State v. Cornwell

• Decision Date: 22 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-1390.,97-1390.
• Citation: 86 Ohio St.3d 560,715 NE 2d 1144
• Parties: THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CORNWELL, APPELLANT.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

86 Ohio St.3d 560

715 NE 2d 1144

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CORNWELL, APPELLANT.

No. 97-1390.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted June 8, 1999.

Decided September 22, 1999.

Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Janice T. O'Halloran, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

John B. Juhasz and Mary Jane Stephens, for appellant.

PFEIFER, J.

Appellant has raised nine propositions of law. We have reviewed each and have determined that none justifies reversal of appellant's convictions for aggravated murder and the other crimes he committed. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.05(A), we have also independently weighed the aggravating circumstance against the evidence presented in mitigation and reviewed the death penalty for appropriateness and proportionality. For the reasons that follow, we affirm appellant's convictions and death sentence.

VOIR DIRE/PRETRIAL ISSUES

Failure to Excuse Biased Jurors

In his first proposition of law, Cornwell contends that the trial court erred in failing to excuse for cause six prospective jurors who expressed views in favor of the death penalty. Cornwell asserts that he was forced to exercise peremptory challenges on five of these biased jurors, but that one juror who should have been excused, Angela Reichenbach, sat on the jury that recommended that he receive the death penalty.

Trial courts have discretion in determining a juror's ability to be impartial. State v. Williams (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 281, 288, 6 OBR 345, 351, 452 N.E.2d 1323, 1331. R.C. 2313.42(J) states that good cause exists for the removal of a prospective juror when "he discloses by his answers that he cannot be a fair and impartial juror or will not follow the law as given to him by the court." A prospective juror who has been challenged for cause should be excused "if the court has any doubt as to the juror's being entirely unbiased." R.C. 2313.43. See State v. Allard (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 482, 495, 663 N.E.2d 1277, 1289. However, a ruling "will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly arbitrary * * * so as to constitute an abuse of discretion." State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 31, 553 N.E.2d 576, 587. Accord State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 8, 679 N.E.2d 646, 654.

While a review of the voir dire examination cited by Cornwell indicates that all six jurors favored capital punishment, all of them stated that they would consider a lesser sentence and would follow the law as instructed by the trial judge.

Cornwell asserts that he was prejudiced by a less-than-impartial jury because he had exhausted his peremptory challenges and juror Angela Reichenbach sat on the jury. During voir dire, Reichenbach stated her belief that the death penalty serves as a deterrent and should be imposed if the crime was severe, intentional, malicious, or brutal. Yet Reichenbach also agreed that she could follow the law as instructed by the trial judge even if she disagreed with it. Moreover, she expressed the view that the death penalty should not be imposed "in every case where someone dies," and that there are mitigating circumstances in determining who should get the death penalty in any murder case.

Here, the trial court considered the defense's challenge for cause on Reichenbach, but determined that her views were not biased in favor of death, since she believed that the death penalty should apply only in certain cases if the facts would warrant it. Under these circumstances, no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court is apparent. "[D]eference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror." Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 853, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 853.

The other five prospective jurors who Cornwell contends should have been excused for cause were peremptorily challenged by the defense and thus never sat on Cornwell's jury. In Ross v. Oklahoma (1988), 487 U.S. 81, 86, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2277, 101 L.Ed.2d 80, 88, the United States Supreme Court stated that any claim asserting that a jury was not impartial must focus on the jurors who ultimately sat. In addition, the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. Id. at 88, 108 S.Ct. at 2278, 101 L.Ed.2d at 90. In contrast, however, this court has recognized that where the defense exhausts its peremptory challenges before the full jury is seated, the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause in a criminal case may be prejudicial. Hartnett v. State (1885), 42 Ohio St. 568, paragraph four of the syllabus; Tyler, supra, 50 Ohio St.3d at 30-31, 553 N.E.2d at 586-587; Williams, supra, 79 Ohio St.3d at 8, 679 N.E.2d at 655.

