State v. Crites

• Decision Date: 04 March 1919
• Docket Number: No. 21054.,21054.
• Citation: 277 Mo. 194,209 S.W. 863
• Parties: STATE v. CRITES.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

209 S.W. 863

277 Mo. 194

STATE v. CRITES.

No. 21054.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

March 4, 1919.

Appeal from Criminal Court, Greene County; C. H. Skinker, Judge.

Joseph J. Crites was indicted for entering into a contract to promote the passage of a certain bill for compensation contingent upon the final enactment into law of a certain measure. From a final judgment quashing the indictment, the State appeals. Affirmed.

Frank W. McAllister, Atty. Gen., and H. B. Hunt and Shrader P. Howell, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

Barbour & McDavid and Thomas J. Delaney, all of Springfield, for respondent.

WHITE, C.

The defendant was indicted by the grand jury of Greene county on the charge of entering into a contract to promote the passage of a certain bill in the Forty-Ninth General Assembly for a compensation of $2,500, the payment of which was contingent upon the final enactment into law of the said measure, contrary to section 8150, Rev. St. 1909. The defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment on several grounds, and the motion was sustained. The state appealed from the final judgment thereupon entered.

In the motion to quash the indictment it is urged, among other things, that the section of the statute upon which the indictment is based is unconstitutional, because contrary to the provisions of section 28, article 4, of the said Constitution which provides:

"No bill * * * shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title."

Section 8150 was enacted in 1907. The bill containing it has the following title:

"An act entitled an act, requiring legislative counsel and legislative agents retained or employed for compensation by any person, firm, corporation or association to promote or oppose the passage of bills or resolutions, or the approval of the same, to file with the secretary of state a statement in writing subscribed by such counsel or agent stating the name of the person, firm, corporation or association by whom or on whose behalf he is retained or employed, together with a brief description of the legislation in reference to which such service is to be rendered, requiring itemized statement of expenditures to be filed, prohibiting legislative agents or counsel from going upon the floor of the Legislature, providing penalties for the violation of this act, with an emergency clause."

The first section of the act provides that every person retained or employed for a compensation to promote or oppose the passage of any bill in either house of the Legislature shall register, giving full particulars as to whom he represents, etc. Then follows in the same section this provision:

"And no person shall accept any such employment or render any such service for compensation contingent upon the passage or defeat of any legislative measure or measures."

Penalties for the violation of the act, fine or imprisonment, or both, are provided. It is the provision just quoted which the indictment charges the defendant with having violated. The respondent claims that it affects a subject not clearly expressed in the title of the bill.

It is argued by counsel for the state that the particular acts prohibited in the passage quoted come within the general scope of the title; that the general subject of the act is sufficiently broad to embrace them. They assert that the title in a general way indicates the subject, and the particular matter affected by the provision is a detail of that subject, a specification included in the general subject-matter. If that were true, the indictment would have to be held good.

Now what is the general subject mentioned in the title? Certainly "legislative counsel and legislative agents." If the title of the act simply stated that it was an act respecting legislative counsel and legislative agents, the particular matters mentioned would be within its scope. The title, however, does not stop there; it is further restrictive. Counsel for the state assert that after the general subject-matter the title in particular relates to "compensation of legislative agents." In this counsel are incorrect. The subject expressed does not relate to the classification of legislative agents, nor to the regulation of their compensation. It affects such agents only as to certain affirmative requirements, and certain restrictions upon their activities; they are required to file with the secretary of state "a statement in writing," showing who they represent, and they are forbidden "to go upon the floor." The subject embraces, not the compensation of agents, but the duties of agents who are compensated; compensation is mentioned only in the classification of the person to whom the requirements apply; the persons upon whom are imposed the duties indicated in the title. There is nothing indicating that any legislative agent, compensated or otherwise, would be prohibited from opposing or promoting measures. These affirmative requirements and the prohibitive injunction apply as well to agents who work for a contingent fee as those who were compensated in any other way. The title, in fact, indicates that all such agents may lawfully pursue that employment, provided they comply with the requirement to make their business a public instead of a secret one.

The reasons for that provision of the Constitution and for a strict adherence to it have been so often and so fully stated by this court in recent decisions that it is only necessary to refer to some of them as illustrative of the point under consideration.

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