State v. Couch

• Decision Date: 22 October 2021
• Docket Number: Docket No. 47892
• Citation: 504 P.3d 388
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Mildred Eileen COUCH, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

504 P.3d 388

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Mildred Eileen COUCH, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 47892

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Filed: October 22, 2021

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Justin R. Porter, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

LORELLO, Judge

Mildred Eileen Couch appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance. We reverse the order denying Couch's motion to suppress and vacate Couch's judgment of conviction.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

An officer drove to a parking lot in response to a report that people in two vehicles were "smoking something off of tin foil" while parked there. The cars were described in the call report as a beige "Chev Cavalier" and a "gry toy pc" with 1A plates; the officer interpreted the latter to mean a gray Toyota passenger car with Ada County license plates. The call report also indicated there were "2 subjects" in both vehicles. When the officer arrived at the parking lot, he saw the Chevy Cavalier but noted the other vehicle was a silver Honda Civic with Ada County license plates, not a Toyota passenger car. In addition, the Honda did not have two occupants as reported. Instead, the officer observed only one person, later identified as Couch, seated in the driver's seat. The officer approached Couch, informed her that he was there to investigate the report of drug use, and questioned her. Couch refused the officer's request to search her vehicle. When the officer asked her for identification, however, Couch produced her driver's license.

The officer then went to the other vehicle, obtained identification from two of the occupants, and gave the documents (including Couch's driver's license) to another officer to run through dispatch. Before dispatch reported back, a canine unit arrived at the scene and a drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs in Couch's vehicle. After the officer ordered Couch out of her vehicle, she admitted that she might have a methamphetamine pipe on her. Searches of her vehicle and person yielded two syringes, one of which contained methamphetamine residue, and a glass pipe. The State subsequently charged Couch with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.

Couch filed a motion to suppress, arguing that she was seized when the officer retained Couch's driver's license and that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify this seizure. The district court denied her motion. The district court agreed that Couch was seized when the officer retained Couch's driver's license, but concluded the seizure was reasonable because the officer had a "legitimate reason to contact" Couch and, as such, the officer could "run her driver's license through dispatch to verify her identity and check the status of her driver's license."¹ Couch moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied. Couch subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), and retained the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. In exchange for Couch's guilty plea, the State dismissed the remaining count. Couch appeals.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson , 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina , 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995) ; State v. Schevers , 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

III.ANALYSIS

Couch argues that the district court erred in applying the "legitimate reason" standard to conclude her seizure was reasonable because the Fourth Amendment requires a minimum of reasonable suspicion to support a detention. Couch further argues that, because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, the district court erred in denying Couch's motion to suppress. The State responds that the district court correctly concluded that the seizure was reasonable under the legitimate reason standard articulated in the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Godwin , 121 Idaho 491, 826 P.2d 452 (1992). The State also responds that the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified the seizure. We hold that Couch was seized when the officer discontinued contact with Couch and took her driver's license with him. We further hold that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to support the detention.

Because Couch's claim involves an alleged unlawful seizure, the preliminary question is when the seizure occurred. The district court's written decision includes two different statements regarding the point of seizure. The first statement is that a seizure occurred when the officer "retained" Couch's driver's license because her "liberty was restrained" at that point. The district court's second statement is that Couch "was seized when [the officer] requested [Couch's] driver's license." On appeal, Couch essentially adopts the district court's first statement and argues that she was seized when the officer "took [Couch's] driver's license and then ran the license through police dispatch."

A seizure occurs for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen. State v. Fry , 122 Idaho 100, 102, 831 P.2d 942, 944 (Ct. App. 1991). A seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual on the street or other public place, by asking if the individual is willing to answer some questions, or by putting forth questions if the individual is willing to listen. Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ; Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Thus, an officer may generally ask an individual questions and ask to examine identification, and doing so does not constitute a seizure so long as the officer is not on a "suspicionless fishing expedition," Utah v. Strieff , 579 U.S. 232, 233, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016), and does not convey a message that compliance with the request is required, Fry , 122 Idaho at 102, 831 P.2d at 944.

The district court found that when the officer arrived in the parking lot where Couch was parked, the officer did not activate his overhead lights or impede Couch's vehicle from leaving the parking lot. The district court further found that Couch admitted her initial contact with the officer was not a seizure, recognizing the officer "could lawfully approach her and ask her questions, and she was free not to answer his questions." The officer could also ask to see Couch's identification or driver's license, and doing so did not constitute a seizure. See Fry , 122 Idaho at 102, 831 P.2d 942, 831 P.3d at 944. A limited seizure occurs, however, when law enforcement "retains" a valid driver's license "or other paperwork of value." State v. Page , 140 Idaho 841, 844, 103 P.3d 454, 457 (2004) ; see also State v. Nickel , 134 Idaho 610, 613, 7 P.3d 219, 222 (2000) ; State v. Howell , 159 Idaho 245, 248, 358 P.3d 806, 809 (Ct. App. 2015).² Couch's license was retained, and she was therefore seized, when the officer discontinued his contact with Couch and took her license with him.

Although the district court correctly characterized the retention of Couch's license as a seizure, it concluded the seizure was reasonable, citing the "valid" or "legitimate" reason rationale derived from the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Godwin , 121 Idaho 491, 826 P.2d 452 (1992) (plurality opinion), and this Court's subsequent decision in State v. Landreth , 139 Idaho 986, 88 P.3d 1226 (Ct. App. 2004). The State advances this same rationale in responding to Couch's argument that a legitimate reason is insufficient for a Fourth Amendment seizure and that such seizure must be supported by reasonable suspicion. We agree with Couch that Fourth Amendment seizures require (at a minimum) reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that the person detained is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. See Howell , 159 Idaho at 248, 358 P.3d at 809 (explaining reasonable suspicion standard for investigatory detention).

The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of a person and requires such seizures to be reasonable. Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) ; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). The United States Supreme Court has stated that the reasonableness of a seizure "depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law [enforcement]." Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. at 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574. This balancing test is the rationale underlying the United States Supreme Court's adoption of the now familiar standard in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence permitting an investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion. See id. (weighing governmental interest in illegal immigration to allow border patrol to briefly detain individuals "when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country"). We do not read Godwin or Landreth to eliminate this well-established constitutional standard, nor could we because the United States Supreme Court has sole authority to set the minimum standards for...