State v. Coria
| Decision Date | 12 November 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 58522-9,58522-9 |
| Citation | 839 P.2d 890,120 Wn.2d 156 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Otoniel Leyve CORIA, Ricardo Castillo Flores, Pablino Alfaro Hernandez, Eldon James Muns, Eric William Price, Juan H. Suarez, Respondents. |
Jeffrey C. Sullivan, Yakima County Prosecutor, Steven R. Keller, Kenneth L. Ramm, Deputy County Prosecutors, Yakima, for petitioner.
Contreras-Trejo & Trejo, Myrna Contreras-Trejo, Yakima, for respondents Coria and Hernandez.
Paul J. Wasson, Spokane, for respondents Flores and Muns (appointed counsel for appeal).
Michael W. Lynch, Yakima, for respondent Price.
Prediletto, Halpin, Scharnikow, Bothwell & Smart, P.S., Thomas Bothwell, Yakima, for respondent Suarez.
Katherine S. Knox, Cheney, amicus curiae for respondents on behalf of Washington Defender Ass'n.
The defendants in this consolidated appeal received enhanced sentences for narcotics trafficking. The sentences were imposed pursuant to RCW 69.50.435 and RCW 9.94A.310(5), which provide for sentence enhancement when a drug-related offense is committed within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop. The Court of Appeals reversed the sentence enhancements on the grounds that the statutes, as applied to school bus route stops, are unconstitutional. We reverse the Court of Appeals.
Otoniel Coria, Ricardo Flores, Pablino Hernandez, Eldon Muns, Eric Price, and Juan Suarez were separately arrested at various locations in Yakima and charged with either delivery of cocaine or possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, or both. At the trial of each defendant, the State established that the crime occurred within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop. Three different school bus route stops in Yakima are involved, located at the intersections of 6th and D, 2nd and Pine, and 8th and Central streets. There are no markings or signs indicating there are school bus route stops at these locations. According to the director of transportation for the Yakima School District and the Central Washington Co-op, Gary Baffaro, the locations of the stops are indicated on a master map he prepares for submission to the office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI). Mr. Baffaro explained that he prepares the master map by taking a regular map of the city of Yakima and placing a clear piece of paper over it. Then he and the bus drivers draw the school bus routes and stops on the paper. This "tracing", as it is called, with the map of Yakima, is sent to the state transportation director's office for review, and from there to SPI, which uses the tracing and map to calculate reimbursement to the school district for transportation expenses. After SPI has calculated the reimbursement, the map and tracing are returned to Mr. Baffaro's office.
In addition to stops where several students are picked up, the school buses also make a number of "door-to-door" stops for the benefit of handicapped students or other students who need to be picked up at their homes. These stops may be added to the bus route after the master map has been submitted to SPI. Therefore, because the master map is not revised after it is submitted to SPI, the added door-to-door stops are not indicated on it. Mr. Baffaro and his staff keep track of the door-to-door stops by using a log book. Mr. Baffaro testified that anyone can learn the locations of any school bus route stop or of all the stops by calling his office.
A list of school bus route stop locations is published in the Yakima Herald-Republic newspaper immediately prior to the opening of school in the fall. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington Defender Association, Appendix 3 (copy of published list of school bus route stops, published in Yakima Herald-Republic Sept. 3, 1989). This list contains the locations of all those stops and routes known to exist at the time of its publication. Since door-to-door stops may be added later, this published list, like the master list submitted to SPI, may be incomplete.
The locations of the school bus route stops at 6th and D, 2nd and Pine, and 8th and Central Streets were among those published in the newspaper prior to the beginning of school in the fall of 1989. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington Defender Association, Appendix 3. The locations were also among those indicated on the map the school district transportation director's office submitted to SPI.
