State v. Craig

• Decision Date: 27 January 1888
• Citation: 80 Me. 85,13 A. 129
• Parties: STATE v. CRAIG.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

13 A. 129

80 Me. 85

STATE

v. CRAIG.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

January 27, 1888.

On exceptions from superior court, Cumberland county.

Complaint for possessing certain lobsters, in violation of chapter 275, Pub. Laws 1885.The verdict was in favor of the state, and the defendant alleged exceptions.

Geo. M. Seiders, Co. Atty., for the State.C. W. Goddard, for defendant.

HASKELL, J. Complaint for possessing certain lobsters, in violation of the act of 1885, c. 275, § 3.The complaint is not made a part of the case, and, as no objection to it is presented by the learned counsel for the defendant in his brief, the court may well assume that it is sufficient, both in form and in substance.

1.The court was requested to instruct the jury that, if the lobsters possessed by the defendant were taken more than a marine league from the shores of Maine, he would not be guilty.The request was properly denied.The statute prohibits the destruction of certain lobsters.State v. Bennett,79 Me. 55, 7 Atl. Rep. 903.It is immaterial where the lobsters were taken, if the defendant possessed them within the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of not liberating them alive, or for destroying them.The cases cited by defendant are authorities against him.In State v. Beat,75 Me. 289, the indictment was for having trout, not alive, in possession during close time, with intent to sell the same in violation of the statute.Although the trout may have been lawfully taken from waters exempt from the operation of the statute, it was held that the possession of such trout, with intent to sell them, was illegal; and the court says: "The taking, the possession, the purpose, would all be lawful; the act of carrying, if, in common phrase or in a legal sense, it could be properly described as a transportation from place to place, would manifestly be wanting in that element of illegality against which it is clear, when all the provisions of the act are examined together, the penalties of that section were directed."So in Allen v. Young,76 Me. 80, it was held that transportation of deer in violation of the letter of the statute, killed before close time, was not illegal, inasmuch as the court says: "We fail to see any motive for making the mere transportation of the hide or carcass of a deer from one place to another a crime, when the deer has been lawfully killed, and is lawfully in the possession of the one who transports it.* * * It has been repeatedly asserted, in both ancient and modern times, that judges may in some cases decide upon a statute even in direct contravention of its terms; that they may depart from the letter, in order to reach the spirit and intent, of the act."Holmes v. Paris,75 Me. 559.The intent of the act in question is to protect lobsters, and to prevent their unreasonable destruction.The act charged is the very thing that the purpose of the act seeks to prevent.

2.The constitutionality of the act of 1885, c. 275, § 3, under which this prosecution is brought, is denied, because penalties are imposed not proportioned to the offense.The object and purpose of the act is to prevent the destruction of lobsters to such a degree as materially to diminish the supply, and preserve a necessary and valuable source of food.The penalty imposed is one dollar for each lobster unlawfully destroyed.Certainly, that penalty is neither excessive nor severe.That the unlawful destruction of many lobsters has created penalties aggregating a large sum signifies no more than a purpose to violate the statutes, regardless of the penalties affixed.It rather shows that the present forfeitures are insufficient to work obedience to the statute than that they are too severe.It can hardly be...