Nevertheless, none of the five peremptorily challenged jurors in issue merited an excusal for cause by the trial court, since all appeared to be impartial with regard to whether the death penalty should be imposed. Prospective juror Sharlene Bica stated that she could follow the law even if she disagreed with it, and could vote for a life sentence. Although Bica supported the death penalty, she stated that she would give meaningful consideration to life-sentencing options and would follow the court's instructions.

Prospective juror James Studacher stated in his questionnaire that he believed in the death penalty as "a life for a life" and had "trouble" with murderers getting life sentences. Yet Studacher stated that he would consider life imprisonment options and agreed that he would follow the law even if it conflicted with his personal beliefs. He also agreed that the death penalty was not automatic and that a life sentence was a severe penalty. Prospective juror Suzanne Murphy favored the death penalty but agreed that she could return a verdict recommending a life sentence. In addition to affirming that she would give life-sentencing options meaningful consideration, Murphy declared that she would need to see the facts of the case to determine whether death or a life sentence would be the more appropriate sentence.

Prospective juror Judith Keefer stated that she believed "the death penalty is Biblical." Nevertheless, Keefer stated that she would follow the judge's instructions and consider the mitigating circumstances, regardless of her personal beliefs. The trial court's decision to reject the defense challenge for cause on Keefer was not an abuse of discretion, especially in view of the deference that must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. State v. Wilson (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 203, 211, 58 O.O.2d 409, 414, 280 N.E.2d 915, 920.

Prospective juror Sally Smolek also favored the death penalty but indicated that she would set aside her personal believes and follow the law, and that she could recommend a life sentence.

Based on the foregoing, we reject Cornwell's first proposition of law.

Duration of Voir Dire Interrogation

In Proposition of Law II, Cornwell argues that the parties were not given the "wide latitude in voir dire questioning" required by R.C. 2945.25(C). Cornwell asserts that the court set an arbitrary time limit on voir dire that disrupted the jury selection process and undermined constitutional safeguards. Cornwell points out that the court twice informed defense counsel of the time they had left in questioning juror Reichenbach and that the trial court erred by unreasonably failing to grant the defense sufficient time to question Reichenbach concerning her death-penalty views.

"The scope of voir dire is within the trial court's discretion and varies depending on the circumstances of each case." State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 129, 529 N.E.2d 913, 920. No prejudicial error can be assigned to the examination of veniremen in qualifying them as fair and impartial jurors unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Ellis (1918), 98 Ohio St. 21, 120 N.E. 218, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 39, 526 N.E.2d 274, 285. "[T]he trial court reserves the right and responsibility to control the proceedings of a criminal trial pursuant to R.C. 2945.03, and must limit the trial to relevant and material matters with a view toward the expeditious and effective ascertainment of the truth." State v. Durr (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 568 N.E.2d 674, 678, citing State v. Bridgeman (1977), 51 Ohio App.2d 105, 109-110, 5 O.O.3d 275, 277, 366 N.E.2d 1378, 1383.

The trial judge allotted each side one-half hour to question each prospective juror. Defense counsel did not object to the court's time allotment. Nor did counsel request more time to question juror Reichenbach during voir dire. In fact, at the close of Reichenbach's voir dire, defense counsel stated, "We have no further questions at this time."

Cornwell cites several instances where he claims the trial court unreasonably restricted defense counsel's voir dire of Reichenbach. Yet Cornwell's claims in this regard do not withstand scrutiny. The court's statement to defense counsel that he had fourteen minutes left in questioning Reichenbach was in response to defense counsel's inquiry: "May I inquire of the time, Your Honor?" In addition, Cornwell misrepresents the trial court's actions during Reichenbach's voir dire when the court stated, "[W]e're getting pretty far afield here * * *, and let's move on." The court did not sustain the prosecutor's objection as Cornwell states in his brief; it overruled it and permitted the particular question objected to. The trial court's later reminder to defense counsel that it had four minutes left in questioning Reichenbach does not appear to be the abrupt, unreasonable interruption that Cornwell implies. Rather, it appears to be more in the nature of a courtesy reminder, made at the time the court sustained an objection by the prosecutor.

Since no abuse of discretion is apparent, we reject Proposition of Law II.

TRIAL ISSUES

Jury Instructions

In Proposition of Law III,...