State v. Crawford, 98,312.

Citation185 P.3d 315
Decision Date13 June 2008
Docket NumberNo. 98,312.,98,312.
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. James Gail Cody CRAWFORD, Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kansas
185 P.3d 315
STATE of Kansas, Appellee,
v.
James Gail Cody CRAWFORD, Appellant.
No. 98,312.
Court of Appeals of Kansas.
June 13, 2008.

[185 P.3d 316]

Rachel Pickering and Sarah Morrison, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Gerald R. Kuckelman, county attorney, and Paul J. Morrison, attorney general, for appellee.

Before HILL, P.J., ELLIOTT and PIERRON, JJ.

HILL, P.J.


This appeal raises the question of whether an adult sentence can be consecutive to a juvenile sanction. This is the first time this issue has been addressed in Kansas. A court's power to impose consecutive sentences flows from statutory authority. Kansas sentencing statutes require some consecutive sentences in certain cases and give the court discretion to impose consecutive sentences in other circumstances. Because none of the consecutive-sentence statutes expressly include probations or imprisonments arising from juvenile adjudications, we hold the district court had no authority to impose a consecutive adult sentence. We vacate the sentence and remand.

The case history reveals a juvenile is certified to stand trial on an adult offense after his adjudication as a juvenile offender.

Certified as an adult, in December 2006, James Gail Cody Crawford pled no contest to burglary and theft, severity level 9 nonperson felonies. The district court accepted his plea and found him guilty of both counts. Based on Crawford's prior juvenile adjudications, the court determined Crawford's criminal history to be a C. The sentencing court then granted Crawford presumptive probation for each offense, ordering these sentences to run consecutive to one another. As a condition to his probation, the sentencing court ordered Crawford to serve 4 weekends in the Atchison County Jail. In addition, because Crawford was on probation for juvenile adjudications of burglary and theft, the sentencing court ordered his adult sentences to run consecutive to his juvenile sanction, even though Crawford objected.

Following sentencing, Crawford filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, claiming the sentencing court erred in ruling his adult sentences consecutive to his juvenile adjudications. When a hearing took place,

185 P.3d 317

Crawford was in the custody of the Kansas Juvenile Correctional Complex in Topeka, Kansas, serving 18 months for his juvenile adjudications. After hearing arguments, the district court denied Crawford's motion. The district court ruled that "the court has the authority to order that the sentence resulting in probation, 2006 CR 597 may be ordered served with probation not starting until [Crawford] is released from custody in 2006 JV 96."

Our standard of review and the applicable canon of statutory construction are fundamental.

Whether a sentence is illegal within the meaning of K.S.A. 22-3504 is a question of law over which the appellate court's review is unlimited. State v. Breedlove, 285 Kan. 1006, 1009, 179 P.3d 1115 (2008); see State v. Flores, 283 Kan. 380, 382, 153 P.3d 506 (2007). An "illegal" sentence, as contemplated by K.S.A. 22-3504(1), is a sentence which does not conform to the statutory provision, either in the character or the term of the punishment authorized. State v. Davis, 283 Kan. 767, 769, 156 P.3d 665 (2007). Therefore, in applying these legal principles, this court should follow the rules of statutory interpretation.

"`The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute. [Citation omitted.] The general rule is that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to the criminal statute. The rule of strict construction, however, is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design and intent. [Citations omitted.] In construing statutes and determining legislative intent, several provisions of an act, in pari materia, must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony if possible. [Citation omitted.]' [Citation omitted.]" In re W.H., 274 Kan. 813, 818-19, 57 P.3d 1 (2002).

Going further, we believe the latin phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius governs our statutory interpretations here. The rule states:

"`The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, i.e., the inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another, may be applied to assist in determining actual legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest, although the maxim should not be employed to override or defeat a clearly contrary legislative intention. [Citations omitted.] Under this rule, when legislative intent is in question, we can presume that when the legislature expressly includes specific terms, it intends to exclude any items not expressly included in the specific list. [Citation omitted.]' [Citation omitted.]" State v. Moffit, 38 Kan.App.2d 414, 419, 166 P.3d 435 (2007).

A review of consecutive-sentence statutes is instructive.

We must examine statutory concepts for this issue because common-law principles do not apply. Our Supreme Court has recognized the power to impose consecutive sentencing is found only within statutory authority and not through common-law authority. In W.H. the court stated: "From its early beginnings, Kansas relied upon statutory authority to impose consecutive sentencing even though Kansas may recognize that a court had the common-law authority to impose consecutive sentences. [Citation omitted.] The common-law rule was abrogated by statute in 1855." 274 Kan. at 817, 57 P.3d 1.

Our statutes authorize consecutive sentences in three types of cases:

• when a court is imposing multiple sentences (K.S.A. 21-4608);

• when sentencing for certain specified crimes committed on or after July 1, 1993 (K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4603d[f]);

• and, as an exercise of judicial discretion (K.S.A. 21-4720[b]). Pertinent excerpts from those laws follow:

K.S.A. 21-4608, which deals with multiple sentences, provides in relevant part:

185 P.3d 318

"(c) Any person who is convicted and sentenced for a crime committed while on probation, assigned to a community correctional services program, on parole, on conditional release or on postrelease supervision for a felony shall serve the sentence consecutively to the term or terms under which the person was on probation, assigned to a community correctional services program or on parole or conditional release.

. . . .

"(e)(1) Any person who is convicted and...

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  • State v. Quested, 106,805.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • June 26, 2015
    ...P.2d 1345 (1995), is contrary to the reasoning in another Court of Appeals decision, State v. Crawford, 39 Kan.App.2d 897, Syl. ¶¶ 2–3, 185 P.3d 315 (2008). He argues that under Crawford, a judge lacks the authority to impose consecutive sentences unless specifically authorized by statute.T......
  • State v. Jones
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • November 23, 2022
    ...in few cases nationally but the results mirror this court's resolution in the instant case. In State v. Crawford , 39 Kan.App.2d 897, 185 P.3d 315 (2008), the Kansas appellate court ruled that the trial court had no statutory authority to impose an adult sentence to be served subsequent to ......
  • State v. Boyer, 98,763.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • June 19, 2009
    ...20 Kan.App.2d 596, 890 P.2d 364 (1995); State v. Fischer, 22 Kan.App.2d 568, 919 P.2d 368 (1996); State v. Crawford, 39 Kan.App.2d 897, 185 P.3d 315 (2008); and State v. Sims, 40 Kan.App.2d 119, 190 P.3d 271 (2008), concluding that "[i]n each of these cases, courts have noted the care with ......
  • State v. Jones
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • November 23, 2022
    ...in few cases nationally but the results mirror this court's resolution in the instant case. In State v. Crawford, 39 Kan.App.2d 897, 185 P.3d 315 (2008), the Kansas appellate court ruled that the trial court had no statutory authority to impose an adult sentence to be served subsequent to C......
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