State v. Coviello
| Decision Date | 19 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | A-54 September Term 2021,086673 |
| Citation | 252 N.J. 539,288 A.3d 1 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Deje M. COVIELLO, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
John Menzel, Point Pleasant, argued the cause for appellant (John Menzel, on the briefs).
Shiraz I. Deen, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney; Samuel Marzarella, Chief Appellate Attorney, of counsel, and Shiraz I. Deen, on the briefs).
Oleg Nekritin, East Hanover, argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Law Offices of Robert J. De Groot, attorneys; Oleg Nekritin, on the brief).
David M. Kahler, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and Jennifer R. Jaremback, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
This appeal presents a narrow jurisdictional question posed by defendant's petition, which we paraphrase as follows:
When a portion of a defendant's sentence for driving while intoxicated requires the installation of an ignition interlock device (IID), should the defendant's application for credit toward that portion of the sentence be heard by the sentencing court or the Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC)?
The trial court and the Appellate Division ruled that the MVC should hear such an application. We hold to the contrary. We conclude the sentencing court, and not the MVC, has the appropriate jurisdiction over defendant's motion for sentencing credit concerning the IID requirement. That conclusion is supported by well-established sentencing principles and the text and structure of the drunk driving statutes. It is also consistent with the legal position argued before us by the Attorney General, who appeared for the first time in this case as counsel for the amicus curiae MVC after certification was granted.
We consequently reverse the jurisdictional rulings and remand for further proceedings before the sentencing court. In accordance with the narrow scope of our review, we do so without reaching the merits of defendant's application.
On September 16, 2013, Toms River police officers found defendant Deje M. Coviello unconscious in the driver's seat of a parked car with the engine running and windshield wipers on. When defendant regained consciousness, she admitted she had been drinking. Several open containers of alcoholic beverages were visible on the passenger seat.
Defendant was arrested and issued three traffic citations for (1) driving while intoxicated (DWI), (2) driving with a suspended license, and (3) refusal to submit to chemical testing of breath. Defendant was also charged with the indictable offense of third-degree theft by unlawful taking.
Following negotiations, defendant pled guilty in the Criminal Part in February 2014 to an amended count of disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2, and the summons for DWI, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. By agreement, the other charges were dismissed.
In April 2014, defendant was sentenced by a Criminal Part judge.1 Her counsel at sentencing argued against jail time because of the strides defendant had taken to address her alcohol abuse, which had been a common feature of her past criminal history. In particular, defense counsel stressed defendant's sobriety over the preceding six months, her completion of a full-time treatment program, and her plans to enter a part-time treatment program.
In his sentencing analysis, the judge gave moderate weight to aggravating factor three, the likelihood of committing another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), and heavy weight to aggravating factor nine, the need to deter defendant and others from violating the law, id. at (a)(9). On the other hand, the judge found that mitigating factor ten applied, i.e., that defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment, id. at (b)(10). The judge concluded the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the sole mitigating factor.
On the disorderly conduct count, the judge sentenced defendant to one year of probation and a suspended eight-day jail term with various conditions. That sentence also included a monetary penalty.
For the DWI conviction -- defendant's second such conviction -- she was sentenced to a two-year period of driver's license forfeiture, thirty days of community service, forty-eight hours of education at the intoxicated driver's resource center (IDRC), a two-year period of breath alcohol IID installation to commence after completion of the license forfeiture, and additional monetary penalties.
As we explain in more detail below, under the statutory framework for a DWI conviction that existed at the time in 2014, the court was required to impose on offenders with one or more previous DWI convictions an obligation to install an IID on their vehicles for a period of one to three years.2 Here, the sentencing judge chose to impose on defendant a two-year IID requirement, at the midpoint of the then-prescribed range.
The parties agree that defendant did not install an IID in a vehicle after her period of license forfeiture ended, or at any other time. Defendant maintains she did not do so because she could not afford to buy or lease a car and had no access to drive another person's vehicle.
Nearly five years after her sentencing, in January 2019, defendant moved before the Criminal Part for a credit on her sentence pursuant to Rule 7:9-4.3 By that point, defendant had fulfilled her entire sentence, including the two-year period of license revocation, except for the IID installation requirement.
In her motion, defendant certified that since the date she surrendered her driver's license for revocation in 2014, she had not owned, leased, or operated a motor vehicle in which an IID could have been installed. Her motion sought to have the court deem her sentence completed, so that she could apply for a driver's license with the MVC. She acknowledged her application for such a new license would require her to take a written test and a driving test and pay the applicable fees to the MVC.
Defendant contended the Legislature could not have reasonably intended that persons in a situation like hers, who cannot afford or do not have access to a vehicle, would be indefinitely precluded by the IID installation provision from having their licenses restored. Alternatively, she argued that the statute was ambiguous and that the rule of lenity should apply.
The Ocean County Prosecutor opposed defendant's motion. The Prosecutor4 argued, first, that the MVC, and not the sentencing court, has exclusive jurisdiction over a request for any IID credit. Second, the Prosecutor asserted that, in any event, defendant's statutory arguments to justify such a credit lacked merit.
After a non-evidentiary proceeding, the Criminal Part judge denied defendant's motion for credit. As a threshold matter, the judge declared that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain defendant's application for relief from the IID installation requirement under the pre-2019 statutory scheme. The judge agreed with the Prosecutor that the MVC, not the court, is the appropriate forum in which to seek sentencing relief, given the information that the MVC has at its disposal regarding "IDRC requirements, surcharges, and court install orders."
Going beyond his jurisdictional ruling, the motion judge further opined that defendant's request for sentencing credit had no substantive basis. In this regard, the judge observed that a defendant is not permitted to "wait out" and "choose to serve a longer driving license revocation as a substitute sentence for the [IID] installation." The judge noted the legislative purpose of the IID requirement is not to have defendants avoid driving, but instead "to ensure the defendant remains sober while operating a motor vehicle."
On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the sentencing court's denial of relief. Specifically, as to the singular issue of jurisdiction now before us, the appellate court held that defendant's requested modification of the IID requirement was not "a sentencing issue," but rather an "administrative" matter for the MVC. The appellate court went on to say that defendant's substantive arguments for relief under the DWI statutes and the associated MVC regulations lacked merit.
Defendant also raised constitutional claims in the Appellate Division, arguing that rigidly imposing the IID installation requirement, despite her asserted inability to afford a vehicle, violated equal protection and due process principles. After finding the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction, the appellate court declined to address defendant's constitutional arguments.
Defendant then sought this Court's review, confining her petition for certification solely to the threshold jurisdictional issue. Defendant asked that we remand her case to the sentencing court and that we direct it to assume jurisdiction and formally adjudicate her request for an IID credit. Alternatively, defendant requested that we remand the matter to the Appellate Division for a disposition of her poverty-based constitutional arguments.
After we granted certification, see 251 N.J. 22, 275 A.3d 904 (2022), the Attorney General, in his role as counsel to the MVC, moved to participate before this Court as amicus curiae and address the jurisdictional issue. We granted that motion. In his brief, the Attorney General sides with defendant's legal position and argues that the sentencing court, not the MVC, has exclusive jurisdiction over a request for sentencing credit from the IID requirement. The Attorney General takes no position concerning the merits.
The Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey, which also is appearing before us as amicus curiae, endorses the...
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