Each defendant in the present case was separately convicted of delivery of cocaine or possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver, or both. Because the crimes were committed within 1,000 feet of school bus route stops, the defendants' sentences were enhanced pursuant to RCW 9.94A.310(5) and RCW 69.50.435. Each defendant appealed, and the appeals were consolidated. The Court of Appeals reversed the defendants' sentences on the grounds that the statutory provision requiring sentence enhancement for committing a drug-related crime within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop is unconstitutionally vague and deprives defendants of the equal protection of the laws. State v. Coria, 62 Wash.App. 44, 813 P.2d 584 (1991). This court granted the State's petition for review.
RCW 69.50.401(a) provides a general prohibition against drug dealing. It provides that "[e]xcept as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." The statute primarily at issue in this case is RCW 69.50.435, which provides for an enhancement of the penalty imposed for violating RCW 69.50.401(a), if that violation occurred within 1,000 feet of certain places such as schools or school bus route stops. Specifically, RCW 69.50.435(a) 1 states:
Any person who violates RCW 69.50.401(a) by manufacturing, selling, delivering, or possessing with the intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver a controlled substance listed under that subsection to a person in a school or on a school bus or within one thousand feet of a school bus route stop designated by the school district or within one thousand feet of the perimeter of the school grounds is punishable by a fine of up to twice the fine otherwise authorized by this chapter ... or by imprisonment of up to twice the imprisonment otherwise authorized by this chapter ... or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(These places where drug-related activity gives rise to an enhanced penalty upon conviction will henceforth be referred to as "drug free zones".) RCW 69.50.435 also provides that it is no defense to a prosecution for a violation of this section that the defendant was unaware the prohibited activity occurred inside a drug free zone, or that no children were present. RCW 69.50.435(b), (c). The statute also defines "[s]chool bus route stop" as "a school bus stop as designated on maps submitted by school districts to the office of the superintendent of public instruction". RCW 69.50.435(f)(3).
Whereas RCW 69.50.435 authorizes in general terms an enhancement of the penalty for drug dealing in a drug free zone, RCW 9.94A.310(5) renders that enhancement more specific. Under RCW 9.94A.310(5), 24 months must be added to the presumptive sentence for any violation of RCW 69.50.435.
The defendants' first contention is that RCW 69.50.435 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to school bus route stops. We disagree.
The first step in any vagueness challenge "is to determine if the statute in question is to be examined as applied to the particular case or to be reviewed on its face." Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d 171, 181-82, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). If the statute does not involve First Amendment rights, then the vagueness challenge is to be evaluated by examining the statute as applied under the particular facts of the case. Douglass, at 182, 795 P.2d 693. Here, the challenged statute, RCW 69.50.435, does not implicate any First Amendment rights. Therefore, the defendants' vagueness challenge must be evaluated in light of how the statute has been applied in their individual cases.
The fundamental principle underlying the vagueness doctrine is that the Fourteenth Amendment requires citizens be afforded fair warning of proscribed conduct. Douglass, at 178, 795 P.2d 693. A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the person challenging a statute on vagueness grounds has the heavy burden of proving vagueness beyond a reasonable doubt. Douglass, at 178, 795 P.2d 693. The challenger must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that either (1) the statute does not define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed, or (2) the statute does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement. Douglass, at 178, 795 P.2d 693.
The requirement of sufficient definiteness "protects individuals from being held criminally accountable for conduct which a person of ordinary intelligence could not reasonably understand to be prohibited." Douglass, at 178, 795 P.2d 693. Accordingly, a statute is unconstitutional if it " 'forbids conduct in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' " Douglass, at 179, 795 P.2d 693 (quoting Burien Bark Supply v. King Cy., 106 Wash.2d 868, 871, 725 P.2d 994 (1986)). This test does not demand "impossible standards of specificity or absolute agreement", and permits some amount of imprecision in the language of a statute. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 179, 795 P.2d 693.
The second requirement under the vagueness doctrine, the requirement of ascertainable standards, is intended to protect against "arbitrary, erratic, and discriminatory enforcement." Douglass, at 180, 795 P.2d 693. A statute should be held to supply adequate standards unless it "proscribes conduct by resort to 'inherently subjective terms' " or by inviting an inordinate amount of police discretion. Doug...
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