State v. Crisp
Decision Date | 24 January 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 25928.,25928. |
Citation | 362 S.C. 412,608 S.E.2d 429 |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Denisona J. CRISP, Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Jeffrey P. Bloom, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry D. McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior Assistant Attorney General William Edgar Salter, III, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Druanne D. White, of Anderson, for Respondent.
Denisona J. Crisp (Appellant) pled guilty in a capital murder case and was sentenced to death. We reverse.
Appellant, then age 20, pled guilty in April 2001 to murder, assault and battery with intent to kill (ABWIK), and two counts of possession of a firearm or knife during the commission of a violent crime. The murder victim was Jealoni Blackwell; the assault victim was Thomas Gambrell. Appellant was sentenced by Judge James W. Johnson, Jr., to life in prison for murder, twenty years consecutive for ABWIK, and five years concurrent on each weapon charge.
Following the plea hearing, the State officially served notice of the intent to seek the death penalty in connection with the murder of Clarence Watson. The State asserted the prior conviction of murder and physical torture as statutory grounds for the death penalty. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(h) and (C)(a)(2) (2003).
Appellant pled guilty in June 2001 to murdering Watson and possession of a firearm or knife during the commission of a violent crime. Following a three-day, non-jury sentencing hearing before Judge John W. Kittredge in October 2001, Appellant was sentenced to death.
In criminal cases, we sit to review errors of law only and we are bound by factual findings of the trial court unless an abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001); State v. Cutter, 261 S.C. 140, 147, 199 S.E.2d 61, 65 (1973). An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law. State v. McDonald, 343 S.C. 319, 325, 540 S.E.2d 464, 467 (2000); State v. Manning, 329 S.C. 1, 7, 495 S.E.2d 191, 194 (1997).
The following exchange occurred as the trial judge questioned Appellant about the waiver of his right to a jury trial during the June 2001 hearing in which Appellant pled guilty to Watson's murder:
Appellant contends the judge, through his extraneous comments, injected his personal opinion about the potential exercise of a constitutional right into the proceeding. Such comments exceed the scope of the judge's authority, regardless of whether his opinion is based on his experience and best judgment. Appellant argues the "ultimate decision to waive a jury trial was [made] subject to the judge's assertion that his best hope at trial might come down to lying jurors who would deliberately subvert his trial for their own purposes." Appellant argues the comments prevented him from making a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial, and the comments constitute prejudicial error. Appellant relies on State v. Gunter, 286 S.C. 556, 335 S.E.2d 542 (1985); State v. Pierce, 289 S.C. 430, 346 S.E.2d 707 (1986),overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991); State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 332, 353 S.E.2d 441 (1986),overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991); and Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 397 S.E.2d 87 (1990).
We recently addressed this same issue on virtually identical facts in State v. Owens, 362 S.C. 175, 607 S.E.2d 78 (2004). In that case, the trial judge sentenced Owens to death after making essentially the same comments describing potentially deceptive jurors during a resentencing proceeding as those made by the judge in this case. We concluded the We reversed and granted the defendant a new sentencing proceeding. Owens at ___, 607 S.E.2d at 80; see also Gunter, supra ( ); Pierce, 289 S.C. at 434,346 S.E.2d at 710 ( ); Cooper, 291 S.C. at 336,353 S.E.2d at 443 ( ); Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 397 S.E.2d 87 (1990) ( ).
The defendant in Owens expressed his belief at the sentencing proceeding that the opposite of the situation described by the judge also could happen, i.e., a death-prone juror might lie to get on the jury in order to sentence him to death. Appellant expressed no such concerns during his guilty plea. Nevertheless, we adhere to our precedent and conclude such comments by a trial judge during a guilty plea proceeding are fundamentally erroneous and constitute prejudicial error. We reverse Appellant's guilty plea.
Appellant argues the provision of S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20(B) (2003), which eliminates the possibility of sentencing by a jury when a defendant pleads guilty in a capital case, is unconstitutional in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). In Appellant's view, Ring interprets the Sixth Amendment to require a jury — not a judge acting alone — determine the aggravating factors in a capital proceeding even when the defendant pleads guilty.
At the June 2001 plea hearing, the trial judge questioned Appellant at length about the various constitutional rights he would waive by pleading guilty. The trial judge specifically and repeatedly informed Appellant that he would waive the right to a jury trial in not only the guilt phase, but also in the sentencing phase; that the jury's verdict recommending death would have to be unanimous, and the refusal of one juror to agree to the death penalty would result in a sentence of life imprisonment. The trial judge told Appellant that admittedly guilty defendants in capital cases often stand trial simply to obtain a jury trial in the sentencing phase. In addition, Appellant's attorneys stated they had explained the same concepts to Appellant.
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