State v. Crittenden
Decision Date | 13 February 2009 |
Docket Number | CR-07-1137. |
Parties | Ex parte State of Alabama. In re STATE of Alabama v. Vanessa CRITTENDEN. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Christopher E. Connolly, district atty., and William I. Powell, chief asst. district atty., Florence, for petitioner.
Curtis Simpson, Florence, for respondent.
The State of Alabama filed this petition for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Michael Jones to set aside the sentence he imposed on Vanessa Crittenden and to sentence her according to the Habitual Felony Offender Act, § 13A-5-9, Ala.Code 1975 ("the HFOA"), and the mandatory drug-enhancement provisions contained in §§ 13A-12-250 and 13A-12-270, Ala.Code 1975. In August 2007, Crittenden was indicted for the unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, specifically, selling crack cocaine to a confidential informant on January 4, 2007. She executed a plea agreement with the State and stipulated that she had four prior felony convictions. At sentencing the State proved that Crittenden had three prior felony convictions1 and that the drug sale made the basis of the indictment had occurred within three miles of a school and a housing project. The State moved to invoke the HFOA. Judge Jones denied the State's motion and sentenced Crittenden to 80 months in prison pursuant to the voluntary sentencing standards. The State objected and moved Judge Jones to resentence Crittenden to a minimum of 30 years in prison. Judge Jones denied the State's motion. The State then filed this petition for a writ of mandamus.2
Initially, we note that the State may file a petition for a writ of mandamus to challenge an illegal sentence. See State v. Monette, 887 So.2d 314 (Ala.Crim.App. 2004).
The State argues that the HFOA and the drug-enhancement provisions are mandatory and jurisdictional and that nothing in the Alabama Sentencing Reform Act of 2003 ("the Act"), as amended effective October 1, 2006, abrogates these mandatory provisions. Specifically, it argues that because the voluntary truth-in-sentencing standards have yet to be enacted, they require additional legislative action, and the sentence imposed on Crittenden pursuant to them is invalid.
Crittenden responded that, under the plain language of the Act, the Act takes precedence over the HFOA and any other mandatory sentencing provisions. She further argues that because her sentence is within the range recommended by the guidelines it is not reviewable by this Court.
The initial voluntary sentencing standards, codified at § 12-25-31 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, became effective on June 20, 2003. Section 12-25-31, Ala.Code 1975, states the purpose of the Act, in pertinent part, as follows:
Section 12-25-34(a)(3) and (4), Ala.Code 1975, as amended effective October 1, 2006, further states:
(Emphasis added.)
Although the initial voluntary sentencing standards have been enacted, the next stage, the voluntary truth-in-sentencing standards, have yet to be enacted.
Section 12-25-36, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.)
The sentencing guidelines and worksheets that were adopted when the initial voluntary sentencing standards became effective in 2006 recommend that two worksheets be completed for each eligible offense.3 The worksheets separate the offenses into three categories: offenses against the person, property offenses, and drug offenses. The first worksheet concerns whether the guidelines recommend a prison or nonprison sentence. This worksheet assesses the nature of the current offense, prior felony convictions, prior incarceration on a sentence of one year or more, the number of juvenile adjudications, and whether a deadly weapon was used in the commission of the offense. The second worksheet concerns the length of sentence recommended by the guidelines. This worksheet assigns numerical values to the current conviction, the number of prior felony convictions, the number of prior sentences for one year or more, and the number of prior sentences imposed that were for less than one year. At the end of each worksheet is the following statement: "Reason recommendation not accepted." Also, the general instructions for completing the worksheets state: "Once a sentence has been selected from the recommended sentence range, it is up to the sentencing judge to decide how it shall be imposed." General instruction no. 7, p. 2.
Crittenden pleaded guilty to unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, a violation of § 13A-12-211, Ala.Code 1975. According to the initial voluntary sentencing guidelines she was eligible for consideration under the Act. Thus, the court completed the worksheet entitled "Drug Prison In/Out." Based on the nature of the offense and the number of prior felony convictions Crittenden's total score was "11." For a score of "11," the guidelines recommend a term of imprisonment. The second worksheet, the "Drug Prison Sentence Length Worksheet," was then completed. Based on the nature of the offense and the number of her prior felony convictions Crittenden scored a "164." The guidelines recommend that for a score of 164 Crittenden receive a straight sentence of between 30 to 104 months. The circuit court sentenced Crittenden to a straight 80-month term of imprisonment and stated in its sentencing order: "The defendant is not to be released from incarceration before the expiration of that minimum term. [§ 12-25-36(3)]."
Section 12-25-34(c), Ala.Code 1975, addresses existing sentencing-enhancement provisions and states:
(Emphasis added.)4
The worksheets authorized by the Act not only specifically reference the HFOA, but also assign a numerical reference number to the total number of prior felony convictions a defendant being sentenced under the Act has obtained. "`The well settled principle is that the last expression of the legislative will is the law in case of conflicting provisions of the statute on the same subject, and the last enacted in point of time prevails.'" Ex parte McCormick, 932 So.2d 124, 139 (Ala.2005), quoting Middleton v. General Water Works & Electric Corporation, 25 Ala.App. 455, 456, 149 So. 351, 352 (1933).
Also, the Alabama Sentencing Commission's publication entitled "Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards and Worksheets" contains a section of frequently asked questions. Question number 16 states: "How do you decide if an offender is sentenced under the standards or the Habitual Felony Offender Act?" The answer states:
State v. Pettaway, 794 So.2d 1153, 1157 (Ala.Civ.App.2001).
Though there are few cases addressing the Act, the Alabama Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 13 So.3d 915 (Ala. 2008), recently considered a mandamus petition filed by the State after a trial judge suspended the confinement portion of the split sentence he had imposed on...
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