State v. Crowe
| Decision Date | 12 June 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 45966,45966 |
| Citation | 486 P.2d 503,207 Kan. 473 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Alvin Eugene CROWE, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
1. Evidence otherwise relevant in a criminal prosecution is not rendered inadmissible because it may show another or greater crime than that charged.
2. The procedural safeguards securing to the accused the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation do not apply to cross-examination of a defendant who has taken the witness stand in his own defense.
3. A defendant who testifies as a witness in his own behalf brings his integrity and character with him, and he cannot complain because he is subjected to the same inquiries and tests as other witnesses.
4. Where a defendant upon direct examination explains his possession of stolen property it is not error for the state to cross-examine him as to whether he had given this explanation to police officers during or following his arrest.
5. When evidence of a prior conviction of felony in a court of another state is used to invoke the provisions of the habitual criminal act, it is sufficient that the offense was a felony as defined by the law of the other state or jurisdiction.
6. The proper sentence for knowingly receiving stolen property of a value in excess of fifty dollars where the habitual criminal act is invoked by reason of a prior felony conviction is confinement at hard labor not exceeding ten years.
Brian J. Moline, Wichita, argued the cause, and Frank A. Caro, Wichita, was with him on the brief for appellant.
R. K. Hollingsworth, Deputy County Atty., argued the cause, and Vern Miller, Atty. Gen., and Keith Sanborn, County Atty., were with him on the brief for appellee.
HARMAN, Commissioner:
Alvin Eugene Crowe was convicted by a jury of the offense of knowingly receiving stolen property of a value in excess of fifty dollars. Sentenced under the habitual criminal act, he now appeals.
Although appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, certain background revealed by that evidence should be stated.
Some time between 10:30 p. m., Saturday, July 12, 1969, and 8:30 a. m., Sunday, July 13, 1969, two Frigidaire window air-conditioners and a small radio were stolen from a junior high school building in Dodge City, Kansas, as a result of a breakin. Between 5:15 p. m., Friday, July 11, 1969, and 7:15 p. m., Sunday, July 13, 1969, a breakin occurred at the subdistrict state highway commission shop in Cimarron, Kansas, in which a General Electric air-conditioner was stolen.
At about 7:00 p. m., July 13, 1969, the owner of an air-conditioner business was called to the Crowe-Bar tavern in Wichita to show appellant Crowe and his wife how to hook up 220 volt wiring for air-conditioning. There this mechanic saw the three air-conditioners, later shown to be the fruits of the two burglaries; observing the plates on the air-conditioners were missing he remarked that in this condition he would suspect they were 'hot' or stolen; he asked appellant how much he had paid for them; appellant replied he had paid something like $85, $100 or $125; two or three times within several weeks prior to July 13, 1969, appellant had talked to the witness about buying air-conditioners for the tavern if they could agree on the payments. The witness helped install one air-conditioner.
Later that same evening, two Wichita police officers, with the written consent of appellant's wife, in whose name the tavern was licensed, searched the tavern. In one room one of the stolen air-conditioners had been installed; on a pool table in the room the officers found a plate bearing a brand name, and model and serial number; they also found the other two air-conditioners, one with chairs stacked around it; in another room they found two panels from one of the stolen amchines as well as the radio taken from the Dodge City school; a second identification plate was found behind the bar; the two plates had been pried from the Frigidaire air-conditioners.
Appellant was charged only with the receipt of the three stolen air-conditioners. Over his objection the stolen radio found in the tavern was admitted in evidence. He now complains this was erroneous because he was not charged with having received that item. He argues it was neither a prior nor a subsequent offense but was 'an act which is intimately connected with the crime for which defendant now stands charged * * * an integral part of the charged crime', and therefore could not be admissible under K.S.A. 60-455 permitting evidence of other offenses to be received when relevant to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. He relies upon opinions of this court in which the evidence of other offenses was referred to as 'prior and subsequent acts', 'prior acts', 'other occasions' and 'other acts'. Appellant's argument is self-defeating. It is true, as he argues, the evidence respecting the radio was not a showing of a separate and isolated crime-rather it was really a part and parcel of the crime charged. Although not charged, as he could have been, with knowingly receiving the stolen radio, apparently because of its inconsequential value in relation to that of the air-conditioners, its possession under the circumstances was nonetheless relevant, without resort of K.S.A. 60-455, as direct evidence of guilt of the offense charged, being fruit of the same act of thievery in which two of the air-conditioners were taken. Evidence otherwise relevant in a criminal prosecution is not rendered inadmissible because it may show another or a greater crime than that charged (State v. Parks, 133 Kan. 568, 1 P.2d 261; also, see State v. Minnick, 113 Kan. 385, 214 P. 111). No complaint is made of the court's instructions to the jury respecting the radio, the instructions are not...
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...State v. Schroeder, 201 Kan. 811, 443 P.2d 284 [ (1968) ]; State v. Wade, 206 Kan. 347, 479 P.2d 811 [ (1971) ]; and State v. Crowe, 207 Kan. 473, 486 P.2d 503 [ (1971) ]." 220 Kan. at 730, 556 P.2d See also State v. Heath, 222 Kan. 50, 52, 563 P.2d 418 (1977), State v. Jordan, 223 Kan. 197......
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