State v. Cott
| Decision Date | 29 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 120,075,120,075 |
| Citation | 464 P.3d 323 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Jason W. COTT, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Michael J. Bartee, of Michael J. Bartee, P.A. of Olathe, was on the brief for appellant.
Shawn E. Minihan, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.
Jason W. Cott takes this direct appeal from a district court order denying his postsentence motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty to two counts of premeditated murder.
On January 22, 2010, the State filed a complaint charging Cott with one count of premeditated murder in the death of his wife. On February 4, 2010, the State filed an amended complaint charging him with one count of capital murder for the killing of more than one person—his wife and unborn child she was carrying; one count of premeditated first-degree murder for the death of his wife; and one count of premeditated first-degree murder for the death of the unborn child. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5419(c).
Ronald Evans was Cott's appointed counsel from early February 2010 through the time that he eventually entered guilty pleas. Soon after Evans' appointment, Cott brought up the idea of a plea bargain that would remove the possibility of a death penalty. In a letter dated March 12, 2010, Cott agreed to enter a guilty plea in exchange for a recommended sentence of life without parole. However, Cott changed his mind. The day before the parties planned to execute the agreement, he informed Evans that he did not want to enter into an agreement. At a hearing on April 7, 2010, Cott informed the State and the district court that he would not be a party to a plea agreement.
The case proceeded to preliminary hearing, which took place on August 17, 2010. Shortly afterwards, Cott again raised with Evans the possibility of a plea bargain. A few days later, on August 27, 2010, he entered into a plea agreement. Under the agreement, the State dismissed the capital murder charge, and Cott pleaded guilty to the two premeditated murder charges. He also agreed that K.S.A. 21-4636 aggravating factors existed and that they were not outweighed by any mitigating factors.
At a hearing on September 16, 2010, the district court accepted the terms of the agreement and sentenced Cott to two concurrent hard 50 terms of life imprisonment.
On June 20, 2011, Cott filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Following a hearing, the district court denied his motion. He takes a belated appeal to this court.
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3210(d)(2) sets out the standard for allowing a defendant to withdraw a plea after sentencing: "To correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea." Generally, an appellate court will not disturb a district court's denial of a postsentence motion to withdraw plea absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Johnson , 307 Kan. 436, 443, 410 P.3d 913 (2018). A court abuses its discretion if its decision is arbitrary or unreasonable, based on an error of law, or based on an error of fact. See, e.g. , State v. Lyman , 311 Kan. 1, 16, 455 P.3d 393, (2020). It is the defendant's burden to establish any such abuse of discretion. See, e.g. , Johnson 307 Kan. at 443, 410 P.3d 913 ; State v. Bricker , 292 Kan. 239, 244, 252 P.3d 118 (2011).
The district court made several specific findings in holding that manifest injustice did not warrant voiding the plea agreement. First, Cott was not coerced into pleading guilty—not by the transmission to him of a letter from his mother, not by his trial counsel pressing him to accept a plea, and not through the effects of mental strain. Second, Cott was not misled as to the nature of the sentence he would receive and he was aware he would have to serve at least 50 years. Finally, Cott was not compelled to accept the plea because of inadequate representation by his trial counsel. Cott disputes these findings on appeal.
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3210 distinguishes between withdrawing a plea before sentence, which requires "good cause," and withdrawing a plea after sentence, which may be done to correct "manifest injustice." Evidence was educed at the hearing on Cott's motion. This evidence provided support for the district court's conclusion that Cott failed to prove manifest injustice resulting from enforcement of the plea agreement.
Testimony at the hearing showed it was Cott who initially suggested to Evans that he was interested in a plea agreement. In a letter dated March 12, 2010, Cott agreed to enter a guilty plea in exchange for a recommended sentence of life without parole. The day before the hearing was set to finalize the agreement, he informed Evans that he had changed his mind and did not want to enter into an agreement. At a hearing on April 7, 2010, Cott informed the State and the district court that he would not be a party to a plea agreement.
According to Cott, Evans then told him he would visit again within 10 days, but it was more than a month or six weeks before Evans visited him again, and then for only a brief conversation through the regular visitation system using a telephone and a glass barrier. Cott testified that he asked Evans several times about the defense and the nature of the evidence against him, and Evans gave him "the idea that unless I took a plea he was not gonna help me." Evans did not state that attitude explicitly-but conveyed it by "the way he was doing and the things that he did say."
While they were awaiting trial, Evans had a stroke, which disabled Evans for a month or two. Evans nevertheless contended that he would be able to provide competent representation. No evidence was introduced suggesting his competence to practice was diminished as a result of the stroke.
During that time after Cott changed his mind about the initial plea agreement, Evans delivered to Cott a letter from Cott's mother, in which she urged him to take a plea because she did not want her son to be executed. Cott understood this letter to represent "just more pressure for me to take a plea."
Cott testified that these circumstances left him feeling that he had no choice but to take the plea because his lawyer was not helping him and he lacked the resources to defend himself. For those reasons, he considered his decision to enter into the plea agreement to be involuntary.
On cross-examination, Cott conceded that, at the plea hearing in 2010, the district court judge had asked him whether the...
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State v. Gutierrez
... ... begin with a summary of our standards of review and Kansas ... law applicable to motions to withdraw pleas. Appellate courts ... review a district court's decision to deny a motion to ... withdraw a no contest plea for an abuse of discretion. See ... State v. Cott , 311 Kan. 498, 499, 464 P.3d 323 ... (2020). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion ... if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is ... based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of ... fact. State v. Ingham , 308 Kan. 1466, ... ...
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State v. Gutierrez
...review a district court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw a no contest plea for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Cott , 311 Kan. 498, 499, 464 P.3d 323 (2020). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is based o......
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State v. Hutto
...court's decision to deny a postsentencing motion to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea for abuse of discretion. See State v. Cott , 311 Kan. 498, 499, 464 P.3d 323 (2020). The movant bears the burden to prove the district court erred in denying the motion. State v. Fox , 310 Kan. 939, 943......
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State v. Tiger
... ... Motion ... to withdraw plea ... Generally, ... we review a district court's decision to deny a motion to ... withdraw a guilty plea or no contest plea for an abuse of ... discretion. State v. Cott, 311 Kan. 498, 499, 464 ... P.3d 323 (2020). As the movant, Tiger bears the burden to ... prove the district court erred in denying the motion. See ... State v. Fox, 310 Kan. 939, 943, 453 P.3d 329 ... (2019) ... When a ... district court ... ...