State v. Cotton
| Decision Date | 13 December 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 58196,58196 |
| Citation | 341 So.2d 362 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph COTTON. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Frank J. Gremillion, Hynes & Gremillion, Baton Rouge, for defendant-respondent.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Warren J. Hebert, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-relator.
On February 22, 1974 Joseph Cotton, Paul 'Pony Cat' Smith and Reynard Bell plotted to burglarize a mobile home structure located on a used car lot at 6274 Scenic Highway in the Parish of East Baton Rouge. About six o'clock that evening Cotton and Bell approached the structure from the rear, pried a small window open and gained entrance. Smith pried the front door open and joined them.
As they were rummaging through the contents in search of money, they heard a vehicle approaching. Arthur C. Brister, who operated the car lot and used the mobile home as an office, arrived. He was accompanied by Charles David and Pierre Brignac, two fishing companions. They were returning a boat and trailer to Brister's shed nearby.
Brister then approached the mobile home and saw that the door was open. He called to his companions saying the mobile home was all messed up. As David and Brignac approached to examine the damage, a tall black man armed with two pistols appeared in the doorway of the mobile home. When Brister called out, 'Wait a minute', the tall man shot him in the chest. Brister fell to the ground mortally wounded.
David ran from the scene as two smaller black men, later identified as Joseph Cotton and Reynard Bell, emerged from the mobile home. As David ran around the mobile home, he thought the two smaller back men were chasing him but, when he fell to the ground, the two smaller men ran past him and into nearby field and disappeared. It was then that Smith, the taller of the three, who had shot Brister, approached David and demanded his wallet at gunpoint. When he obtained the money he fled.
Cotton was arrested on February 26, 1974. He was charged with the armed robbery of David, tried, convicted on June 27, 1974 of simple robbery, and sentenced to five years at hard labor. On appeal his conviction was affirmed by this Court. See 341 So.2d 355.
The instant prosecution was instituted by a grand jury indictment filed on April 17, 1974 charging Cotton with the second degree murder of Brister. A defense motion to quash the indictment was filed on the ground of double jeopardy. The motion alleged that the prosecution of Cotton for second degree murder was an effort to prosecute for an offense which was substantially and legally identical with the offense for which he was convicted on June 27, 1974. The motion was heard and sustained on January 6, 1975. Certiorari was granted on the State's application for review of the ruling.
The right against double jeopardy is embodied in the Federal and State Constitutions. U.S.Const. Amend. V; La.Const. art. I, § 9 (1921); La.Const. art. I, § 15 (1974); Wickberg v. Henderson, 292 So.2d 505 (La.1974). It is the guarantee against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and against multiple punishments for the same offense.
The principle is stated in Article 591 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
'No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense, except, when on his own motion, a new trial has been granted or judgment has been arrested, or where there has been a mistrial legally ordered under the provisions of Article 775 or ordered with the express consent of the defendant.'
and, by the terms of Article 596,
'Double jeopardy exists in a second trial only when the charge in that trial is:
(1) Identical with or a different grade of the same offense for which the defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial, whether or not a responsive verdict could have been rendered in the first trial as to the charge in the second trial; or
(2) Based on a part of a continuous offense for which offense the defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial.'
When judged by these principles the facts before us do not present a case of double jeopardy. According to the State's answer to a defense application for bill of particulars, the State intended to rely in this prosecution upon the proposition that '(a)ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.' La.Rev.Stat. 14:24.
In this light, the actions of Smith, who shot and killed Brister, makes Cotton a principal to that offense. The offense charged is second degree murder defined as follows:
'Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: . . .
(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape, armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill.'
Further, in answer to the defense application for bill of particulars, the State advised that it would not contend that at the time of Brister's death the defendant was engaged in the crime of simple robbery. It is indicated, therefore, that the State's reliance would be that Brister was killed while Smith was engaged in the perpetration of aggravated burglary. Aggravated burglary is a crime which can be committed by the unauthorized entering of any structure with intent to commit a theft therein while armed with a dangerous weapon. La.Rev.Stat. 14:60. If Smith was guilty of second degree murder Cotton, as a principal, was likewise guilty of the same offense.
From the facts available to the Court on this record, and the record of Cotton's conviction of simple robbery, Cotton was convicted of simple robbery on the thery that Smith committed a simple robbery of David, and Cotton was likewise guilty of the same offense as a principal. This follows because Cotton was concerned in the commission of the crime and was guilty even though he did not directly commit the act of...
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State v. Wiley
...consequence of burglary which every party to the offense must accept no matter what he or she actually intended. See State v. Cotton, 341 So.2d 362, 364 (La.1976) (if the co-perpetrator in an aggravated burglary was guilty of second degree murder because he shot and killed the victim, then ......
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State v. Wilson, 2006-KA-1421.
...The Court also discussed the specific intent to commit a felony or a theft in State v. Jones, 426 So.2d 1323 (La.1983).1 State v. Cotton, 341 So.2d 362 (La.1976) addressed a double jeopardy issue, while State v. Searle, 339 So.2d 1194 (La.1976) involved the presumption that a person caught ......
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State v. Anderson
...doubt that the defendant made an unauthorized entry of a structure with the intent to commit a theft or a felony. See State v. Cotton, 341 So.2d 362 (La.1976); State v. Searle, 339 So.2d 1194 (La.1976) (on rehearing). At the moment of the unauthorized entry, the actor must intend to commit ......
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State ex rel. Robinson v. Blackburn
...for the same offense after acquittal or conviction, and against multiple prosecutions for the same offense. State of Louisiana v. Cotton, 341 So.2d 362 (La.1976); State v. McCarroll, 337 So.2d 475 This principle forms the basis of Article 591 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: "No person sh......