State v. Crandall
| Decision Date | 24 October 1939 |
| Docket Number | 44836. |
| Citation | 288 N.W. 85,227 Iowa 311 |
| Parties | STATE v. CRANDALL. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Washington County; J. G. Patterson Judge.
The defendant was indicted and convicted of the crime of assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury upon Cecil Replogle, and appealed from the judgment.
Affirmed.
Louis J. Kehoe, of Washington, for appellant.
Fred D Everett, Atty. Gen., Jens Grothe, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Richard A. Stewart, Co. Atty., of Washington, for the State.
The offense of which the defendant was convicted took place on November 11, 1938, in Washington, Iowa. He was then eighteen years old, and lived in said city with his parents. Cecil Replogle, upon whom the alleged assault was made, was seventeen years old, and lived with his parents on a farm near Washington. The boys had been acquainted since the fall of 1935, and associated with about the same young people in that community. In July, 1938, the defendant became acquainted with Replogle's fifteen year old sister, and had a few dates with her. Her parents objected to her being out until midnight, and to her keeping company with any of the boys, and asked Cecil to aid in enforcing their wishes in this matter. He admonished the defendant of his parents' wishes. The defendant resented this and persisted in his attentions to the young lady, and the record discloses no protest on her part. The two boys had a few wordy altercations over the matter, with an occasional blow. Each one accused the other of trying to run him off the highways in the operation of their automobiles, and of cutting in too soon in passing. As witnesses at the trial, each blamed the other as the aggressor and the one at fault. Each had the support of particular friends, and their accounts of what took place on these occasions were conflicting. It is not surprising that there was an unfortunate ending to the feud of these young people. On November 11, 1938, there was a football game in the afternoon at Columbus Junction. Cecil took his sister and a number of young people in his car, and the defendant rode in a car driven by Stanley McKeown. There was testimony that the McKeown car cut in very abruptly ahead of the Replogle car. That night after the game and after all had returned to Washington, the defendant and McKeown, in the latter's car, followed Replogle as he was taking a young lady to her home. Both cars came to a stop in the street in front of the young lady's home. There was another young girl who remained in the rear seat of Replogle's car. All three boys got out of their cars, and engaged in a heated discussion. There is a variance in their accounts of just what took place, but all agree that the defendant and Replogle engaged in a fight in which the defendant threw Replogle to the ground and kept him there until he had " taken back" certain claimed things he had said about the defendant, and had promised to behave better toward the defendant in the future. Replogle then got behind the wheel in his car and started the motor with his foot pressed on the clutch. The left front door of the car was open. It was hinged in front. The glass in the door was up, thus closing the opening. Both agree as to this. Defendant stood with his left hand on the steering wheel and his right hand on the back of the front seat. The boys were still engaged in conversation. As witnesses they disagreed as to what was said and as to what subsequently took place. The defendant and McKeown testified that, after calling the defendant a vile name, Replogle started the car violently forward and closed the door forcibly, catching the defendant's right wrist between the door and the frame, thus shattering the glass in the door, and dragging the defendant forward, partly on the ground, for about three car lengths. Replogle denied this and testified that he gradually eased in the clutch, and the door swung shut with the forward movement of the car, and that then the defendant jumped on the running board, and struck at Replogle with his left fist and drove it through the glass, causing the pieces and particles of glass to scatter over the inside of the car. One of these slivers of glass struck Replogle's right eye ball, so cutting and injuring it that he lost the sight thereof. The young lady in the rear seat of the car corroborated Replogle in his version of what took place, particularly as to what happened after the scuffle outside of the car.
On this appeal the defendant assigns and argues the four following errors as grounds for reversal: 1. The court erred in overruling defendant's motion for a new trial based on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict of the jury. 2. The court erred in overruling defendant's motion for a directed verdict, at the conclusion of the evidence. 3. The court erred in admitting evidence of the operation of the McKeown car on the afternoon of November 11th, on the road to Columbus Junction, and in overruling defendant's motion to strike the same after it became apparent, beyond dispute, that the defendant was not driving that car and had no control over it. 4. The court erred in admitting evidence of the state's rebuttal witness, Keisey, an officer who arrested defendant, over the objection of the defendant that the testimony was not rebuttal, and a violation of the rule requiring notice of additional testimony, and in refusing to strike this testimony. The italicized statements, in the examination following, is the testimony of which defendant complains. Keisey testified as follows:
Defendant excepts.
