State v. Cormier
| Citation | 2007 ME 112,928 A.2d 753 |
| Decision Date | 14 August 2007 |
| Docket Number | Docket: Cum-05-354. |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Richard CORMIER. |
| Court | Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US) |
Stephanie Anderson, District Attorney, Julia A. Sheridan, Asst. Dist. Attorney, Portland, for State.
Glen L. Porter, Esq., Eaton Peabody, Bangor, for defendant.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, CALKINS,
[¶ 1] When a motor vehicle collision is so severe that people are killed or may die, Maine law requires law enforcement officials to test the blood of all drivers for intoxicants. 29-A M.R.S. § 2522(1), (2) (2006). This appeal requires us to determine whether the statute's procedures, which in some instances allow the admission of those blood test results in a criminal trial of the driver, 29-A M.R.S. § 2522(3) (2006), violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
[¶ 2] Specifically, the State appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Fritzsche, J.) granting Richard Cormier's motion to suppress the results of a blood test administered pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2522 (2006) on the ground that Cormier's blood was drawn in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because we agree with the State that the operation of the mandatory testing statute does not violate the Fourth Amendment, we vacate the court's judgment of suppression and remand the matter for further proceedings to determine whether the results of the blood test are admissible in this matter pursuant to the statute.
[¶ 3] The facts of this case relevant to the dispute before us are not disputed on appeal. On the afternoon of May 11, 2003, Cormier was driving a car that was involved in a head-on motor vehicle collision. Two occupants of the other vehicle died as a result of that collision. Cormier was transported to the hospital by ambulance. The police and paramedics did not, at the scene of the accident, smell alcohol on Cormier or observe anything that would indicate that he was under the influence of alcohol.
[¶ 4] Acting in accordance with 29-A M.R.S. § 2522(1),1 a State Police detective sought to obtain a blood sample from Cormier for the purpose of testing for the presence of alcohol or drugs. A phlebotomist for the State was called to the hospital to draw Cormier's blood. Without obtaining Cormier's consent,2 the detective informed Cormier that he was there to obtain a blood sample, and the phlebotomist drew Cormier's blood. During the blood draw, Cormier told the detective that he had consumed one alcoholic drink earlier in the day. The blood-alcohol test revealed that Cormier's blood-alcohol content was .08%.
[¶ 5] Cormier was indicted on two counts of manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2006); one count of aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 208(1)(B), (2) (2006); one count of aggravated OUI (Class C), 29-A M.R.S.A § 2411(6) (Supp.2003);3 and one count of reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 211, 1252(4) (1983 & Supp.2003).4 Cormier moved to suppress the results of the blood test. After an evidentiary hearing, the court granted Cormier's motion. The court found that Cormier had not consented to the blood draw and that the police had not obtained sufficient evidence before the blood test was taken to establish probable cause to believe that Cormier had operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants. The court found that the only justification for the blood test was section 2522, which mandates a test when an accident has resulted in a fatality. Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001), the court declared section 2522(3), the subsection that addresses admissibility of the test results, unconstitutional as it applied to Cormier. It concluded that the result of Cormier's blood test was inadmissible in light of the "`Fourth Amendment's general prohibition against nonconsensual, warrantless, and suspicionless searches.'" (Quoting Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86, 121 S.Ct. 1281.) The State appeals pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A (2006) and M.R.App. P. 2(a)(4) and 21.
[¶ 6] We are, accordingly, called upon to examine the constitutionality of the Maine statute that allows the admission, in certain circumstances, of blood test results against drivers involved in motor vehicle accidents resulting in, or likely to result in, a fatality. 29-A M.R.S. § 2522(3). We begin by examining the purpose and function of section 2522. We then review the application of Fourth Amendment principles to the statute.
[¶ 7] The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reports that in 2005, 225 drivers were involved in fatal vehicle accidents in Maine and that an estimated twenty-three percent of those drivers had alcohol in their blood. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: STATE ALCOHOL ESTIMATES 7 (2005). Of the estimated fifty-two drivers with alcohol in their systems, forty-five were estimated to have had blood-alcohol levels of .08% or greater. Id. Because of incomplete data, these figures were only estimates based on a statistical model. Id. at 1. As NHTSA noted, "Missing data can result for a number of reasons, the most frequent of which is that persons are not always tested for alcohol." Id.
[¶ 8] The Maine Legislature, aware of the dire consequences of drunk driving, has enacted exacting standards for drivers and law enforcement officials that are designed to reduce alcohol-related deaths on Maine roads. Recognizing the need for more complete information about the involvement of alcohol in serious and fatal accidents, the Legislature has mandated blood-alcohol testing for any driver involved in an accident in which there is probable cause to believe a death has occurred or will occur:
Mandatory submission to test. If there is probable cause to believe that death has occurred or will occur as a result of an accident, an operator of a motor vehicle involved in the motor vehicle accident shall submit to a chemical test . . . to determine blood-alcohol level or drug concentration in the same manner as for OUI.
29-A M.R.S. § 2522(1). Even if the driver is the person who died at the scene, the testing is mandated nonetheless. See id. § 2522(1), (2). The testing of drivers is thus required after a fatal accident without regard to the possibility that the driver may be prosecuted. This mandatory testing adds to the State's body of knowledge regarding the effects of driving in Maine while under the influence of alcohol or drugs and allows the Legislature to be more informed as it shapes policy.
[¶ 9] Taking into account the potential for the blood test results to be used against a driver in a criminal proceeding, however, the statute goes on to limit the admissibility of the blood test results at a criminal trial to circumstances in which evidence independent from the test would demonstrate probable cause to believe that the operator was under the influence of intoxicants:
Admissibility of test results. The result of a test is admissible at trial if the court, after reviewing all the evidence, whether gathered prior to, during or after the test, is satisfied that probable cause exists, independent of the test result, to believe that the operator was under the influence of intoxicants at the time of the accident.
[¶ 10] Thus, the statute allows for the admission of the test results only when there exists independent probable cause to believe that the driver was operating under the influence. Unique to this statute is the Legislature's authorization of law enforcement to determine whether probable cause existed at the time of the test through evidence gathered after the test had been taken.
[¶ 11] Cormier's blood test results were gathered pursuant to section 2522. There is no dispute that the test results were obtained through a search conducted without Cormier's consent, without a warrant, and without the determination of probable cause before the test was administered. On these facts, the court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional as it was applied to Cormier, and the court granted Cormier's motion to suppress. We now review the court's legal conclusions regarding Maine's mandatory blood testing statute de novo. See State v. Reynoso-Hernandez, 2003 ME 19, ¶¶ 11-12, 816 A.2d 826, 830.
[¶ 12] In reviewing the court's suppression order, we confront two questions: (1) do the provisions of section 2522 result in an unreasonable search that violates the Fourth Amendment, thereby requiring suppression of the test results; and (2) if the statute comports with the Fourth Amendment, did the motion court determine whether the State had established probable cause pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2522(3)?
[¶ 13] We have previously, if briefly, addressed the legal question presented here, holding that the predecessor to section 2522(3) permits the admission of blood test results when, before, during, or after the administration of the mandatory blood test, information comes to light that establishes probable cause to believe that the operator involved in the accident was operating while intoxicated. See State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472, 474-75 (Me.1996); State v. Bento, 600 A.2d 1094, 1096 (Me. 1991). Although we recognized in Roche that other courts had treated similar statutes more restrictively, we refused to adopt their approach. Roche, 681 A.2d at 475. We do not disturb our holdings in Bento and Roche today.
[¶ 14] The Fourth Amendment of the United State...
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