State v. Crisman

• Decision Date: 28 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 19829,19829
• Citation: 123 Idaho 277,846 P.2d 928
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Donald L. CRISMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 928

846 P.2d 928

123 Idaho 277

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Donald L. CRISMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19829.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Dec. 28, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 9, 1993.

Petition for Review Denied March 11, 1993.

Donald Crisman, pro se.

Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Douglas A. Werth, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

SWANSTROM, Judge.

After a trial before the magistrate, Donald Crisman was convicted of driving without a license, I.C. § 49-301, and of operating an unregistered vehicle, I.C. § 49-456(1). Crisman appeals from the judgments of conviction contending that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, that he was denied due process and that his rights to freely exercise his religion were infringed. We affirm.

Prior to the events giving rise to this case, Crisman held a valid Alaska driver's license. Crisman returned his Alaska driver's license and did not obtain a new license from Idaho or any other state. Crisman sent notices to the Idaho Department of Transportation, the Idaho State Police, the Bonner County Sheriff's Office and other governmental entities informing them of his refusal to obtain a driver's license and to register his vehicle for the express reason that he did not think he was bound to do so because he intended to conduct only personal, and not business, activity on the public highways. In his notices, Crisman requested the various agencies to supply him with the legal authorities, if any, that mandated his compliance with the licensing and registration laws. After not receiving any response, Crisman apparently believed that he need not comply with the licensing and registration laws of Idaho.

On February 4, 1991, a Bonner County Deputy Sheriff stopped the vehicle Crisman was driving because he had noticed that it did not have proper license plates. Crisman's vehicle had blue plates with large gold lettering which read "YHWH" and underneath, in smaller silver lettering, "AMBASSADOR." When asked for his driver's license, registration and proof of insurance, Crisman told the deputy that he did not have them. The deputy arrested Crisman for operating a vehicle without a driver's license and without proper registration and for failure to carry proof of insurance.

On February 20, Crisman filed a "notice of special appearance" for the purpose of challenging the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Apparently he supported his challenge with a "verified statement and memorandum" which is not contained in our record.

On February 24, in his first appearance in court, Crisman was informed of his rights via a video presentation. After the magistrate had inquired as to his understanding of the presentation, Crisman responded that he did not understand how the presentation applied to him. The magistrate told Crisman that the purposes of this appearance were to advise him of his rights and for Crisman to enter a plea. Undoubtedly, the magistrate was frustrated with Crisman's interruptions and unwillingness to cooperate; he attempted to appoint counsel for Crisman, but Crisman indicated that he did not want representation. He insisted that his appearance should be designated as "in propria persona." ¹ Despite his statements of record to the effect that he did not refuse to enter pleas, Crisman did not enter any, although he was given the opportunity to do so. However, the magistrate entered pleas of not guilty for Crisman and informed him that any other issues he wished to address must be presented either at trial or through a motion.

Crisman next filed a motion to dismiss as provided for in I.C.R. 12(a) and noticed it up for hearing. In the motion Crisman renewed his challenge to the court's jurisdiction. Although Crisman complains he was denied due process in part because the magistrate did not address his challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction at the first appearance, Crisman was not harmed by the delay in addressing the issue of jurisdiction until he presented it in his motion to dismiss. No waiver of his challenge to jurisdiction resulted from either I.C. § 1-2214 or I.C.R. 2.2(d). After a hearing on the merits, the magistrate issued a written order denying Crisman's motion to dismiss. The case proceeded to trial before another magistrate. Judgments of conviction were entered July 9, 1991, on both counts and they provided that Crisman was to serve five days in jail on each count with the sentences running concurrently.

The issues Crisman raises on appeal are: whether the magistrate erred in ruling that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction; whether the written order denied Crisman due process as a result of being filed and served one day before the trial; whether Crisman was denied due process by not being provided with any administrative procedures by the Idaho Department of Transportation prior to the commencement of criminal charges; and whether the forms and procedures used by the court denied Crisman meaningful access to the court and infringed upon his right to freely exercise his religion.

Crisman challenges the court's ruling that subject-matter jurisdiction existed. Crisman bases his right of non-compliance with the applicable statutes upon his status as an "ambassador" from the "Kingdom of YHWH (Yahweh)." Crisman further contends that his status as an "ambassador" of "Yahweh" entitles him to immunity. He also contends because of his ambassador status, the United States Supreme Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, which provides in part: "In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction."

We exercise independent review over the issue of a magistrate's jurisdiction. In re Hanson, 121 Idaho 507, 826 P.2d 468 (1992). The record reflects that, at the hearing on Crisman's motion to dismiss, the magistrate relied upon "State v. Blume" in ruling that Crisman's claimed ambassadorial status was not recognized and therefore it created no bar to the court's exercise of its personal or subject-matter jurisdiction. The written opinion issued by the magistrate at a later date cited no case authority.

Apparently, the case the magistrate relied upon was Gregersen v. Blume, 113 Idaho 220, 743 P.2d 88 (Ct.App.1987), which was a companion case to State v. Blume, 113 Idaho 224, 743 P.2d 92 (Ct.App.1987). In Gregersen v. Blume, we upheld the authority of a state licensing agency to license and regulate the commercial practice of barbering by persons who profess religious beliefs that do not recognize secular authority being imposed upon them. State v. Blume, on the other hand, involved an appeal from a magistrate's order finding Blume in contempt for refusal to pay a fine in a criminal case in which Blume was convicted for operating a barbershop without a license. We find support in the Blume cases for the state's position here, although these cases do not control this appeal.

Crisman further asserts that he did not receive a copy of the Blume opinion upon which the magistrate relied, that the magistrate had promised to send a copy of the opinion, and therefore, jurisdiction was improperly exercised. We accept the factual basis for Crisman's argument, that he did not receive a statement of authority for the court's exercise of jurisdiction, but we are not persuaded that this failure in any way affected the court's right to exercise the jurisdiction it had.

If jurisdiction was properly exercised below, even if the magistrate relied upon improper authority, the decision to exercise jurisdiction will be affirmed. See State Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Engelbert, 114 Idaho 89, 753 P.2d 825 (1988) (where order of lower court is correct, but based upon erroneous theory, order will be affirmed upon correct theory). Ambassadorial status cannot be obtained through unilateral proclamation as Crisman has attempted. The receiving state's executive branch must recognize the sovereignty of the other state before diplomatic immunity exists. United States v. Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.1984). The record does not reflect that either the United States Department of State or the Idaho Secretary of State has recognized the "Kingdom of YHWH (Yahweh)" as a sovereign. Furthermore, the record fails to show that either of...