State v. Crafton

• Decision Date: 07 October 1893
• Citation: 56 N.W. 257,89 Iowa 109
• Parties: STATE v. CRAFTON.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

89 Iowa 109

56 N.W. 257

STATE

v.CRAFTON.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 7, 1893.

Appeal from district court, Polk county; C. P. Holmes, Judge.

The defendant was indicted and tried for the crime of murder in the first degree, and convicted of murder in the second degree. He was adjudged to be confined in the penitentiary at Anamosa for the term of 15 years, and from that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.L. Kinkead, Hays Bros., and Cole, McVey & Cheshire, for appellant.

John Y. Stone, Atty. Gen., W. A. Spurrier, Co. Atty., C. A. Bishop, and T. C. Dawson, for the State.

KINNE, J.

1. Mabel Swartz was on the night of March 28, 1892, in a house of prostitution, in the city of Des Moines, killed by the contents of a revolver which was discharged while in the hands of, and being manipulated by, the defendant. The grand jury returned an indictment against the defendant on May 9, 1892, and on May 12, 1892, the defendant waived arraignment, and on the 20th of the same month entered a plea of not guilty. On the same day he filed a petition and motion, supported by affidavits, for a change of place of trial. The petition was grounded on the claim that excitement and prejudice existed to such an extent among the residents of the county that defendant could not obtain a fair trial therein. Many specific charges or statements were made in the showing, among the more important of which were the following: That after the alleged murder, and without any foundation therefor, lengthy, sensational, and unjustifiable comments were made and published in the newspapers of the city of Des Moines, which were circulated daily, and which contained serious and damaging charges against defendant; that they denounced him as being a slayer and a villain; charged that he had seduced Mabel Swartz; that defendant's father had been guilty of a like offense in the state of Illinois to that charged in the indictment, and that his father was indicted and tried therefor; charged defendant with burglary and robbery, and with being implicated in stealing a diamond ring from the finger of Mabel Swartz after her death; that Mabel Swartz was pregnant with child, and that defendant slew her to prevent publicity of such fact; that defendant had murdered a man in Nebraska, and was then a fugitive from justice; that defendant was engaged in enticing girls and women away for the purposes of prostitution. The state resisted the application, and filed an affidavit of 10 men to its counter showing. The points made in the resistance were, in brief, that the application did not contain a statement of facts entitling the defendant to the change; that the statements were mere conclusions; that none of the articles referred to were set out; that it did not appear that the articles so published were all that were published by the local press; that it did not appear that the comments of the press, taken together, were not fair; that newspaper comments, no matter of what character, would not justify a change of venue; that the application was not made in good faith, but for the purpose of delay. The 10 citizens swore that they had “read the newspaper accounts, or some of them, in relation to the killing of Mabel Swartz by F. S. Crafton,” and had heard the matter talked of some among residents of said county, and from what they had heard and read they were of the opinion that there was no prejudice against the defendant, and that Ex–Mayor Swartz had no influence in Polk county. The court overruled the motion, and the trial began in the city where the alleged crime was committed, and about 60 days after the tragedy had occurred. The application for a change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is a judicial discretion, and not to be interfered with by us unless it has been abused. State v. Rowland, 72 Iowa, 327, 33 N. W. Rep. 137;State v. Beck, 73 Iowa, 616, 35 N. W. Rep. 684;State v. Cadwell, 79 Iowa, 473, 44 N. W. Rep. 711;State v. Woodard, (Iowa,) 50 N. W. Rep. 885.

