State v. Craner

Decision Date11 April 2002
Docket NumberNo. 27608.,27608.
Citation137 Idaho 188,45 P.3d 844
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Dickie Ray CRANER, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals

Molly J. Huskey, Interim State Appellate Public Defender; Nancy C. Luebbert, Special Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Moscow, for appellant.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; William A. Loomis, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

PERRY, Chief Judge.

Dickie Ray Craner appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence for aggravated battery. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

Craner was charged with aggravated battery, I.C. §§ 18-903, -907, after he threw a large rock at Cecilio Medrano and fractured Medrano's hip. A jury found Craner guilty following a trial. The district court ordered a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) but did not order a psychological evaluation. No objection was made to the lack of a psychological evaluation, and Craner did not specifically request such an evaluation for purposes of sentencing. The district court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Craner to a unified term of fifteen years, with a minimum period of confinement of ten years. Craner appeals, claiming that the district court abused its discretion by not sua sponte ordering a psychological evaluation because there was substantial evidence demonstrating that Craner's crime was likely the result of a mental condition.

The determination of whether to obtain a psychological evaluation lies within the sentencing court's discretion. I.C. § 19-2522(1); I.C.R. 32(d); State v. Jones, 132 Idaho 439, 442, 974 P.2d 85, 88 (Ct.App.1999). The legal standards governing the court's decision whether to order a psychological evaluation and report are contained in I.C. § 19-2522. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522(1), if there is reason to believe that the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the sentencing court must appoint a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the defendant's mental condition.

Previous decisions indicate that even if there is reason to believe the defendant's mental condition will be a significant factor at sentencing, the court nonetheless may deny a request for a new evaluation if the information contained in existing reports satisfies the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 879, 876 P.2d 158, 161 (Ct.App.1994). Accordingly, we will uphold the district court's failure to order a psychological evaluation if the record supports a finding that there was no reason to believe a defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing or if the information already before the court adequately meets the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). Id. Where a defendant fails to request a psychological evaluation or object to the PSI on the ground that an evaluation has not been performed, the defendant must demonstrate that by failing to order a psychological evaluation the sentencing court manifestly disregarded the provisions of I.C.R. 32. Jones, 132 Idaho at 442,974 P.2d at 88.

Here, the record reflects that Craner woke up on the morning his offense was committed, went into the bathroom, and shaved off all of his hair. When Craner came out of the bathroom, he ordered everyone in the house to leave. Craner became angry and began choking his mother. When Craner's brother attempted to defend his mother, Craner attacked him. Craner then turned on Medrano. After Medrano exited the home, Craner threw a large rock at Medrano and fractured his hip. As Medrano tried to escape, Craner grabbed a tire iron and chased Medrano around a car, threatening to kill him. An officer who responded to the incident found Craner standing outside without any clothing on. As the officer placed Craner in handcuffs, Craner stated that he was being poisoned through his hair by the other occupants of the home.

Attached to Craner's PSI was a report of an incident at the jail that occurred three days after Craner's arrest. According to the report, Craner was being held in maximum security because he was a threat to himself and to others. Craner was banging on the walls of his cell and yelling. In addition, he was standing on the toilet seat and repeating that someone was going to kill him. A special response team was called in to...

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17 cases
  • State v. Clinton
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • August 20, 2012
    ...148 Idaho at 822, 229 P.3d at 1184; State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 366, 195 P.3d 723, 725 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188, 189, 45 P.3d 844, 845 (Ct. App. 2002). As with any discretionary decision, however, the district court's action must be consistent with applicable lega......
  • Rinke v. State
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • May 18, 2018
    ...evaluation if information in existing reports satisfies the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). See State v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188, 189, 45 P.3d 844, 845 (Ct. App. 2002). However, not every mental health report complies with the exacting requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). See, e.g., State v.......
  • State v. Green
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • June 22, 2015
  • State v. JOCKUMSEN
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • April 1, 2010
    ...court's discretion. I.C.R. 32(d); State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 366, 195 P.3d 723, 725 (Ct. App.2008); State v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188, 189, 45 P.3d 844, 845 (Ct.App.2002); Jones, 132 Idaho at 442, 974 P.2d at 88. As with any discretionary decision, however, the district court's action mus......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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