State v. Cromwell

• Decision Date: 10 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 77356-4.,77356-4.
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. George Richard CROMWELL and Jennifer Shirley Reynolds-Cromwell, Petitioners.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 593

140 P.3d 593

157 Wn.2d 529

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. George Richard CROMWELL and Jennifer Shirley Reynolds-Cromwell, Petitioners.

No. 77356-4.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued March 23, 2006.

Decided August 10, 2006.

Kathryn A. Russell Selk, Russell Selk Law Office, David Bruce Koch, Nielson Broman & Koch PLLC, Seattle, for Petitioner/Appellant.

Carla Barbieri Carlstrom, King County Prosecutor's Office, Seattle, for Appellee/Respondent.

BRIDGE, J.

¶ 1 George Cromwell and Jennifer Reynolds-Cromwell each seek reversal of a conviction under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) (2002). They argue they were improperly convicted under that statute because it did not expressly impose punishment for possession, manufacture, or delivery of methamphetamine salts, isomers, or salts of isomers, but simply imposed punishment for those activities in reference to "methamphetamine." Thus, they contend that former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) does not apply to the salt form of methamphetamine, only its base form. We disagree and hold that the plain language of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) encompasses all forms of methamphetamine. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

I Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2 The Cromwells were arrested following a series of drug transactions with an informant of the Kent Police Department, in which they sold him methamphetamine. Jennifer Reynolds-Cromwell was charged with four counts of delivery of methamphetamine and one count of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine. George Cromwell was charged as an accomplice to three counts of delivery of methamphetamine and one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. State v. Cromwell, 127 Wash.App. 746, 748, 112 P.3d 1273 (2005). Both were charged under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii).

¶ 3 At trial, the State's forensic expert, Dr. Suzuki, testified that the substances delivered to the informant and recovered from the Cromwell residence all contained methamphetamine and were in a salt form, most likely methamphetamine hydrochloride. Cromwell, 127 Wash.App. at 748, 112 P.3d 1273. Following his testimony, the Cromwells moved to dismiss, asserting "that they had been charged with crimes involving methamphetamine, but the proof was limited to salts of methamphetamine, a substance they argued was treated differently in the relevant statutes." Id. at 749, 112 P.3d 1273. The Cromwells maintained that "methamphetamine" as it is used in former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) means only pure methamphetamine, or base methamphetamine, which is an oily liquid. The trial court denied the motion. In reference to the methamphetamine charges, Reynolds-Cromwell was found guilty as charged, and Cromwell was found guilty of two counts of delivery and the lesser included crime of simple possession, rather than possession with intent to deliver.

¶ 4 The Cromwells appealed, arguing their motion to dismiss should have been granted. Division One of the Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions, reasoning that to interpret the statute as contended by the Cromwells would reach a "strained result." Cromwell, 127 Wash.App. at 751, 112 P.3d 1273. The record indicated that the base form of methamphetamine has no other purpose than to produce methamphetamine in a form for sale and is rarely recovered in drug transactions. The Court of Appeals thus concluded that the legislature obviously intended to encompass methamphetamine in all its forms by its use of the word "methamphetamine" in the statute. The Court of Appeals conceded that its conclusion conflicts with a decision from Division Two, State v. Morris, 123 Wash.App. 467, 98 P.3d 513 (2004), which holds that the word "methamphetamine" as used in former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) does not include methamphetamine salts. The Cromwells appealed to this court, and we granted review on the conflict issue only.

II Analysis

¶ 5 The former RCW at issue here, RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii), is part of Washington's Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Under the act, methamphetamine is classified as a Schedule II drug. RCW 69.50.206(d). Former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) imposes a maximum punishment of 10 years for possession, manufacture, or delivery of "methamphetamine." In contrast, former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii), a catch-all provision, states that manufacture, delivery, or possession of "any other controlled substance classified in [Schedule II]" is punishable by not more than five years in prison.

¶ 6 While RCW 69.50.206(d), the statute classifying methamphetamine as a Schedule II substance, makes specific reference to the salts, isomer, and salts of the isomers of methamphetamine, former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) used the term "methamphetamine" without further elaboration. Therefore, the Cromwells argue that they were improperly charged under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) because they possessed the salt form of methamphetamine and that statute does not expressly include salt methamphetamine. They assert that they should have been charged under the catch-all provision contained in former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii), which imposes a five year maximum for all other Schedule II substances. Thus, they contend their charging document was insufficient and warrants reversal of their respective convictions.

