State v. Crisler

Decision Date03 March 1994
Docket NumberNo. 12467-3-III,12467-3-III
Citation73 Wn.App. 219,868 P.2d 204
PartiesThe STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Mistie B. CRISLER, Appellant.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals

Eric M. Christianson and Barker & Howard, Wenatchee, for appellant.

Judith L. McCauley, Pros. Atty., and Frank W. Jenny, Deputy Pros. Atty., Waterville, for respondent.

SCHULTHEIS, Judge.

Mistie B. Crisler appeals the judgment on a jury verdict that she was guilty of second degree theft. She contends that the prosecution for theft was barred on double jeopardy grounds. We affirm.

The parties have submitted an agreed report of proceedings, which is the sole record for review. Pertinent portions are paraphrased below.

On December 9, 1991, Ms. Crisler and another woman entered the Lamonts store in East Wenatchee. After some discussion, they each grabbed an armload of clothing and ran out the door. Store personnel chased them, and they dropped the clothing. It was later recovered in the parking lot.

Ms. Crisler was cited by the City of East Wenatchee for criminal conspiracy under RCW 9A.28.040. On December 10, she was arraigned in District Court and pleaded guilty. The court accepted the plea and entered a finding of guilt. Ms. Crisler was not represented by counsel at the time.

On December 11, 1991, Ms. Crisler was charged by information in Superior Court with second degree theft arising out of the same incident. On March 10, 1992, a jury trial was held on the theft charge. Over defense counsel's objection, the court gave an accomplice instruction, WPIC 10.51, based on evidence the women had discussed stealing jointly--one of the women was heard to say "Let's go" immediately before they ran out of the door with the stolen merchandise. The total value of the clothing taken by Ms. Crisler and the other woman exceeded $250.

The jury found Ms. Crisler guilty of second degree theft arising from the same incident as the conspiracy charge. An earlier agreement had been reached between the Douglas County prosecutor and the East Wenatchee city prosecutor to continue the sentencing on the conspiracy charge pending resolution of the theft charge.

Defense counsel did not learn of the earlier plea until March 18, approximately 1 week after the theft trial. He was appointed to represent Ms. Crisler in the sentencing phase of the conspiracy matter. On March 23, Ms. Crisler filed a motion seeking dismissal of the theft charge based on double jeopardy.

On April 1, 1992, judgment was entered on the second degree theft charge. Under the first offender option, the standard range sentence was waived and Ms. Crisler received a 15-day sentence. On April 15, the conspiracy charge was dismissed upon motion of the East Wenatchee prosecuting attorney. Ms. Crisler's motion for dismissal of the theft charge based on double jeopardy was denied by order filed June 30. The court also denied Ms. Crisler's motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed.

Ms. Crisler contends the prosecution for second degree theft was precluded by the double jeopardy proscription of both the state and federal constitutions.

The United States Constitution provides in relevant part that no person shall be "subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ...". U.S. Const. amend. 5. This double jeopardy clause prohibits a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or after conviction, and prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Laviollette, 118 Wash.2d 670, 674, 826 P.2d 684 (1992). Due to their similarity, the state double jeopardy clause and the federal double jeopardy clause receive the same interpretation in Washington. State v. Kirk, 64 Wash.App. 788, 790-91, 828 P.2d 1128, review denied, 119 Wash.2d 1025, 838 P.2d 691 (1992).

In resolving Ms. Crisler's claim of double jeopardy, there are two questions to be answered: Was the court's acceptance of her guilty plea a "conviction" subject to double jeopardy protection? If so, was she subsequently prosecuted for the "same offense" to which she had pleaded guilty?

As to whether the court's acceptance of a guilty plea is a conviction, the courts have held that "the entry of a plea of guilty, standing alone, unless specially made so by statute does not constitute a conviction." (Italics ours.) Tembruell v. Seattle, 64 Wash.2d 503, 510, 392 P.2d 453 (1964). In this case, there is a statute which specifically makes a plea of guilty constitute a conviction. RCW 9.94A.030(9) provides:

"Conviction" means an adjudication of guilt pursuant to Titles 10 or 13 RCW and includes a verdict of guilty, a finding of guilty, and acceptance of a plea of guilty.

(Italics ours.)

The State contends that, according to the official commentary, this statute was not intended to apply for double jeopardy purposes. Washington Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, Implementation Manual, at II-10 (1992). However, the actual text of the commentary does not support this assertion. The comment is silent on whether the definition applies to double jeopardy contexts.

Moreover, the commentary does say that the statute applies for purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, which determines the punishment meted out to guilty offenders. As mentioned above, multiple punishments are indeed limited by the double jeopardy clause. Laviollette, 118 Wash.2d at 674, 826 P.2d 684. As acceptance of a guilty plea has already been defined as a conviction for some purposes governed by the double jeopardy clause, it is only fair to treat acceptance of a guilty plea as a conviction for all double jeopardy purposes. The State has brought no statute to the court's attention which requires a contrary result. Consequently, the court's acceptance of a guilty plea is a conviction for double jeopardy purposes.

The next question is whether the charges for criminal conspiracy and second degree theft as an accomplice are the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes.

In Laviollette, at 674, 826 P.2d 684, Washington adopted the rationale of Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • State v. Gocken
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • June 22, 1995
    ... . Page 95 . 127 Wn.2d 95 . 896 P.2d 1267 . The STATE of Washington, Respondent, . v. . Frederick Leslie GOCKEN, Petitioner. . The STATE of Washington, Respondent, . v. . Mistie B. CRISLER, Petitioner. . Nos. 61482-2, 61603-5. . Supreme Court of Washington, . En Banc. . June 22, 1995. . Page 97 .         [896 P.2d 1268] Joseph Cooney Legal Services, Leslie Loukkola and Frank A. Malone, Spokane, for petitioner Gocken. .         Eric M. Christianson, Wenatchee, ......
  • In re Percer
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • August 21, 2003
    .......         In a single charging document, the State charged Percer with multiple felonies, including second degree felony murder, vehicular homicide, taking a motor vehicle without the owner's ... Percer, 111 Wash.App. at 849, 47 P.3d 576 (citing State v. Crisler, 73 Wash.App. 219, 222-23, 868 P.2d 204 (1994), aff'd sub nom. State v. Gocken, 127 Wash.2d 95, 896 P.2d 1267 (1995) ). The Court of Appeals' ......
  • State v. Higley
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Washington
    • June 13, 1995
    ...... United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1353, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977); Serfass, at 388, 95 S.Ct. at 1062; State v. Culp, 30 Wash.App. 879, 881, 639 P.2d 766 (1982). It attaches in a guilty plea proceeding when the court accepts the plea. State v. Crisler, 73 Wash.App. 219, 223, 868 P.2d 204, review granted, 124 Wash.2d 1014, 879 P.2d 276 (1994) and aff'd sub nom. State v. Gocken, 127 Wash.2d 95, 896 P.2d 1267 (1995); State v. Knutson, 11 Wash.App. 402, 404, 523 P.2d 967 (1974). .         Here, the purpose of the November 28 proceeding ......
  • State v. Swenson
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Washington
    • October 3, 2000
    ...... (1) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another person to commit the crime; or . (2) aids or agrees to aid another person in planning or committing the crime. .         WPIC 10.51 (Supp.1986), quoted in State v. Crisler, 73 Wash.App. 219, 224, 868 P.2d 204 (1994), aff'd. sub nom. State v. Gocken, 127 Wash.2d 95, 896 P.2d 1267 (1995) . In both the accomplice liability statute and the former WPIC 10.51, the use of "the" relates back to the crime charged, i.e., the crime to which the person is an accomplice due ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT