State v. Crespo

• Decision Date: 19 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 19242.,19242.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Victor CRESPO.

317 Conn. 1

115 A.3d 447

STATE of Connecticut

v.Victor CRESPO.

No. 19242.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 1, 2014.

Decided May 19, 2015.

Megan L. Weiss, assistant public defender, with whom was Martin Zeldis, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Leonard C. Boyle, deputy chief state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state's attorney, and Nicholas J. Bove, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD and ROBINSON, Js.

Opinion

PALMER, J.

The primary issue presented by this appeal is whether General Statutes § 54–1c,¹ which renders inadmissible “[a]ny ... statement ... obtained from an accused person who has not been presented to the first session of the court” following his or her arrest, applies to a statement elicited from an accused who, although not presented to the first session of court, provided the statement before the expiration of that first court session, when his presentment still would have been timely. The defendant, Victor Crespo, was charged with one count each of the crimes of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 29–35(a),² having a weapon in a motor vehicle without a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 29–38(a), and possession of an assault weapon in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53–202c (a). To establish the defendant's guilt with respect to these offenses, the state relied, in part, on a written confession that the defendant had given to the police following his arrest. After a trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict.³ The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment; State v. Crespo, 145 Conn.App. 547, 582, 76 A.3d 664 (2013) ; and we granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to two issues. First, did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the trial court properly rejected the defendant's claim under § 54–1c that he was entitled to the suppression of his written statement because he was not presented to the first session of the court and, second, was the evidence sufficient to establish that he had carried a pistol in violation of § 29–35(a) even though the pistol was discovered in the defendant's vehicle. See State v. Crespo, 310 Conn. 953, 953–54, 81 A.3d 1181 (2013). With respect to the first issue, we agree with the Appellate Court and the trial court that § 54–1c did not bar the state's use of the defendant's written statement because § 54–1c is inapplicable when, as in the present case, the statement is elicited prior to the expiration of the first session of court. With respect to the second issue, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant carried the pistol in violation of § 29–35(a). We therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts that the jury reasonably could have found. “On January 18, 2010, at approximately 10:45 p.m., Officer Hugo Stern of the Bridgeport Police Department received a tip from a confidential informant (informant) that [he] had been approached by a man (seller) in the parking lot of the T Market in [the city of] Bridgeport offering to sell the informant an Uzi-type pistol. The informant described the seller as a ‘Hispanic male’ with a ‘[s]lender build, approximately [five foot, seven inches tall], [wearing] a black jacket, blue jeans, and ... a multicolor knitted hat....’ The informant stated that the gun was wrapped in a black plastic garbage bag. The informant told Stern that the seller had removed the gun from a white van ... [that] was parked in the parking lot of the T Market.⁴ Armed with this information, Stern called Officer Frank Delbouno of the Bridgeport Police Department, requesting that Delbouno meet him at the T Market. Stern arrived at the T Market approximately ten minutes later to investigate the informant's tip.

“Upon his arrival at the T Market, Stern immediately saw the defendant standing a few feet away from a white van, which was parked in the parking lot of the T Market. Satisfied that the defendant matched the informant's description of the seller, Stern exited his police cruiser, drew his weapon and ordered the defendant to raise his hands; the defendant complied. After conducting a patdown search of the defendant, which did not produce any weapons, Stern ordered the defendant to lie on the ground; the defendant again complied. Thereafter, Delbouno arrived at the scene to provide backup. Because the side door to the van was completely open, Stern was able to see a black plastic garbage bag inside it, which was similar to that which the informant had described. Stern ordered Delbouno to seize the bag, which he did. Inside the bag, Delbouno found a loaded, semiautomatic Uzi-type pistol.

“While Delbouno was securing the gun, the defendant volunteered, without interrogation, that the van ‘was his vehicle....’ Thereafter, Stern arrested the defendant. After Stern placed the defendant in the backseat of his police cruiser, the defendant voluntarily stated, again unprompted by interrogation, that ‘he was holding the weapon for Fats, who was supposed to meet him later ... in exchange for some heroin folds.’ The informant subsequently appeared on the scene and identified the defendant as the man who had attempted to sell him the gun. The informant further confirmed that the defendant's van was the vehicle from which the seller had retrieved the gun. The defendant was then transported to Bridgeport police headquarters.

“At approximately 10 a.m. the following morning, January 19, 2010, Detective Paul Ortiz of the Bridgeport Police Department approached the defendant and asked him to make a statement. The defendant agreed and executed a waiver of rights, at which time Ortiz advised him of his Miranda⁵ rights.... The defendant then provided a written statement to Ortiz in which he stated that he had agreed to ‘hold the firearm’ in exchange for heroin.” (Citation omitted; footnotes altered.) State v. Crespo, supra, 145 Conn.App. at 550–52, 76 A.3d 664.

After the defendant was convicted of carrying a pistol without a permit, having a weapon in a motor vehicle without a permit, and possession of an assault weapon, he appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly had declined to suppress his written statement to Ortiz in accordance with § 54–1c and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of carrying a pistol without a permit.⁶ The Appellate Court rejected these claims, and we granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to those issues.

I

We first address the defendant's claim that, contrary to the determination of the Appellate Court, the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress his written statement to Ortiz pursuant to § 54–1c.⁷ We are not persuaded by the defendant's claim.⁸

As we indicated, the defendant was arrested in the late evening hours on Monday, January 18, 2010. The defendant contends, and the state does not dispute, that, under § 54–1c, he should have been “presented to the first session of the court” after his arrest, which was held on January 19, 2010. General Statutes § 54–1c. The parties also agree that the defendant was not presented in court until January 20, 2010. The defendant claims that the written statement that he gave to Ortiz at about 10 a.m. on January 19, 2010, was inadmissible because the statute clearly and unambiguously provides that “[a]ny ... statement ” made by a defendant who has not been presented to the court in a timely manner must be suppressed.⁹ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 54–1c. The state contends that the suppression remedy of § 54–1c applies only to statements that an accused person makes after the time that the person should have been presented in court pursuant to § 54–1c. We agree with the state.

The meaning of § 54–1c is a question of statutory interpretation over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Thomas v. Dept. of Developmental Services, 297 Conn. 391, 399, 999 A.2d 682 (2010). “The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply.... In seeking to determine [the] meaning [of a statute], General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered .... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter .... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

We begin our analysis with the language of the statute. Section 54–1c provides in relevant part that “[a]ny ... statement ... obtained from an accused person who has not been presented to the first session of the court, or on the day specified for arraignment under the provisions of section 54–1g ... shall be inadmissible.” In the defendant's view, although his written statement to Ortiz was obtained before he should have been presented in court, the statement nevertheless is inadmissible because the statute clearly and unambiguously...