State v. Craig

• Decision Date: 13 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2018-0146,2018-0146
• Citation: 2020 Ohio 455,151 N.E.3d 574,159 Ohio St.3d 398
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. CRAIG, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

159 Ohio St.3d 398

151 N.E.3d 574

2020 Ohio 455

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee,

v.CRAIG, Appellant.

No. 2018-0146

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted March 27, 2019

Decided February 13, 2020

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Anton Lapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and David Hoffmann, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

DeWine, J. {¶ 1} A jury found Steven Craig guilty on two counts in an indictment and hung on a third count. The judge sentenced him to prison on the two counts on which he was convicted. The third count remains pending. Because of this "hanging charge," the First District Court of Appeals dismissed Craig's appeal for lack of a final, appealable order, thereby preventing him from appealing his convictions.

{¶ 2} Both Craig and the state of Ohio ask this court to hold that a conviction on each count of a multicount indictment is a separate, final order that may be appealed upon an entry of conviction and sentence, even if other counts in the indictment remain pending. Because Ohio's final-order statute does not permit such a result, we decline to do so. But we determine that in this case, the trial court's subsequent finding that Craig was incompetent to stand trial on the pending charge operated as a de facto severance of that count from the counts of conviction. We, therefore, conclude that Craig may appeal his convictions, even though the one charge remains unresolved.

The proceedings below

{¶ 3} A grand jury issued an indictment against Steven Craig alleging two counts of felonious assault and one count of rape, all involving the same victim. A jury found Craig guilty of the felonious-assault counts, but it was unable to reach a verdict on the rape count, causing the court to grant a mistrial as to that count. The state indicated that it intended to retry Craig on the rape charge, so that charge was not dismissed. The court entered judgment imposing concurrent seven-year prison sentences on the counts of conviction and remanded Craig to the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to begin serving his sentences. The judgment entry stated that the rape charge was "still pending and has no new trial date."

{¶ 4} Craig attempted to appeal his convictions, but the First District Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the judgment entry was not a final, appealable order because the rape charge remained pending in the trial court. 2017-Ohio-8962, 101 N.E.3d 650, ¶ 12.

{¶ 5} Back in the trial court, questions arose about Craig's competency. After his appeal of the felonious-assault convictions had been dismissed, the trial court found Craig to be incompetent to stand trial on the remaining rape count. The court ordered Craig to undergo treatment in an attempt to restore him to competency and scheduled the case for a status report one year later. See R.C. 2945.38(C)(1)(b). At the status-report hearing, the court concluded that Craig remained incompetent and found by clear and convincing evidence that he committed the offense charged and was a mentally ill person subject to court order. See R.C. 2945.39(A)(2). The court therefore retained jurisdiction over Craig and committed him to the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction pending further review of his competency status. As a result, the proceedings on the pending rape charge have been halted indefinitely, and he remains unable to appeal his convictions.

{¶ 6} We accepted Craig's discretionary appeal from the First District's dismissal order. See 152 Ohio St.3d 1462, 2018-Ohio-1795, 97 N.E.3d 499. He asks the court to adopt the following proposition of law: "In a criminal action involving a multicount indictment, the trial court's failure to dispose of a count on which the jury fails to reach a verdict does not prevent the judgment of conviction on the other counts from being final and appealable." The state joins in Craig's request for this court to reverse the First District's dismissal of his appeal.

Craig's appeal is not moot

{¶ 7} During oral argument in this case, a question arose as to whether Craig's subsequent incompetency adjudication on the rape count resolved that count of the indictment, thereby removing the impediment to Craig's ability to appeal his convictions and rendering the issue presented in this appeal moot.

{¶ 8} We conclude that it is not. When a criminal defendant charged with a first- or second-degree felony offense of violence has not been restored to competency within a one-year period, the trial court may exercise continuing jurisdiction over the defendant if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the charged offense and that he is a mentally ill person subject to court order. R.C. 2945.39(A)(2). The trial court has opted to retain jurisdiction over Craig in this case. During this time, the court is required to periodically review Craig's competency, see R.C. 2945.401(C) and (D), and if the court determines that Craig is capable of understanding the proceedings and assisting in his defense, it "shall order" that Craig is competent to stand trial and that he "shall be proceeded against" on the underlying charge, R.C. 2945.401(J)(2)(a). Thus, Ohio law permits the state to prosecute Craig on the pending rape charge if he is restored to competency at any point prior to the maximum potential incarceration period for that offense—in this case, 11 years. See id. The incompetency adjudication did not resolve the rape count and that charge remains pending. We therefore proceed to address the merits of the issue presented.

