State v. Cox

• Decision Date: 07 November 1964
• Docket Number: No. 43356,43356
• Citation: State v. Cox, 193 Kan. 571, 396 P.2d 326 (Kan. 1964)
• Parties: The STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Clarence S. COX, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 326

396 P.2d 326

193 Kan. 571

The STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Clarence S. COX, Appellant.

No. 43356.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Nov. 7, 1964.

Syllabus by the Court

In an appeal from a conviction of the offense of larceny of an automobile defendant contends that (1) his constitutional rights were violated because he was not represented by counsel at his preliminary examination, and that (2) the trial court erred in placing him on trial after commitment to the state hospital for the insane pursuant to G.S.1949, 62-1531, without a finding that he had recovered. The record is examined, and, all as fully set forth in the opinion, it is held that neither contention has merit.

Harry C. Blaker, Pleasanton, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Leighton A. Fossey, County Atty., argued the cause, and William M. Ferguson, Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Hoffman, Asst. Atty. Gen., were with him on the brief for appellee.

PRICE, Justice.

Defendant was convicted in the district court of Linn county of the offense of larceny of an automobile. Throughout his trial he was represented by M. K. Hoag of the Linn county bar, court appointed counsel.

Defendant appealed--pro se, contending that the trial court was without jurisdiction to try him because he had been adjudged to be insane, and that his motion for a new trial was erroneously overruled because the evidence amply sustained his contention that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense.

This court affirmed--see State v. Cox, 191 Kan. 326, 380 P.2d 316, and supplemental opinion at 191 Kan. 456, 381 P.2d 704.

Notwithstanding the fact defendant had not requested the appointment of counsel to represent him in the appeal to this court, the Supreme Court of the United States on February 17, 1964, granted his petition for a writ of certiorari and vacated the judgment of this court and remanded the case 'for further consideration in light of Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811, and Daegele v. Kansas, 375 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 89, 11 L.Ed.2d 44 (376 U.S. 191, 84 S.Ct. 637, 11 L.Ed.2d 603).

Construing the foregoing order of the Supreme Court of the United States as meaning that defendant's appeal should be reinstated and counsel appointed to represent him, this court, on March 31, 1964, entered an order reinstating the appeal and directing the district court of Linn county forthwith to appoint counsel to represent him in such appeal so reinstated. (Prefatory Rule No. 1(f), 191 Kan. XII.)

Pursuant to that order Harry C. Blaker of the Linn county bar, was appointed. Mr. Blaker filed an abstract and brief and appeared upon oral argument of the appeal.

Although four specifications of error are urged--they present only two questions.

It is contended that defendant's constitutional rights were violated in that he was denied due process of law because of the fact he was not represented by counsel at his preliminary examination, and that under the rule of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733, he was entitled to 'the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.'

The purpose and function of a preliminary examination for one charged with a felony under the laws of this state has been discussed in many of our decisions. Its purpose is to determine whether an offense has been committed and whether there is probable cause for charging a defendant with the commission thereof. It is not a 'trial' in the oridinary sense of the word, and neither is it a trial in the sense that one may be found 'guilty'. A defendant is bound over for trial only when the state establishes that an offense has been committed and that there is probable cause for charging him with its commission--otherwise he is to be discharged. A defendant has the right to be assisted by counsel at a preliminary examination, but there is no statute requiring the appointment of counsel in such a proceeding, and it has been held many times that failure to appoint counsel at a preliminary examination is not error. (State v. Daegele, 193 Kan. 314, 316, 393 P.2d 978, and cases cited in the opinion.)

In State v. Latham & York, 190 Kan. 411, 375 P.2d 788, (cert. den. 373 U.S. 919, 83 S.Ct. 1310, 10 L.Ed.2d 418), the conviction of defendants of murder in the first degree and imposition of the death sentence was upheld. They subsequently petitioned for federal habeas corpus. It was denied. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, it was contended they were entitled to have counsel appointed for them prior to their preliminary examination, and reliance was had on the Gideon case, above....