State v. Crisp

Decision Date02 July 1991
Docket NumberNo. 90-593,90-593
PartiesSTATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Randall Dean CRISP, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Gary E. Wilcox, Billings, for defendant and appellant.

Marc Racicot, Atty. Gen., Patricia J. Jordan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena, Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Atty. and Charles Bradley, Deputy County Atty., Billings, for plaintiff and respondent.

HUNT, Justice.

A jury impaneled in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, found defendant and appellant, Randall Crisp, guilty of one count of criminal endangerment, a felony. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

The following issues are raised on appeal:

1. Is Sec. 45-5-207, MCA, which defines criminal endangerment, unconstitutionally vague?

2. Did the District Court err in refusing defendant's instruction defining "substantial risk of death"?

Defendant and Renae Yancey had lived together off and on for five years. On March 16, 1990, they were living in an area of Billings known as Lockwood. They spent that evening drinking with friends in Billings. Testimony at trial conflicted regarding the time the couple left the nightclub known as T-Birds, the route they took home, and, most importantly, the events that transpired during the ride home.

Yancey, who is 5'3" tall and weighs 108 lbs., testified that on the way home defendant accused her of spending money on someone else, called her a tramp and a whore, grabbed her by the hair, beat her head between the seats, hit her in the shoulder and face, and threatened to kill her. Defendant drove past the turnoff to their trailer and stopped in a field. He opened the passenger door and yanked her out by her hair. When she landed on the ground on her hands and knees, defendant, who is 6'4" tall and weighs between 205 and 210 lbs., proceeded to stomp on her and kick her with his cowboy boots until about 4 a.m., over three hours later. He kicked her in the head, neck, shoulder, arms, elbows, wrists, hands, back, chest, stomach, shins, buttocks, knees, and thighs--in short, every part of her body. She lost consciousness several times. He threatened to kill her numerous times.

She further testified that, after he quit beating her, defendant yanked her back into the Jeep, and took her to their trailer. There, he pulled her out of the car by her hair, pushed her up the steps, and continued to beat her. He followed her into the bathroom, where he began to draw a bath. He told her that she needed to get cleaned up to go to the hospital. When she went into the living room to get away from him, he grabbed a steak knife and threatened to kill her. She fell against a cupboard and crawled to the couch. He yelled at her for bleeding on the couch, then went to turn off the bath. She ran out of the front door and sought assistance from the neighbors.

Defendant took the stand on his own behalf and testified that he and Yancey began arguing on the way home. At one point, Yancey started kicking him. He struck back at her, slapping her on the arm, leg, shin, foot, and ribs. After he had resumed driving, he heard the door to the Jeep open and saw Yancey falling out of the vehicle. He grabbed her foot, but did not have the strength to pull her back into the Jeep. She fell out.

Law enforcement officers were called at approximately 4:30 a.m. The deputy who first responded to the call testified that Yancey was extremely afraid that defendant was going to kill her. Defendant was immediately arrested. He told the deputies that Yancey had jumped out of the Jeep while it was moving. At the Yellowstone County Detention Facility, he stated that any blood on his clothing would be hers.

Dr. Dennis Tek, the emergency room physician, testified that Yancey had suffered numerous bruises about the face, head, neck, chest, back, shoulders, thighs, and left shin. She had swelling over the left cheekbone and a two centimeter laceration on her scalp in the right superior temporal area.

Dr. Tek stated that being kicked about the head and body with cowboy boots could possibly cause protracted loss or impairment of a bodily member or organ, serious permanent disfigurement, or death. He testified that Yancey had received a concussion, which could have been a life-threatening condition if she had lost consciousness. In response to the State's hypothetical on redirect, he answered that a two-hour beating that rendered the victim unconscious could place the victim in a substantial risk of serious bodily injury. He noted on recross-examination, however, that the injuries Yancey actually received from this incident did not pose a substantial risk.

The jury found defendant guilty of criminal endangerment, a felony, but acquitted him of resisting arrest, a misdemeanor. Defendant was sentenced to ten years in the Montana State Prison, with all ten suspended. This appeal followed.

I.

Is Sec. 45-5-207, MCA, which defines criminal endangerment, unconstitutionally vague?

A defendant may challenge the constitutionality of a statute by arguing that the statute is so vague that it is void on its face or that it is vague as applied in his particular situation. City of Choteau v. Joslyn, 208 Mont. 499, 505, 678 P.2d 665, 668 (1984).

"A statute is void on its face if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden." State v. Woods, 221 Mont. 17, 22, 716 P.2d 624, 627 (1986); Joslyn, 208 Mont. at 505, 678 P.2d at 668. No person should be required to speculate as to whether his contemplated course of action may be subject to criminal penalties. State v. Conrad, 197 Mont. 406, 412, 643 P.2d 239, 243 (1982).

The statute challenged in this case defines the offense of felony criminal endangerment as follows:

(1) A person who knowingly engages in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another commits the offense of criminal endangerment. This conduct includes but is not limited to knowingly placing in a tree, log, or any other wood any steel, iron, ceramic, or other substance for the purpose of damaging a saw or other wood harvesting, processing, or manufacturing equipment.

(2) A person convicted of the offense of criminal endangerment shall be fined an amount not to exceed $50,000 or imprisoned in the state prison for a term not to exceed 10 years, or both. (Emphasis added.)

Section 45-5-207, MCA.

Defendant argues that the statute is vague on its face because it does not require a specific intent to cause the risk. In State v. Clawson, 239 Mont. 413, 421, 781 P.2d 267, 272 (1989), we indicated that a defendant may commit the offense of felony criminal endangerment by engaging in negligent or reckless conduct. A plain reading of the felony criminal endangerment statute, however, establishes that the State must prove that the defendant acted knowingly. If the State can establish only that the defendant acted negligently, the defendant may be convicted of violating Sec. 45-5-208, MCA, misdemeanor negligent endangerment; he may not be convicted of violating Sec. 45-5-207, MCA, felony criminal endangerment.

Knowingly is defined in Sec. 45-2-101(33), MCA, as follows:

[A] person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of his conduct or that the circumstance exists. A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of conduct described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that it is highly probable that such result will be caused by his conduct. When knowledge of the existence of a particular...

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