A. I saw him first at the Sinclair station, the Sinclair Oil Station.
Q. Where is that? A. On North Marion Ave.
Q. Go ahead and tell what happened there. Defendant objects as not rebuttal.
Court: Overruled.
Defendant excepts.
A. The deputy sheriff and I went down and got Crandall at the filling station and took him to the county jail.
Q. What was said down at the filling station, if anything?
Defendant objects as not rebuttal.
Court: I think the Court should know what he is ruling on.
Q. Mr. Keisey tell the court and jury what was said down at the filling station by the defendant. Defendant objects as not rebuttal.
Court: Overruled.
Defendant excepts.
A. Crandall was sleeping under the filling station, and I called to him to come out and he came out and the deputy sheriff with me told him he better come with us, and Crandall said ‘ I was afraid of that.’
Q. Where did you take him? A. To the County Jail.
Q. Did you have any further conversation with him? Defendant objects as not rebuttal, if anything it is part of the State's case.
Court: Overruled.
Defendant excepts.
Q. What did Crandall say if anything? A. We asked him to tell us his story and he says: ‘ Well, I finally caught up with the guy.’
Q. Was there anything more said? A. He told us what happened.
The defendant objects to all this testimony, as not rebuttal and moves to strike it out for that reason."
Under the first two assignments of error, the defendant contends that the state failed to establish the allegations of the indictment with evidence sufficient to warrant the submission of the case to the jury, or to sustain the verdict of the jury. The defendant was charged with the crime of assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury. This is a crime which is not susceptible of exact definition. It is also difficult to define with exactness or definite limitations just what a great bodily injury is. We have said at different times that it is an injury to the person of a more grave and serious character than an ordinary battery, but that it cannot be definitely defined. State v. Gillett, 56 Iowa 459, 9 N.W. 362; State v. Ockij, 165 Iowa 237, 145 N.W. 486; State v. Schumann, 187 Iowa 1212, 175 N.W. 75; State v. Dickson, 200 Iowa 17, 202 N.W. 225; State v. Grimm, 206 Iowa 1178, 221 N.W. 804.It is not necessary, in fact, that there be any injury inflicted, as where one attempts to inflict the injury, but fails. State v. Shaver, 197 Iowa 1028, 198 N.W. 329; State v. Steinke, 185 Iowa 481, 170 N.W. 801.While the extent of the injury may be taken into consideration as bearing upon the intent, it is not, in itself, determinative of that intent. State v. Grimm, supra. The gist, or the foundation of the offense, as this court has repeatedly held, is the intent with which the injury is inflicted, or attempted. State v. Malcolm, 8 Iowa 413, 415; State v. Parker, 66 Iowa 586, 589, 24 N.W. 225, and cases cited above. " The intent with which an action is done is an act or emotion of the mind, seldom if ever capable of direct and positive proof, but is to be arrived at by such just and reasonable deduction or inferences, from the acts and facts proved, as the guarded judgment of a candid and cautious man would draw ordinarily therefrom." State v. Gillett, supra [56 Iowa 459, 9 N.W. 363]. Necessarily, then, the intent, in most cases must be established circumstantially, and by legitimate inferences from the evidence. State v. Shaver, supra; State v. Gillett, supra; State v. Schumann, supra. As stated in State v. Grimm, supra: " This intent is disclosed by the circumstances attending the assault, together with all relevant facts and circumstances antedating the assault." See also State v. Woodward, 84 Iowa 172, 50 N.W. 885.
The principle that one intends the natural result of his act, has repeatedly been stated by the court. In State v. Gillett above cited, we approved as sound law an instruction, stating that: " The law warrants the presumption or inference that a person intends the results or...
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