In the light of the facts above set out, and of the rule of law so wisely established, we are to determine whether or not the court erred in its ruling. We have in mind also that it is the policy of our law to make the execution of justice as speedy as is consistent with a due regard to the rights of a man charged with a grave crime. The resistance does not deny the publication of the articles as charged. It does not deny that they created a prejudice against the defendant, and that such prejudice existed after the killing. The denials of prejudice, as made, relate only to the time of the filing the affidavit of resistance. The only question of controversy between the two showings is that defendant's showing is that the excitement and prejudice continued to exist up to the time it was filed, while the state's showing is that it did not exist at that time. It was not incumbent upon the defendant to set out the newspaper articles, especially so as there is no denial that they were published as claimed by the defendant, and that they, for a time at least, had the effect which he claims. The question of prejudice is a question to be determined from facts before the court in the showings made. Now, it is clear that the showing of the defendant, in the absence of one made by the state, would have entitled him to the change. What facts, then, appear in the state's showing which would be held sufficient to overcome that made by the defendant? It does not appear that the state's affiants had read all or even any of the articles which contained the specific charges set out in defendant's showing, and on which the change is prayed. There is not a fact which shows that the change was sought for delay, and not in the best of faith. There is nothing to show what the opinion of the state's affiants is based upon, except that they had read “some” of the accounts of the killing, and had heard the matter talked of some among the residents of the county. Doubtless, there may be cases where such a counter showing would be sufficient that depends upon the facts stated by the other side; but we cannot think that in a case like this, where the defendant is charged with the commission of many and grave crimes, some of them of the most revolting character, the very charging of which was calculated to engender prejudice in the public mind, which would be deep–seated and far–reaching, that such a showing in resistance of the application should be regarded as sufficient. Defendant was a comparative stranger in the city. His associates, to say the least, had been bad, and here was the press of the city poisoning the minds of the people against him by charging him with the commission of innumerable crimes. Counsel for the state insist that this case is distinguishable from the cases of State v. Canada, 48 Iowa, 448,State v. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347, and State v. Billings, 77 Iowa, 417, 42 N. W. Rep. 456, in that in the last two cases it appeared that there had been threats of lynching made against the defendants, and in the Canada Case no resistance was filed. These are distinguishing facts; but is public excitement and prejudice, which will prevent a defendant from having a fair trial, to be measured only by a single act in all cases, and that a threat? Must the court, in the exercise of its discretion, say that, because excitement and prejudice have not yet arrived at the point where threats to do personal violence to the person of the defendant are made, therefore it appears that prejudice does not exist? The admitted facts upon which defendant's application is based, show, to our minds, that an opinion based thereon is entitled to more weight than one based upon the meager facts stated in the state's showing. State v. Beck, 73 Iowa, 616, 35 N. W. Rep. 684. Each case must depend upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances. We know how difficult it is for an appellate court to see these matters as they may have appeared to the trial judge, and hence it becomes us to be exceedingly careful in passing upon the question of the proper exercise of the discretion vested in the trial court. When, after due investigation, we are satisfied that the trial court has made a mistake, it is our duty to rectify it as far as possible. The language of this court in the case of State v. Nash, supra, is applicable in this case. It was there said: “It is important, to maintain the usefulness of our judicial system, that no suspicion of influence from popular excitement in the administration of the law should be allowed to impair the public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of judicial proceedings. An excited state of public feeling and opinion is always the most unfavorable for the investigation of truth. Not only should the mind of the juror be wholly without bias and prejudice, it should not only be free from all undue feeling and excitement in itself, but it should be, as far as possible, removed from the influence of prejudice and feeling and excitement in others.” A man charged with the commission of the grave crime of murder has a right to be tried by an impartial jury, and in a community where his case has not been prejudiced and prejudged. It matters not what the standing or reputation of this defendant may be, or how low his condition, the law throws around him all the safeguards which the enlightened wisdom of the ages has shown essential to the safe, orderly, and impartial administration of justice. Considering the magnitude of the crime charged, the limited time between the homicide and the trial, the showing made for a change of venue, and the weakness of the resistance, we are impressed with the conviction that the court below erred in overruling the defendant's motion.

2. Error is assigned on the court's ruling in refusing to continue the case. In the view we have taken on other questions presented, it is not necessary for us to consider this question.

3. A reversal is asked because...