State v. Crumbley

• Decision Date: 23 May 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 2D16–3875,Case No. 2D16–3872
• Citation: 247 So.3d 666
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. William CRUMBLEY, Appellee. State of Florida, Appellant, v. Tosha Jo Robbins, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

247 So.3d 666

STATE of Florida, Appellant,
v.
William CRUMBLEY, Appellee.

State of Florida, Appellant,
v.
Tosha Jo Robbins, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16–3872
Case No. 2D16–3875

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed May 23, 2018.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Dawn A. Tiffin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.

A.R. Mander, III and Keeley R. Karatinos of Mander Law Group, Dade City, for Appellee William Crumbley.

Christopher E. Cosden, Fort Myers, for Appellee Tosha Jo Robbins.

LaROSE, Chief Judge.

In this consolidated appeal, the State seeks review of the trial court's order dismissing the informations. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(A). Section 458.3265, Florida Statutes (2010 and 2011), criminalizes the operation of a pain management clinic without a license. The trial court found the statute unconstitutionally vague. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Background

Harbour Medical Group was founded in 2009. Following an investigation, the Pasco County Sheriff's Office executed a search warrant for Harbour Medical in late 2011.

247 So.3d 668

A few months later, law enforcement officers arrested Dr. William Crumbley, a physician at Harbour Medical since its founding. They also arrested Tosha Jo Robbins, who had served as Harbour Medical's office manager for approximately two years.

Each made incriminating statements. Dr. Crumbley's arrest affidavit reflects that he told a detective that "he knew he was participating in the operation [of] a pain management clinic without a license." Ms. Robbins' arrest affidavit indicates that she "admitted the Harbour Medical Group was acting as a pain management clinic, but denied knowing they had no license to act as such."

The State charged Dr. Crumbley and Ms. Robbins,¹ in separate cases, with one count each of violating section 458.3265,² a third-degree felony. The charged conduct occurred "on or between" October 14, 2010, and December 13, 2011. Thus, the offenses implicate the 2010 version of the statute and the amended 2011 version. See ch. 2010-211, §§ 4, 14, at 2632-38, 2649, Laws of Fla. (making October 1, 2010, the effective date of section 458.3265 ); ch. 2011-141, §§ 4, 31, at 2198-2207, 2247, Laws of Fla. (amending section 458.3265 effective July 1, 2011).

Dr. Crumbley and Ms. Robbins moved to dismiss the informations. They claimed that the 2010 and 2011 versions of section 458.3265 were unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as-applied. After hearing argument of counsel, the trial court granted the motions in a written order. The trial court took no testimony, received no evidence, and made no factual findings.

The 2010 version of section 458.3265 required registration of "[a]ll privately owned pain-management clinics, facilities, or offices, hereinafter referred to as ‘clinics,’ which advertise in any medium for any type of pain-management services, or employ a physician who is primarily engaged in the treatment of pain by prescribing or dispensing controlled substance medications." § 458.3265(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010).

The trial court found this provision unconstitutionally vague because it failed to define the terms "primarily" and "pain." The trial court noted the "fact that physicians engage in the treatment of injuries and diseases ... which involve some degree of pain." The trial court stressed that the provision lacked normative standards and "cast[ ] its net so broadly as to require doing an act in terms so vague that men and women of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."

The legislature amended the statute in 2011, defining a "pain-management clinic" as a facility "[w]here in any month a majority of patients are prescribed opioids, benzodiazepines, barbiturates, or carisoprodol for the treatment of chronic nonmalignant pain." § 458.3265(1)(a)(1)(b)(II), Fla. Stat. (2011). The trial court concluded that, as amended, the statute "still fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct." The trial court observed that "[t]he wording of the statute requires that a clinic must register as a pain management clinic when in any 30 day period a majority of its patients are prescribed controlled substance medications for the treatment of chronic non-malignant pain."

247 So.3d 669

The trial court found both versions of section 458.3265 unconstitutionally vague because they "fail to provide an objective guideline and standard for determining when a medical facility develops into a ‘pain-management clinic’ requiring registration," do not identify who is responsible for registering the medical facility, and do not address "the amount of time a facility has to register ... after the registration requirement is triggered."

The State argues on appeal that neither version of the statute is "so vague as to fail to give a reasonable person notice of the prohibited conduct." The State relies on the admissions reflected in the arrest affidavits. Dr. Crumbley and Ms. Robbins dispute the contents of the affidavits given the absence of testimony at the motion to dismiss hearing. They also challenge the affidavits as hearsay.

They further assert that both versions of section 458.3265 are unconstitutionally vague because they fail to: (1) "provide practicable means to determine when a facility becomes a ‘pain-management clinic’ thereby triggering the need for registration," (2) "address who is required to submit registration paperwork," and (3) "address the time period in which a pain-management clinic must register" after triggering the need for registration.

Analysis

We review a trial court's order concerning a statute's constitutionality de novo. See State v. Catalano, 104 So.3d 1069, 1075 (Fla. 2012) ("A court's decision regarding the constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo as it presents a pure question of law."). "Statutes enjoy a strong presumption in favor of constitutionality and courts are obligated to construe statutes to avoid declaring them unconstitutional." Wegner v. State, 928 So.2d 436, 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citations omitted). Yet, "in a vagueness challenge, any doubt as to a statute's validity should be resolved in favor of the citizen and against the State." DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272, 274 (Fla. 2002).

"The vagueness doctrine ... was developed to ensure compliance with the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Simmons v. State, 944 So.2d 317, 324 (Fla. 2006). The Florida Constitution, too, guarantees that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty[,] or property without due process of law." Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. The "void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage...