State v. Croney

Citation31 Wash. 122,71 P. 783
PartiesSTATE v. CRONEY.*
Decision Date24 February 1903
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington

Appeal from Superior Court, Stevens County; Frank H. Rudkin, Judge.

J. E Croney was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Fullerton C.J., dissenting in part.

C. A Mantz and J. A. Kellogg, for appellant.

J. E. M. Bailey and P. F. Quinn, for the State.

DUNBAR J.

The appellant was charged, upon information of the prosecuting attorney, with the crime of murder in the first degree for the killing of one Jerry Lyons on the 12th day of February, 1902. The killing was admitted, and as a defense the appellant claimed that at the time of the killing he was insane from the excessive and long-continued use of intoxicating liquors, and by inheritance from his father, who had been addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating liquors, and who had been insane before the birth of the defendant; also that the killing was done by defendant in self-defense, it appearing to him at the time of the killing that it was necessary to take the life of deceased in order to protect his own. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, and the court thereupon pronounced sentence of 17 years in the penitentiary.

It is assigned, first, that the court erred in its refusal to grant defendant's motion to quash the information and discharge the defendant, for the reason that at the time a grand jury was in session the defendant was confined in the county jail, and that the grand jury made no investigation concerning the alleged crime with which the defendant was charged, or at all; and that the grand jury did not return a true bill against the defendant, charging him with the crime of murder in the first degree, or with any crime. We think the appellant misinterprets section 6813, 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St., which provides that 'the grand jury shall inquire into the cases of parties in custody or under bail, charged with the commission of offenses against the laws of this state, and duly returned by a committing magistrate, or on a complaint sworn to before an officer authorized to administer oaths, and presented by the prosecuting attorney, or under the instructions of the court.' This case does not fall within the provisions of such section. Our statute provides that a prosecution may be either by information or indictment, and the provision referred to above does not apply to a case where an information has been filed.

The second assignment--that the court erred in its refusal to grant defendant's motion to quash and set aside the panel of petit jurors--is equally without merit. The defendant had no vested right in the number of jurors provided for in the venire to fill incomplete panels. The provision in relation to the number is an economic provision in the interest of the state, with which the defendant is not concerned.

Nor are we inclined to sustain the third assignment--that the court erred in refusing to grant defendant's motion for a continuance on the ground of the absence of material evidence on the part of the defendant. This is a matter which was submitted to the discretion of the court, and an investigation of the record does not convince us that such discretion was abused.

It is stoutly maintained that the court erred in its refusal to sustain defendant's challenges for cause to numerous jurors to whom defendant excepted. The first of these was the juror Nettleton. The first pertinent answers in the examination were as follows: 'Q. Mr. Nettleton, have you any feeling or prejudice against a man who stands charged with a crime? A. Yes, sir. Q. You have? A. Yes, sir. Q. Is that opinion or prejudice such as would preclude you from, or would hinder you in any way from, bringing in a verdict according to the law and evidence? A. No, sir. Q. Is that opinion a fixed opinion against a person charged with an offense? A. To a certain extent. Q. Then you could not, Mr. Nettleton--could not, if you were chosen as a juror--go into the case unbiased in every way? A. I think I could. Q. But still you do have a prejudice against a person who stands charged with an offense? A. Yes, sir. Q. Even before the is proven guilty? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you would go into the trial of this case, if chosen as a juror, with that prejudice against the defendant, would you? A. I think I would. Q. Then you could go into the trial of this case presuming the defendant innocent of any crime? A. Yes, sir; I could. Q. You would? A. Yes. Q. Then that prejudice which you have spoken of against the defendant would not in any way affect your feeling towards him in the trial of this case, if you were chosen? A. Not to any extent. Q. But it would to some extent? A. Yes. The Court: Will you try this case upon the evidence wholly, and under the instructions of the court, regardless of any other consideration? A. Yes, sir.' Whereupon the challenge was denied. We do not think that the answers elicited from the juror show that he was disqualified to act as a juror in the case. In the first place, it is not proper to ask a juror if he has a feeling or prejudice against a man who stands charged with a crime. No man, if he understands such a question, will answer that he has a prejudice, because a prejudice is something that is not founded on information or reason. It was plainly not the intention of the juror to proclaim himself such a man. He evidently meant to say that he had a feeling against crime, and, when he said that he would try the case upon the evidence wholly, and under the instructions of the court, regardless of any other consideration, if he is to be believed, he would be a fair juror. A further examination of this juror was as follows: 'Q. Mr. Nettleton, have you any feeling or prejudice against a defense, interposed to the charge of murder, of insanity? A. I think not. Q. Well, do you know you have not? A. Yes. Q. If the defense should be insanity caused by the excessive use of intoxicating liquors, could you give that evidence the same weight as any other defense known to the law? A. I could not. Q. You could not? A. No, sir. Q. And you would not? A. No, sir.' (Another challenge was interposed for cause.) 'The Court: If the court should instruct you that the defense of insanity, whatever might be the cause of that insanity, was a defense to this crime, would you consider that--would you give the defendant the benefit of it? A. I would. Q. The mere fact that his insanity was caused by the excessive use of intoxicating liquors would not prejudice you against him, providing the insanity was shown--would you consider it the same as any other defense interposed upon the trial, and give the defendant the benefit of it, provided it was shown by the testimony? A. I would.' It is evident that the witness did not understand the difference between insanity and intoxication, and that, when he understood from the court that insanity from intoxication was a defense under the law to a charge of crime, he was willing to recognize the defense, and abide by the law.

