State v. Creech

• Decision Date: 20 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. 15475,15475
• Citation: 109 Idaho 592,710 P.2d 502
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thomas CREECH, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 502

710 P.2d 502

109 Idaho 592

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thomas CREECH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15475.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

June 20, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 31, 1985.

Alan E. Trimming and Rolf M. Kehne of Ada County Public Defender's Office, Boise, for defendant-appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., and Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

DONALDSON, Chief Justice.

This appeal involves defendant's post-conviction relief proceedings. The circumstances leading up to defendant's conviction and sentencing are set out in State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983) cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1327, 79 L.Ed. 722 (1984). The proceedings subsequent to defendant's sentencing were as follows.

On May 19, 1983, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion "1) the guilty plea in this case was accepted conditionally because the psychological examinations were not reported or finished by the time of the guilty plea ...;

[109 Idaho 593] was filed pursuant to I.C.R. 33(c) and alleged the following:

"2) At the time of his guilty plea the appellant believed he had no defenses to the charge and he knowingly waived no defenses;

"3) appellant now realizes that the unprovoked, deadly-force attack on him by David Jensen negates the malice needed to make a killing murder;

"4) appellant never knowingly or intentionally waived the right to take his case to a jury authorized by law to convict him of manslaughter, a lesser included offense of murder;

"5) appellant now realizes that the psychological testing gives him a legal defense to the charge in that as Mr. Creech exceeded the lawful bounds of self-defense he did so because, due to mental disease or defect, he lost capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law;

"6) at the time of his plea the appellant had no idea he had an insanity defense to the charge and he did not knowingly, intelligently waive this defense;

"7) Tom Creech believed that his life would be in jeopardy from the administration of the prison if he revealed the causes and events which led to Jensen's attack upon him;

"8) threats were made upon the lives of appellant's family after his not guilty plea which pressured him to waive his trial and plead guilty;

"9) defendant's guilty plea was caused by improper medical care:

"(a) during the period of time his case was before the district court, Tom Creech needed medication to maintain his brain chemistry in normal balance;

"(b) during the pendency of this case before the guilty plea the defendant was not maintained on his prescribed, antidepressant medication;

"(c) the interruption of the defendant's prescription medicines by the neglect of State medics caused the suicidal depression which led defendant to plead guilty."

Four days later, on May 23, 1983, this Court filed its opinion affirming defendant's conviction and death sentence. On May 27, 1983, the district court heard arguments by both parties as to whether a hearing would be necessary on defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the defendant's request for a hearing and took the matter under advisement. Then, on June 23, 1983, the district court issued an order refusing to rule on defendant's motion to withdraw his plea until defendant's direct appeal was finally remitted and returned to the district court by the Idaho Supreme Court. The remittitur was subsequently issued by the Supreme Court on September 21, 1983. In the meantime, however, the defendant appealed the district court's refusal to rule on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On January 24, 1984, this Court dismissed that appeal because the district court's order was not an appealable order and remanded the case immediately for all further proceedings on all pending matters. That same day, the district court, in response to the Supreme Court's remand, issued the following order:

"The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho having returned and remitted this case back to this court for further proceedings on all pending matters, in accordance with its Order dated January 24, 1984, and it appearing to this court that all remaining post trial matters should be rigidly structured by this court so as to expeditiously handle such matters, and prevent excessive delay, and good cause appearing therefore:

"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that all Uniform Post-conviction act proceedings, Habeas Corpus proceedings, and all other post trial motions of either party, be filed with this court not later than February "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that a hearing under the provisions of § 19-2715 of the Idaho Code is set by this court, on its own motion, for Monday, February 27, 1984 at 9:00 a.m., in front of this court."

[109 Idaho 594] 6, 1984. Any not filed will be deemed by this court to be waived by the parties hereto. Hearing on these matters, if any, shall commence February 21, 1984, at 10:00 a.m., and continue thereafter until completely disposed of by this court.

Pursuant to that order, defendant renewed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. No other post-conviction relief was requested by defendant. On February 21-23, and February 27, 1984, all evidence admitted in prior proceedings was judicially noted and testimony was received on defendant's motion. Then, on March 6, 1984, the district court issued the following order;

"This court, after considering the defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea, denies his request. (See Rule 33(c) of the Idaho Criminal Rules) Thomas Eugene Creech's plea and my sentence will stand! No Manifest injustice has been shown. A sentence of death is a tragic and extraordinary penalty, but when it is legally and properly imposed, execution must follow, or surely we are not a nation ruled and governed by law.

"IT IS SO ORDERED."

Defendant now appeals, challenging the district court's denial of his motion, the lack of findings supporting the district court's denial and the propriety of the district court's January 24, 1984, order consolidating all of defendant's post-conviction motions into one proceeding.

I.

I.C.R. 33(c) establishes the standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea. That section provides: "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea."

"This distinction rests upon practical considerations important to the proper administration of justice.... Before sentencing, the inconvenience to court and prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as compared with the public interest in protecting the right of the accused to trial by jury. But if a plea of guilty could be retracted with ease after sentence, the accused might be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment, and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe.... The result would be to undermine respect for the courts and fritter away the time and painstaking effort devoted to the sentencing process." (Emphasis in original). Russell v. State, 105 Idaho 497, 500, 670 P.2d 904, 907, (Ct.App.1983) (quoting Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir.1963)).

In this instance, defendant's motion was filed after sentence was imposed by the district court. Therefore, the district court's inquiry should have, and apparently was, focused on whether manifest injustice would result by not allowing defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court found no manifest injustice in allowing defendant's guilty plea to stand.

A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the sound discretion of the district court. Kienlen v. U.S., 379 F.2d 20, 24 (10th Cir.1967). "With these principles in mind we must look to the whole record before us to determine whether it is manifestly injust to preclude withdrawal of [defendant's] guilty plea." Id. In his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the defendant enumerated nine grounds for allowing the withdrawal. These grounds can be synthesized into five grounds. Each will be reviewed in turn. First, in allegations 1, 5 and 6, the defendant submits that he entered his plea conditionally. His position is based on the following colloquy that occurred on Friday, August 28, 1981, when defendant entered his guilty plea.

"Mr. Kehne: I would just like to state that Mr. Creech has been seen by Dr. Stoner for psychiatric evaluations, and those evaluations are not completed at this time. We would like to reserve the right to come back to the court and withdraw the plea if it turns out Mr. Creech is in some way not competent to make this decision.

"The Court: I gather you have no objection to that, Mr. Harris?

"Mr. Harris: No.

"The Court: The court is certainly going to rely on this report before I make any changes."

On December 8, 1981, Dr. Stoner issued a report which could be the basis for an insanity defense. He testified at the sentencing hearing on January 11, 1982, that at the time of the murder, the defendant was incapable of understanding the wrongfulness of his conduct. The defendant filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on May 19, 1983, almost a year and a half later. Defendant maintains that until he studied the appeal briefs he did not understand what Dr. Stoner's testimony could mean for him. Defendant also claims that during this time lag his counselors and family talked him into withdrawing his plea.

The State points to several flaws in defendant's position. The State first asserts that the most damaging evidence against Creech on this point is the time lag between the completion of Dr. Stoner's psychiatric examination and defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. It is the State's position that defendan...