Ohio's final-order rule

{¶ 9} The general rule is that all judgments in a case should be reviewed in a single appeal. See Anderson v. Richards , 173 Ohio St. 50, 55, 179 N.E.2d 918 (1962) ; Ashtabula v. Pub. Util. Comm. , 139 Ohio St. 213, 215, 39 N.E.2d 144 (1942). This rule is embodied in the constitutional and statutory provisions establishing the jurisdiction of Ohio's courts of appeals. The Ohio Constitution grants the courts of appeals "such jurisdiction as may be provided by law" to review "judgments or final orders." Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3 (B)(2). The "provided by law" part of the constitutional grant is effectuated through the definition of a "final order" contained in R.C. 2505.02(B).

{¶ 10} Although our Constitution and several statutory provisions use the language "judgments or final orders" when describing appellate-court jurisdiction, Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2) ; R.C. 2501.02 and 2953.02 ; see also R.C. 2505.03, this court has never distinguished between judgments and final orders in determining whether a decision is appealable. Rather, it has consistently said that to be appealable, a decision must meet the requirements set forth in R.C. 2505.02. See , e.g. , Supportive Solutions , L.L.C. v. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow , 137 Ohio St.3d 23, 2013-Ohio-2410, 997 N.E.2d 490, ¶ 10 ("An appellate court can review only final orders, and without a final order, an appellate court has no jurisdiction"), citing Hubbell v. Xenia , 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, ¶ 9, and Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. , 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 540 N.E.2d 266 (1989) ; State v. Baker , 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 6.

{¶ 11} R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) through (7) provide a comprehensive list of "final orders"; conversely, the term "judgment" is not defined in statute. It is perhaps because the legislature has not seen fit to provide a separate definition of "judgment" that this court has used the terms interchangeably for jurisdictional purposes and relied solely upon the statutory definition. See , e.g. , State v. White , 156 Ohio St.3d 536, 2019-Ohio-1215, 130 N.E.3d 247, ¶ 13 ("When valid, a judgment of conviction is a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B)"); Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ. , 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 88, 541 N.E.2d 64 (1989) (explaining that Civ.R. 54(B) applies when the trial court has issued a "final judgment, pursuant to R.C. 2505.02," with respect to fewer than all of the claims or parties).

{¶ 12} We therefore apply the definitions provided by the General Assembly. The relevant subsection of the jurisdictional statute states that an order is final when it "affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment." R.C. 2505.02(B)(1). Important in this case is the meaning of the phrase "determines the action."

{¶ 13} The word "action" has typically been understood to refer to the entire legal proceeding, regardless of how many claims or charges are included in the proceeding. See , e.g. , State v. Goodwin , 9th Dist. Summit No. 23337, 2007-Ohio-2343, 2007 WL 1427473, ¶ 10 (relying on definitions of "action" found in Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's New World Dictionary ); State v. Pippin , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150061, 2016-Ohio-312, 2016 WL 524355, ¶ 6. This understanding is consistent with common parlance. When we say that someone pursued a legal action, we are talking about the entire proceeding, not some discrete part of the proceeding. See, e.g., A Civil Action (Touchstone Pictures 1998).

{¶ 14} In keeping with the common meaning of the term "action," we have explicitly said that the "determines the action" language in R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) contemplates a resolution of the "entire action." In re D.H. , 152 Ohio St.3d 310, 2018-Ohio-17, 95 N.E.3d 389, ¶ 14 ; State ex rel. Daniels v. Russo , 156 Ohio St.3d 143, 2018-Ohio-5194, 123 N.E.3d 1011, ¶ 12.

{¶ 15} Moreover, this court has on numerous occasions indicated that all counts of an indictment must be resolved before a judgment entry of conviction may become a final, appealable order. We have granted a peremptory writ of mandamus directing a trial court to issue a final order "disposing of all" charges. State ex rel. McIntyre v. Summit Cty. Court of Common...