The juror Ogden testified that he had read an account of the killing in a newspaper; that he formed an opinion from such reading, and that it would take evidence to remove that opinion; and, when asked the direct question if it would take evidence to remove such opinion, replied that it would. But to the next question: 'Then you could not go into this jury box, sworn as a juror, with your mind perfectly free neither in favor of one side or the other, if you were chosen as a juror?' the answer was: 'Yes, sir; I think I could. Q. You could go into the jury box with your mind perfectly free from bias? A. Yes, sir. Q. Then the opinion you have would not in any manner influence you in arriving at a just verdict in this case? A. I don't think it would.' The whole testimony of the juror shows that he did not intend to state that he had any fixed opinion in regard to what he had read of the matter, but that it was simply an impression from such reading, without any knowledge of whether what he...

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15 cases
  • State v. McCollum, 28809.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • 27 Septiembre 1943
    ...178, 177 P. 795; Poland v. Seattle, 200 Wash. 208, 93 P.2d 379; Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113, 127 A.L.R. 1022. State v. Croney, 31 Wash. 122, 71 P. 783, by State v. Riley, 36 Wash. 441, 447, 78 P. 1001, in which we stated that we had not intended to lay down the rule that jurors w......
  • State v. McCollum, 28809.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • 27 Septiembre 1943
    ...178, 177 P. 795; Poland v. Seattle, 200 Wash. 208, 93 P.2d 379; Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113, 127 A.L.R. 1022. State v. Croney, 31 Wash. 122, 71 P. 783, questioned by State v. Riley, 36 Wash. 441, 447, 78 P. [17 Wn.2d 151] 1001, in which we stated that we had not intended to lay d......
  • State v. Anderson, 45497–1–II.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Washington
    • 19 Mayo 2015
    ...Parnell, 77 Wash.2d 503, 504, 463 P.2d 134 (1969) ; Wash. v. City of Seattle, 170 Wash. 371, 373, 16 P.2d 597 (1932) ; State v. Croney, 31 Wash. 122, 128, 71 P. 783 (1903) ; State v. Rutten, 13 Wash. 203, 204–07, 43 P. 30 (1895) ; State v. Wilson, 16 Wash.App. 348, 352, 555 P.2d 1375 (1976)......
  • State v. White, 35692
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • 25 Septiembre 1962
    ...given at the trial and the law as given him by the court. See State v. Bird, 31 Wash.2d 777, 198 P.2d 978 (1948); State v. Croney, 31 Wash. 122, 71 P. 783 (1903); and State v. Gile, 8 Wash. 12, 35 P. 417 A thorough examination of the entire voir dire examination of each of the challenged pr......
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