State v. Creighton
| Decision Date | 27 July 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-331-C,82-331-C |
| Citation | 462 A.2d 980 |
| Parties | STATE v. William CREIGHTON. A. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
The defendant, William Creighton (Creighton), is before us on an appeal following the return of guilty verdicts against him by a Superior Court jury on charges that he had committed first-degree sexual assaults against his stepson and his own sister during the latter part of 1980. The stepson incident occurred during the evening hours between December 5 and December 6, and his sexual involvement with his sister took place in the month of November, sometime between the tenth and the thirtieth.
At the time in question, Creighton and his wife, Lorraine, lived in a duplex house situated on Hillard Street in Providence. Also living at the Creighton residence was Robin, Creighton's seventeen-year-old married sister, and three of Lorraine's children by a previous marriage, nine-year-old John, ten-year-old Bobby, and three-year-old Sherry. The upper floor of the duplex consisted of three bedrooms: one belonged to Creighton and his wife; another was occupied by John, who slept there with his brother Bobby; and the third bedroom was Sherry's exclusive domain. Robin slept downstairs on the living-room couch.
Robin testified that sometime during a twenty-day period in November 1980 her brother woke her up from a sound sleep and raped her. Robin told no one about the incident until the following month. She explained her silence by saying that she was afraid of her brother and wanted to remain in the house because she "felt sorry for the kids."
John testified that sometime around 4 a.m. on December 6, 1980, he was awakened by noise coming from downstairs in either the kitchen or the parlor, and subsequently, John explained, he and his stepfather went upstairs to the Creighton bedroom where, in John's words, Creighton "stuck his penis up my rear end."
In his appeal Creighton first claims that the trial justice erred when he allowed a member of the Providence police department to testify concerning what John told him when the police arrived at the Creighton home at approximately 6 p.m. on December 6, 1980.
Robin was the catalyst that made the police aware of what was going on at the Creighton home. At approximately 5:30 p.m. on December 6, 1980, a patrolman, in responding to a call, went to a phone booth situated near an Olneyville Square car wash and there talked with Robin. The patrolman then summoned his sergeant, who in turn contacted the department's Juvenile Division.
One of the department's juvenile specialists was Detective Thomas F. Blessington. Upon his arrival, the police and Robin drove over to the Creighton duplex. Detective Blessington told the jury that once he arrived on the premises, he took John into a separate room and asked him what had happened. The officer acknowledged that after he had made the initial inquiry, John broke down and cried and denied that anything had happened and then became very emotional. John, the officer said, was very scared at the time but, after receiving the detective's reassurance, told the officer what had occurred. The officer testified that John said that Creighton had come into John's room and brought him into Creighton's room. There he was told to take off his clothes and lie on the bed. Creighton removed his clothes, got onto the bed, and proceeded with an "act of anal intercourse and sodomy on the child." The detective acknowledged that the phrase an "act of anal intercourse and sodomy" was his and not John's.
Creighton argues that John's conversation with the detective cannot be considered within the so-called "spontaneous-utterance" exception to the rule barring the use of hearsay evidence. The trial justice thought otherwise, and so do we.
The admissibility of statements purporting to be spontaneous utterances is a matter directed to the sound discretion of the trial justice. Strict contemporaneity is not required. Generally speaking, a less demanding time requirement is necessary in sexual-offense cases, particularly when the victim is a child of tender years. The trial justice must determine from all the facts whether the declarant, when he spoke, was laboring under the stress of nervous excitement. State v. Souza, R.I., 456 A.2d 775, 778 (1983); State v. Potter, R.I., 423 A.2d 67, 68 (1980); State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 619, 382 A.2d 526, 529 (1978). The fact that the statement was made in response to an inquiry does not render the spontaneous-utterance doctrine inapplicable. State v. Elzie, 351 So.2d 1174 (La.1977); State v. Simmons, 52 N.J. 538, 247 A.2d 313 (1968); Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 369 (1977).
In placing this issue in its proper time frame, we would first point out that Robin was clearly in error when she said the sodomy incident occurred in...
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