State v. Coudotte

• Decision Date: 08 November 1897
• Citation: 7 N.D. 109,72 N.W. 913
• Parties: STATE v. COUDOTTE.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

7 N.D. 109

72 N.W. 913

STATE

v.COUDOTTE.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Nov. 8, 1897.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The testimony in this case relied upon by the state as furnishing the corroboration required to warrant a conviction upon the testimony of an accomplice examined, and held to furnish no corroboration, under section 8195, Rev. Codes, which declares that “a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless he is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, or the circumstances thereof.”

2. Testimony that tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense charged only when supplemented by certain testimony of the accomplice is not such corroborating testimony as the statute requires.

3. There is no presumption of guilt arising from the fact that a person charged with crime, and while in confinement, and before trial, attempts to commit suicide.

Appeal from district court, Emmons county; W. H. Winchester, Judge.

Alec Coudotte was convicted of murder and appeals. Reversed.R. N. Stevens and John Stowell, for appellant. John F. Cowen, Atty. Gen., H. A. Armstrong, State's Atty. of Emmons Co., and E. S. Allen, for the State.

BARTHOLOMEW, J.

The appellant, Alec Coudotte, was informed against by the state's attorney of Emmons county for the crime of murder in the first degree, in killing one Thomas Spicer, in said county, on the 17th day of February, 1897. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to be hung, in the district court of said county. A motion for a new trial, made on a statement of the case, was denied, and the appellant brings the entire record to this court by appeal. The errors alleged, and which we shall discuss, relate exclusively to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. If there was in the case no question as to the proper corroboration of an accomplice, our task, in this instance, would be brief. True, there is strong evidence in the case tending to support the appellant's claim of alibi; but, on the state of this record, no court would be warranted in disturbing the finding of the jury upon that point. But the principal evidence for the state in this case came from two confessed accomplices. Our statute, voicing the almost universal practice in both England and the United States even in the absence of statute, declares, in section 8195, Rev. Codes: “A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless he is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, or the circumstances thereof.” The specific requirement, under this section, is that the corroborating evidence tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. Whart. Cr. Ev. § 442, declares: “The corroboration requisite to validate the testimony of an alleged accomplice should be to the person of the accused. Any other corroboration would be delusive, since, if corroboration in matters not connecting the accused with the offense were enough, a party who, in the case against him, would have no hope of escape, could, by his mere oath, transfer to another the conviction hanging over himself.” And Rosc. Cr. Ev. 130, states the principle thus: “There may be many witnesses, therefore, who give testimony which agrees with that of the accomplice, but which, if it does not serve to identify the accused parties, is no corroboration of the accomplice.” Under this principle, which courts were compelled originally to adopt to protect innocent persons, and which, by innumerable decisions, was crystallized into universal law, and which is declared in clear and specific language by our statutes, it will not be necessary or proper for us to discuss any of that portion of the so-called corroborating testimony which simply goes to show that the crime was committed, and the time and manner of its commission. We can profitably discuss only such portions of this testimony as it may be claimed in some degree tend to identify this defendant with the commission of the crime.

The confessed accomplices are Philip Ireland and Paul Holy Track. These parties also accuse the defendant and one George Defender with being present, and aiding and participating in the commission of the crime. All these parties are Indians, or persons of Indian descent. They belong at the Standing Rock Indian agency. This agency is situated on the west bank of the Missouri river, and opposite the town of Winona, in Emmons county. The residence of Thomas Spicer, where the crime was committed, was about 1 3/4 miles north of Winona, and on the same side of the river, which at that season of the year (February 17th) was frozen over solidly, and could be crossed at any point. The crime that was committed has few parallels in atrocity and wanton cruelty. The sole object for its commission was to plunder the house. To accomplish this purpose, Thomas Spicer and his wife, and his wife's aged mother, Mrs. Waldron, and their married daughter, Mrs. Rouse, were foully murdered; and then, actuated, it would appear, solely by the instincts of a savage, the perpetrators proceeded to murder the twin baby boys of Mrs. Rouse. Six persons in all were killed. It could not be otherwise than that a deed of such depravity should arouse the community where committed almostto frenzy. Every instinct of humanity and of justice demanded the swift and certain punishment of the inhuman miscreants whose minds could conceive and whose hands could execute a deed so dastardly. Standing face to face with such a crime the judgment of a juror, however, intelligent and honorable he may be, must inevitably be influenced in some degree by his surroundings. It is to the credit of his nature that it cries out for punishment for such a crime. But under such circumstances it is too plain for argument that the court, if such a thing could be possible, should exercise all the greater care to see to it that the evidence does conform to a well-established and statutory rule, which the experience of ages has shown to be necessary for the protection of innocent persons. It was suggested in argument that as there were two accomplices, and their testimony was substantially the same, a less amount of corroborating evidence than in ordinary cases, and where there was but one accomplice, would suffice. This argument should be addressed to the jury. It can have no weight here, because we are not concerned with the amount of corroborating testimony. If there be any such evidence, coming within the requirements of the statute, its weight was for the jury, and we cannot disturb their verdict. But, if there was no such testimony, then the jury should have been so instructed, or, failing in that, the motion for a new trial based upon that ground should have been granted.

We shall discuss the testimony only so far as may be necessary to an understanding of those portions which the state claims furnish the corroboration required by the statute. It appears that after Coudotte's arrest, and prior to his preliminary hearing, he was confined in jail at Williamsport, the county seat of Emmons county. While thus confined he was visited by several parties who spoke the Sioux language, which was Coudotte's native tongue,-and he could speak no other,-and they endeavored to procure from him a confession. Prior to this time he had gashed himself in the abdomen with a knife. The state claims, and perhaps correctly, that this was an attempt to commit suicide. He was suffering from the wound at the time of the interview, and stated to the witnesses that he expected to die from its effects. In that interview, if we accept as true what the witnesses state, Coudotte said that he was in Winona on said February 17, 1897; that he left there about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and crossed over to the agency, where he met one Frank Blackhawk; that Blackhawk was intoxicated, and took another drink of whisky from a supply that he (Coudotte) had; that Blackhawk then said to Coudotte that he was going over to kill the Spicer family, and asked Coudotte to go with him, which Coudotte refused to do, but immediately proceeded to his home. He gave as his reason for going home,-to quote one of the witnesses: “Because people were going to be killed, and he would be home, so there would not be any blame for him.” He also stated, according to the witnesses, that on February 20th he again met Blackhawk at one of the agency stores, and Blackhawk told him that he had killed the Spicer family, and wanted to give him money to keep the secret. We notice that the testimony of the accomplices in no manner implicates Blackhawk in the crime. But we assume that he was implicated. The utmost that can be claimed for this statement is that Coudotte was told beforehand that the Spicers were to be killed, and was told afterwards that they had been killed. But how can knowledge alone...