¶ 7 The Cromwells support their argument with a line of cases from Division Two, cases that conflict with Division One's decision in this case. In State v. Halsten, Division Two considered whether former RCW 69.50.440 (1997), a statute that criminalized possession of the methamphetamine ingredient pseudoephedrine, applied to a suspected methamphetamine manufacturer who possessed cold tablets containing pseudoephedrine hydrochloride. 108 Wash.App. 759, 33 P.3d 751 (2001). The Halsten court held that the statute at issue there did not encompass pseudoephedrine hydrochloride because the legislature did not specifically include the hydrochloride salt form of pseudoephedrine. Id. at 764, 33 P.3d 751. In Morris, Division Two adopted the reasoning in Halsten and applied it to the statute at issue here. 123 Wash.App. at 474, 98 P.3d 513. Morris held that methamphetamine as it is used in former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) refers only to base methamphetamine (the liquid) and does not include methamphetamine hydrochloride (the salt). Id.

¶ 8 Rules of statutory interpretation require courts to give effect to the legislature's intent and purpose. State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). In doing so, we look first to the plain meaning of a statute. See id. "When a statute is plain and unambiguous, its meaning must be derived from wording of the statute itself." Cromwell, 127 Wash.App. at 750, 112 P.3d 1273 (citing State v. Keller, 143 Wash.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001)). We may also look to the dictionary to determine the meaning of nontechnical terms. State v. McDougal, 120 Wash.2d 334, 350, 841 P.2d 1232 (1992).

¶ 9 As the State's forensic expert repeatedly stressed, there is no difference between base methamphetamine and the salt form, other than their physical properties—which amounts to the difference between ice and water. Report of Proceedings (vol.5) at 46-49. The base and salt forms of methamphetamine are simply two forms of the same substance. Id. at 48-49, 841 P.2d 1232. Thus, "methamphetamine" is plainly synonymous with both the base and salt forms.

¶ 10 The Cromwells argue that the legislature means what it says, and we "`cannot add words . . . when the legislature has chosen not to include that language.'" Suppl. Br. of Pet'r Cromwell at 7 (quoting State v. Delgado, 148 Wash.2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003)). We are puzzled by this admonition because it is precisely what the Cromwells ask this court to do—that is, to add the word "base" rather than "salt" to the definition of methamphetamine where the legislature has expressly stated neither. Nothing in the plain language of the statute at issue prompts us to read the word "methamphetamine" to exclusively mean base or salt methamphetamine. Because the legislature did not expressly refer to the salt or base forms of methamphetamine in the statute, Cromwell's logic would compel us to find that methamphetamine as it is used in the statute has no meaning at all. We cannot construe a statute so that it is meaningless. See J.P., 149 Wash.2d at 450, 69 P.3d 318.¹

¶ 11 The dictionary definition of methamphetamine supports the conclusion that "methamphetamine" means more than just its base form. The dictionary definition refers to the "crystalline hydrochloride" form of methamphetamine, which is a salt form of the substance. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1422 (2002). And as the Court of Appeals suggested, the conclusion that "methamphetamine" plainly includes the salt form of the drug is supported by the legislature's use of "kilogram" as a unit of measurement in corresponding statutes, rather than "liquid ounce," which might be exclusively applied to a liquid. Cromwell, 127 Wash.App. at 752, 112 P.3d 1273.²

¶ 12 In sum, base and salt methamphetamine are the same chemical substance.³ Moreover, the salt form is encompassed by the dictionary definition of methamphetamine. And, given the frequency with which the salt form is recovered by law enforcement, it is reasonable to infer that the commonly understood definition of "methamphetamine" includes its salt form. Thus, we hold that when the legislature used the word "methamphetamine" in former RCW 69.50.501(a)(1)(ii), that word included all forms of the substance.

¶ 13 The plain meaning of methamphetamine also sufficiently resolves the conflict between the divisions regarding former RCW 60.50.401(a)(1)(ii) in favor of Division One. Cromwell is distinguishable from Halsten, on which Morris, the case in conflict with Cromwell, relied. In Halsten, the defendant was charged under former RCW 69.50.440 with possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture. In actuality, he possessed...