State v. Cornelius

• Decision Date: 07 January 1907
• Docket Number: 16,398
• Citation: 42 So. 754,118 La. 146
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. CORNELIUS

42 So. 754

118 La. 146

STATE v. CORNELIUS

No. 16,398

Supreme Court of Louisiana

January 7, 1907

Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; Clay Elliott, Judge.

Boots Cornelius, alias Bud, was convicted of murder, and appeals. Affirmed.

Thomas Milton Bankston, for appellant.

Walter Guion, Atty. Gen., and Robert Stephen Ellis, Dist. Atty (Lewis Guion, of counsel), for the State.

OPINION

BREAUX C.J.

The defendant, charged with the murder of San Gladis, was tried and found guilty, without capital punishment.

He was sentenced on the 3d day of November, 1906, to serve at hard labor in the penitentiary for life.

He prosecutes this appeal.

The points set forth in his defense on appeal are set forth in nine bills of exceptions.

We are informed by the record that, after some of the witnesses had been sworn and examined, the defendant, through counsel interposed the objection that the indictment charged him with having committed the homicide on the 10th day of July, 1905, while the witnesses agreed that this was not the correct date; that the date was as far back as the year 1903.

The indictment was returned into court and filed. He was placed on his trial on October 29, 1906.

Counsel followed up his objection before stated by a motion to strike out the testimony and have it entirely excluded on the ground that there was illegality in the bill of exceptions because of the error in date.

The court refused the motion and allowed the district attorney to amend the indictment so as to agree with the date given in the proces verbal of the coroner's inquest.

This is not an open question. It is evident that, time not being one of the issues in an indictment charging murder, the amendment allowed by the court on the motion of the district attorney was in time.

This court has already several times decided that the allegation of the date at which the offense was committed is not a matter of substance, if the offense is not the one which falls within the terms of the statute of limitation or prescription.

The crime of which the defendant was found guilty is specially excepted from the limitation of time for the prevention of certain criminal offenses. Rev. St. § 986.

Of the crimes thus excepted the court said:

"Date is immaterial, provided it be averred that the murder was committed prior to the date of the indictment." State v. Hardaway, 50 La.Ann. 1345, 24 So. 320.

In State v. Fields, 51 La.Ann. 1239, 26 So. 99, it was held that:

"In an indictment for murder, it is sufficient to charge in general terms that the accused committed the crime, without giving details as to the time or place it occurred."

The point is without merit. Marr's Crim. Jur. of Louisiana, p. 400, and decisions cited.

Another bill of exceptions was taken to the ruling of the court on the ground of error in permitting the district attorney to challenge the juror Harris Robertson peremptorily after he had been accepted by the state and tendered to defendant.

The juror had not been accepted by the defense at the time of the ruling of the court excluding him.

The question has been answered contradictorily to defendant's contention. We deem it sufficient to refer to the decisions. State v. Durr, 39 La.Ann. 751, 2 So. 546; State v. Rolan, 38 La.Ann. 18.

Another ground of defense is stated in the bill of exceptions just referred to. It was reserved to the court's ruling to permit defendant's counsel to propound the following question to a juror on his voir dire:

"Would you require the defendant to prove his innocence, or would you require the state to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt?"

The court stated as its reason for stopping the further examination in the direction mentioned that in answer to questions propounded the juror had proved himself entirely competent; he was intelligent and well qualified; that he offered to let counsel ask the juror whether, after hearing all the evidence, if he had any reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, he would give him the benefit of this doubt and acquit him; but that counsel had declined to avail himself of the offer. The court said that its intention was to break up a bad practice; that, if the juror had shown the least animus or want of intelligence, a full examination would have been permitted; that some of the members of the bar had carried beyond reasonable limit the right of examination on the voir dire; and that afterward they went too far in arguing before the jury, in reminding the jurors of what had been said in answer to some point brought out in the examination on the voir dire.

The right of jurors on their voir dire should be safeguarded by the court, and they should not be subjected to a rigid cross-examination, unless the court deems it proper in case of a recalcitrant juror.

The court is vested with a large discretion in directing proceedings in the trial of a case. There must be a limit to the examination on the voir dire. The court did not exceed the limit in this instance.

A question very similar was decided in State v. Hinton, 49 La.Ann. 1354, 22 So. 617; State v. Perioux, 107 La. 601, 31 So. 1016; Abbott's Trial Brief in Criminal Cases (2d Ed.) p. 217, c. 31.

The court, in ruling on this point, stated, as before mentioned, "that this is not the correct practice."

The remark was objected to by the defendant on the ground that it prejudiced his defense.

It was an utterance of the court while passing upon the objection which does not appear to have been of any importance as relates to the guilt or innocence...