State v. Crites
Decision Date | 19 November 1997 |
Docket Number | Nos. 95-6011,s. 95-6011 |
Citation | 151 Or.App. 313,948 P.2d 757 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. David Wayne CRITES, Appellant. ; CA A93578. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Kimi Nam, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the brief was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender.
Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General.
Before RIGGS, P.J., and LANDAU and LEESON, JJ.
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for transporting special forest products without a permit. ORS 164.813. He contends that the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence of the crime that was obtained when an officer stopped his truck without reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed any crime. We affirm.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Deputy Swanson, a forest patrol officer for the Clatsop County Sheriff's Department, was patrolling a rural section of Highway 26 when he observed defendant drive by. It was dark at the time, but as defendant's truck passed by Swanson's headlights, the officer noticed large blocks of cedar in the back of the truck. It is unlawful to cut or remove special forest products without a permit, ORS 164.813, and large blocks of cedar qualify as special forest products, ORS 164.813(6)(b)(D). Swanson was aware of a large cedar theft problem in the immediate area, which mostly consisted of forest land owned by the State of Oregon. Swanson knew that the Oregon State Forestry Department did not issue cedar permits. He also knew that the immediate area contained a large quantity of cedar and that a mill located down the highway sometimes purchased cedar. Swanson was aware that there was some private forest land in the area that contained cedar and that some of the private landowners permitted the sale of cedar.
Swanson did not see defendant commit a traffic infraction. He did, however, suspect that the cedar in the back of defendant's truck was stolen. Swanson pulled defendant over to ask if he had a permit for transporting the cedar. When defendant could produce no permit, Swanson cited him for unlawful transport of forest products and seized the cedar as evidence.
Defendant pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the vehicle stop. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in doing so. He contends that because Swanson lacked reason to suspect that defendant had committed any crime, the officer had no lawful basis to stop him, and, as a result, any evidence that resulted from the stop should have been suppressed. According to defendant, Swanson had no basis on which he could reasonably conclude that the cedar in the truck had been obtained without a permit. The state contends that Swanson reasonably did suspect that defendant had stolen cedar, given the time of day, the nature of the area and the history of cedar theft in the immediate area.
ORS 131.615(1) provides that a peace officer who "reasonably suspects that a person has committed a crime" may stop the person and make reasonable inquiry. "Reasonably suspects" means "a belief that is...
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