State v. Cronk
Decision Date | 26 February 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 8337,8337 |
Citation | 307 P.2d 1113,78 Idaho 585 |
Parties | The STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William R. CRONK, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Paul C. Keeton, Lewiston, for appellant.
Graydon W. Smith, Atty. Gen., J. R. Smead, Asst. Atty. Gen., Wynne M. Blake, Pros. Atty., Lewiston, for respondent.
Appellant was convicted in the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District in and for Nez Perce County, State of Idaho, of burglary in the first degree. The charging part of the information is as follows:
'* * * that on, to-wit: the 22 day of December, 1954, at the County of Nez Perce in the State of Idaho, the aforesaid William R. Cronk then and there being committed the crime of burglary in the first degree who then and there did in the night time, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and burglariously enter Room 407 of the Lewis Clark Hotel in Lewiston, Idaho, said room not being the room of the defendant, with intent then and there to commit larceny therein contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.'
The defendant has seven specifications of error, upon which he relies for a reversal of the conviction in the court below.
The first specification is that the court erred in denying defendant's motion to quash and set aside the information, which motion was filed on February 7, 1955, alleging irregularities in the preliminary examination. We have examined the record, and find a substantial compliance with the law, and no prejudicial irregularities. State v. Clark, 4 Idaho 7, 35 P. 710; State v. Ayres, 70 Idaho 18, 211 P.2d 142.
The second specification of error is that the trial court erred in not allowing the defendant at least two days' time to prepare for trial after the plea of the defendant was entered, in accordance with I.C. sec. 19-1908. This statute is as follows:
'Time to prepare for trial.--After his plea the defendant is entitled to at least two days to prepare for trial.'
It appears from the transcript and the minutes of the court that the defendant had the information read to him on two separate occasions. The first time was on February 3, 1955, at which time the defendant requested the statutory time to move against the information, whereupon the court gave the defendant until February 7, 1955, to file his motion. Thereafter, there was a continuance of the case to February 14, 1955. The motion to quash and set aside the information, which had been filed February 7, 1955, was denied by the court February 14, 1955.
On May 23, 1955, the defendant again had the information read to him, and was called upon to state his plea. The defendant refused to plead to the charge, whereupon the court directed the clerk to enter a plea of not guilty for the defendant. The transcript of the reporter sets out that the panel of trial jurors was present in the court room at the time of this second arraignment, but none of the jurors had been impaneled as trial jurors to try this particular cause. The following is an excerpt from the transcript:
'Mr. Blake: The State is ready, your Honor.
'The Court: Are you ready?
'Mr. Keeton: Yes sir.
'The Court: All the jurors in the court room will rise and be sworn.'
By the attorney for the defendant stating he was ready for trial, the statutory provision was thereby waived, and there has been no showing made of prejudice to the substantial rights of the defendant. I.C. sec. 19-2819 in this regard is as follows:
'Judgment upon appeal--Technical errors disregarded.--After hearing the appeal, the court must give judgment without regard to technical errors or defects, or to exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.'
The third specification of error is that the court erred in not allowing the defendant at least one day to answer the indictment or to move to set it aside, demur or plead to the indictment, as required by I.C. sec. 19-1516:
It appears from the minutes of the trial court there was ample opportunity to raise any law questions or to plead between February 14, 1955, and May 23, 1955. The defendant had been arraigned on February 3, and had the motion to quash and set aside the information denied on February 14. No request was made by the defendant for additional time under the statute, and he has failed to show how the rights of the defendant were prejudiced thereby. It is apparent that the defendant had many days within which to raise issues, move to set aside the information, or demur or plead to the information. When the court entered the plea of not guilty, the case was at issue. I.C. sec. 19-2819.
The fourth specification of error is that the court erred in not requiring, or not having, the clerk read the information to the jury and state the plea of the defendant to the jury after they were impaneled and sworn, as required by I.C. sec. 19-2101. That section is as follows:
'Order of trial.--The jury having been impaneled and sworn, the trial must proceed in the following order:
* * *'
The transcript reveals that the contention of the defendant is correct in stating that the trial court used this irregular procedure, and no showing was made by the respondent to the contrary. Failure to follow the mandatory statutory provisions of I.C. sec. 19-2101 was reversible error. State v. Chambers, 9 Idaho 673, 75 P. 274; State v. Crea, 10 Idaho 88, 76 P. 1013; State v. Burwell, 67 Idaho 373, 181 P.2d 197.
As was maintained in the second specification of error, supra, all the trial jurors were apparently in the courtroom but had not been sworn to try this particular case. It can be presumed the trial jurors were not familiar, or even interested, in the proceedings which were being held by the court prior to such impaneling; and as such, the jurors would not have been familiar with the issues in the case, either by way of having attentively listened to the reading of the information or the entry of...
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State v. Sharp
...to read the indictment or information and to state the plea of the defendant has been held to be reversible error. State v. Cronk, 78 Idaho 585, 307 P.2d 1113 (1957); State v. Chambers, 9 Idaho 673, 75 P. 274 (1904). Appellant cites no pertinent authority in support of his argument. We deem......
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State v. Stiffler
...intent. No more specific intent is required to perpetrate statutory rape than to commit involuntary manslaughter. In State v. Cronk, 78 Idaho 585, 307 P.2d 1113 (1957), this Court held that burglary was a crime malum in se as referred to in State v. Keller and required the trial court to gi......
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State v. McKenna
...710; State v. Ayres, 70 Idaho 18, 211 P.2d 142; State v. Main, 37 Idaho 449, 216 P. 731; Section 19-2819, I.C. In the case of State v. Cronk, Idaho, 307 P.2d 1113, although it does not appear on the face of the decision, we considered and decided a motion to quash the information on the gro......
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State v. Cook
...he was ready to proceed to trial. We do not believe that the defendant waived his right to a two day delay. The case of State v. Cronk, 78 Idaho 585, 307 P.2d 1113 (1957) indicates that this right can be waived. In that case the defendant was first read the information on February 3, 1955. ......