cyclopedia of Criminal Law, Brill, § 62. But reasonable definiteness in view of the conditions is all that is required." Citing in addition to Oregon Cases, Ex parte Lockett, 179 Cal. 581, 178 P. 134; Guetling v. State, 198 Ind. 718, 153 N.E. 765.

III. While the courts are in agreement as to the principle of law stated in the division just preceding, the great difficulty has been in its application, because of the diversity of statutes submitted for construction and interpretation, and the necessity of recognizing other equally important rules of law. There are, therefore, a host of court decisions involving the determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of statutory definitions or designations of criminal offenses, and they are far from harmonious. These decisions on the controversial matter are of little help in the instant case because of the differences in the statutes and the pertinent facts, but we mention a few of them as illustrative of the problem involved. Among the cases in which the challenges against the statute have been upheld are the following. An often cited case is ...