State v. Corbus

• Citation: 249 P.3d 398,150 Idaho 599
• Decision Date: 22 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 36846.,36846.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Raymond Gene CORBUS, Defendant–Appellant.

150 Idaho 599

249 P.3d 398

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Raymond Gene CORBUS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 36846.

Supreme Court of Idaho. Boise, February 2011 Term.

March 22, 2011.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Eric D. Frederickson argued.

Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M. Lorello argued.

J. JONES, Justice.

Raymond Gene Corbus appeals the district court's order of restitution. We affirm.

I.Factual and Procedural Background

On the night of May 7, 2006, police officers observed Corbus driving his vehicle at approximately 60 mph in a 35 mph zone. After Corbus drove past the officers, they entered their police vehicles and activated the overhead emergency lights. Corbus then accelerated and turned off the headlights on his vehicle. A chase ensued during which Corbus reached speeds in excess of 100 mph. When Corbus slowed to approximately 50 mph to make a turn, the passenger in his front seat jumped out of the vehicle and was knocked unconscious. Corbus continued driving another 300 yards before hitting a rock and coming to a stop. The passenger was transported to the hospital where he received medical treatment for the injuries he sustained after jumping from the vehicle.

Thereafter, Corbus was charged with felony eluding a peace officer, misdemeanor reckless driving, and misdemeanor driving without privileges. Corbus pleaded guilty to reckless driving at his arraignment and later entered a conditional plea of guilty¹ to eluding a peace officer pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. Among other things, the plea agreement provided that the State would dismiss the driving without privileges charge and would recommend restitution for the injuries that Corbus' passenger sustained. As part of Corbus' sentence, the district court ordered restitution in an amount to be determined at a restitution hearing. During the restitution proceedings, Corbus argued that he was not liable for restitution because his passenger's injuries were not a result of his criminal conduct but, rather, were a result of the passenger's independent choice to flee from the police to avoid being apprehended for violating his probation by consuming alcohol that evening. No evidence was submitted during the restitution proceedings regarding the passenger's motive for jumping from the vehicle. The district court ultimately ordered restitution in the amount of $18,203.67, finding a sufficient causal connection between Corbus' conduct and his passenger's injuries. The district court found that,

[i]n the court's view, there is a sufficient causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant was convicted and the injuries [the victim] sustained. [The victim] was afraid because he was a passenger in the defendant's vehicle which he was driving at a high rate of speed with his headlights off on a road where other vehicles were located. It was not unreasonable for [the victim] to decide that he might be better off "bailing out" of the vehicle rather than risk more serious injuries in the event that the defendant wrecked the vehicle. There is no reason to believe that [the victim] would have left the defendant's vehicle, while it was moving, had the defendant not been engaged in criminal actions that constituted Felony Eluding and Reckless Driving.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order of restitution, holding that,

[a]lthough the prosecutor certainly could have done a better job of proving the passenger's status as a "victim" by presenting an affidavit from that individual explaining why he jumped from the vehicle, the facts before the district court were sufficient to support an inference that the passenger jumped from the car out of fear for his safety due to Corbus' criminal conduct of eluding.

State v. Corbus, No. 502, slip op., p. 3 (Ct.App. June 18, 2009).

Corbus then filed a petition for review with this Court. The petition for review was granted, but was stayed pending this Court's decision in State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 223 P.3d 750 (2009).² The Court issued its decision in Lampien on December 23, 2009, and this appeal was subsequently resumed.

II.Issue on Appeal

I. Whether the district court's conclusion that there is a causal connection between Corbus' criminal conduct and his passenger's injuries is supported by substantial evidence.

III.Discussion

A. Standard of Review

When considering a case on review from the Court of Appeals, this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but reviews the district court's decision directly. Lampien, 148 Idaho at 371, 223 P.3d at 754. The decision regarding whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the district court's discretion and is guided by consideration of the factors set forth in Idaho Code section 19–5304(7). State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct.App.2002). The issue of causation in restitution cases is a question of fact to be decided by the trial court. See Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875, 204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009). The district court's factual findings with regard to restitution will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822, 242 P.3d 189, 192 (Ct.App.2010).

B. Causation

Idaho's restitution statute permits a court to order restitution for "any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim." I.C. § 19–5304(2). The statute defines victim as "a person or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct. " I.C. § 19–5304(1)(e)(i) (emphasis added). The term economic loss includes "the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal conduct. " I.C. § 19–5304(1)(a) (emphasis added). Therefore, in order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries suffered by the victim.

As articulated by this Court in Lampien, causation consists of actual cause and true proximate cause. Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374, 223 P.3d at 757. "Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event produced a particular consequence." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 P.3d at 515). The "but for" test is used in circumstances where there is only one actual cause or where two or more possible causes were not acting concurrently. Id. On the other hand, true proximate cause deals with "whether it was reasonably foreseeable that such harm would flow from the negligent conduct." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 P.3d at 515). In analyzing proximate cause, this Court must determine whether the injury and manner of occurrence are so highly unusual "that a reasonable person, making an inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably expected the injury to occur." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 P.3d at 515).

An intervening, superseding cause is "an independent act or force that breaks the causal chain between the defendant's culpable act and the victim's injury." Id. In general, an intervening, superseding cause replaces the defendant's act as the proximate cause of the victim's injury. Id. at 374–75, 223 P.3d at 757–58. However, to relieve a defendant of criminal liability, an intervening cause must be an unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence. Id. at 375, 223 P.3d at 758. "The defendant remains criminally liable if either the possible consequence might reasonably have been contemplated or the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of harm of the kind that could result from his act." Id.

We find there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Corbus' conduct was both the actual and proximate cause of the passenger's injuries, and that the passenger's act of jumping from the vehicle was not an intervening, superseding cause sufficient to relieve Corbus of liability for the passenger's injuries.

1. Actual Cause

In this case, the issue of actual cause involves the factual question of whether the passenger's injuries would not have occurred but for Corbus' criminal conduct. On appeal, Corbus offers several arguments related to the passenger's motive for jumping out of the vehicle. However, the passenger's motive for jumping out of the vehicle is irrelevant when determining actual cause. Regardless of whether the passenger jumped from the vehicle to avoid being apprehended by the police, or because he feared for his personal safety, he would not have needed to do so if it had not been for Corbus' acts of driving recklessly and eluding police officers and then failing to stop in response to their overhead emergency lights. In other words, Corbus' argument fails because even if the passenger jumped from the vehicle to avoid being apprehended for a probation violation, the passenger would have never come into contact with law enforcement that night if it were not for Corbus' act of speeding and then eluding and failing to stop. Thus, there is substantial evidence to support the district court's conclusion that but for Corbus' criminal conduct, his passenger would not have been injured.³

2. Proximate Cause

In this case, the issue of proximate cause involves the factual question of whether the passenger's act of jumping from the vehicle and sustaining injuries was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Corbus' criminal conduct. The district court found that "[i]t was not unreasonable for [the victim] to decide that he might be better off "bailing out" of the vehicle rather than risk more serious injuries in the event that the defendant wrecked the vehicle." While the district court did not specifically mention foreseeability, the district court's finding that the passenger acted reasonably by jumping from the...