State v. Cramer

• Decision Date: 07 November 1895
• Citation: 33 A. 201,58 N.J.L. 278
• Parties: STATE (BERRY, Prosecutor) v. CRAMER et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

33 A. 201

58 N.J.L. 278

STATE (BERRY, Prosecutor)

v. CRAMER et al.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Nov. 7, 1895.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Certiorari by the state, at the prosecution of Abel J. Berry, against Isaac Cramer and others. Proceedings set aside.

Argued June term, 1895, before VAN SYCKEL, MAGIE, and LIPPINCOTT, JJ.

Wm. E. Potter, for relator.

VAN SYCKEL, J. This writ is prosecuted to test the legality of the proceedings taken by the voters of the township of Stafford in the county of Ocean under the fourth section of the act to regulate the sale of spirituous, vinous, malt, and brewed liquors, passed March 20, 1889 (Pamph. Laws 1889, p. 77). This act fixes a minimum license fee in respect to population. It gives a discretion to courts and other bodies empowered to grant licenses to fix a greater fee; and the fourth section provides "that upon application by a petition signed by at least one-fifth of the legal voters voting at the last previous gubernatorial election for governor, of any township, town, borough or city wherein licenses are required to be granted by the court of common pleas of the county, being made to the law judge or circuit judge in and for the county wherein said township, town, borough or city may be located, setting forth the desire of such petitioners that not less than a certain sum of money, to be named and specified in such petition, be charged and paid for licenses thereafter to be granted to sell the liquors aforesaid or any of them, by less measure than one quart, within such township, town, borough, or city," it shall be the duty of such judge to order an election at which the legal voters shall determine by ballot whether any license shall be granted for any sum less than that specified in such petition.

The first objection to the validity of the proceeding is the radical one that this section of the act is special and local, and therefore unconstitutional. The provisions stated all come within the title of the act, because all tend to regulate the traffic. By the fourth section, elections can be held only in townships, towns, boroughs, and cities wherein licenses are required to be granted by the court of common pleas. The act, therefore, does not apply where licenses proceed from other authorities. This limitation of the exercise of the right to voters in those localities wherein licenses are to be granted by the court, in our judgment, localizes and specializes this provision; for in this respect it is impossible to discover in the characteristic differentiating them from other localities—viz. license by the court—any distinction which will make this legislation germane to them and inappropriate to others. Even if we could take a different view of this question, a very recent decision of this court constrains us to pronounce the act in this respect to be in contravention of that provision of the state constitution that "the legislature shall not pass private, local or special laws regulating the internal affairs of towns and counties." The case referred to is Loucks v. Bradshaw, 56 N. J. Law, 1, 27 Atl. 939, in which the validity of the act entitled "An act to create county boards of license commissioners, and to define their powers and duties," was challenged. That act provides for the appointment of boards of license commissioners by the governor of the state, whose powers are thus defined: "They shall have general supervision and control of the wholesale and retail sale of spirituous, vinous and malt liquors, except where license for the sale thereof has been or may hereafter be granted by a court in their respective counties." The chief justice, who delivered the opinion of the court, holding ...