State v. Cruz

• Decision Date: 14 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 32,130.,32,130.
• Citation: 2011 -NMSC- 038,150 N.M. 548,263 P.3d 890
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner,v.Debbie CRUZ, Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

150 N.M. 548
263 P.3d 890
2011 -NMSC- 038

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner,
v.
Debbie CRUZ, Defendant–Respondent.

No. 32,130.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Sept. 14, 2011.

[263 P.3d 890]

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Ann M. Harvey, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public Defender, Carlos Ruiz de la Torre, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.OPINION BOSSON, Justice.

{1} Defendant was convicted of issuing payroll checks with insufficient funds to cover them. Because the worthless checks were issued a week after the last day of the pay period, the Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, relying on previous opinions of our respective courts to conclude that the Worthless Check Act (“the modern Act”), NMSA 1978, §§ 30–36–1 to –10 (1963, as amended through 1984), applies only to a “contemporaneous exchange” and not to pre-existing or antecedent debts. We reject that distinction as inconsistent with the clear legislative intent and purpose of the Act. We reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for their consideration of the remaining issues raised, but not decided, on appeal.

BACKGROUND

{2} Debbie Cruz (“Defendant”) was the owner and president of DGM Construction. DGM employed Benjamin Kallestewa, Vicki Kallestewa, and Leo Erachio (collectively, “the workers”) to work on a construction project on the Zuni Pueblo in 2002. Defendant signed all the company's paychecks, which were delivered to the workers by the site foreman one week after the end of the pay period. In June 2002, the workers cashed four paychecks at a local trading post. The trading post owner deposited the checks at his bank, but the bank returned all four checks for insufficient funds. The trading post owner made three additional attempts to deposit the checks before the bank returned

[263 P.3d 891]

the checks for a final time, noting that the “account [had] closed.”

{3} Defendant was charged with four counts of issuing worthless checks, pursuant to Section 30–36–4 of the Act. Convicted on each count, Defendant argued on appeal, among other issues, the lack of sufficient evidence to prove that she had issued a check “in exchange for anything of value” as set forth in Section 30–36–4 of the Act. State v. Cruz, 2010–NMCA–011, ¶¶ 1, 26, 40, 147 N.M. 753, 228 P.3d 1173. The Court of Appeals agreed, reversing Defendant's convictions on that ground. Id. ¶¶ 1, 41.

{4} Relying on some hoary case law from this Court and a more recent case of its own, the Court of Appeals concluded that the statutory “exchange” for which the worthless checks issued—in this case an exchange of labor for wages—had to be “contemporaneous,” meaning the checks had to issue at or near the end of the pay period. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33, 38. Because these paychecks were delivered one week after the end of the pay period, they were in payment of an “antecedent or pre-existing debt” not covered by the Act. Id. ¶¶ 32–33. Thus, if we were to follow the logic of the Court of Appeals, the Act would never apply to most payroll situations in which a delay of a week or two between the end of the pay period and receipt of a paycheck is common. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the Act and whether the case law on which it relied has any continuing vitality. State v. Cruz, 2010–NMCERT–001, 147 N.M. 674, 227 P.3d 1056.

DISCUSSION

{5} As phrased in the petition for certiorari, we consider whether the Act's prohibition against issuing worthless checks “in exchange for anything of value” applies to checks issued for labor, often “paid within the traditional two weeks required for processing payroll.” “We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo.” State v. Lucero, 2007–NMSC–041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489.

{6} This is the first time we apply the Act in its modern form, as it has been approximately ninety years since we last spoke on this subject. We considered predecessor versions of the Act in the early part of the last century. Since our last relevant review, see generally State v. Davis, 26 N.M. 523, 194 P. 882 (1921) (applying the 1919 Act), it has been amended or replaced in its entirety nine times. See 1929 N.M. Laws, ch. 126, § 1; 1937 N.M. Laws, ch. 142, §§ 1–5; 1953 N.M. Laws, ch. 132, § 1; 1959 N.M. Laws, ch. 113, §§ 1–2; 1961 N.M. Laws, ch. 206, § 1; 1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 315, §§ 1–10; 1965 N.M. Laws, ch. 114, §§ 1–2; 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 8, §§ 1–2; 1984 N.M. Laws, ch. 110, §§ 1–2. Thus, our Davis, 26 N.M. 523, 194 P. 882, opinion from 1921—the most recent relevant case from this Court—considered a substantially different statute.

{7} We begin our analysis by looking at the language of the modern Act, for the most part enacted in 1963, and the plain meaning of its text. See State v. Moya, 2007–NMSC–027, ¶ 6, 141 N.M. 817, 161 P.3d 862 (“[O]ur primary goal is to effectuate the Legislature's intent. We do so by looking first to the words the Legislature chose and the plain meaning of the language.”). We will then turn to prior iterations of the Act and the case law interpreting them and determine whether such a comparison can shed any light on the Act in its present form.

{8} Defendant was convicted of violating Section 30–36–4 of the Act, which states:

It is unlawful for a person to issue in exchange for anything of value, with intent to defraud, any check, draft or order for payment of money upon any bank or other depository, knowing at the time of the issuing that the offender has insufficient funds in or credit with the bank or depository for the payment of such check, draft or order in full upon its presentation.

(Emphasis added.) This appeal turns on the meaning of the phrase in Section 30–36–4 “in exchange for anything of value.”

{9} The Act defines a “thing of value” to include “money, property, services, goods and wares; and lodging.” Section 30–36–2(D) (emphasis added). The Act does not define “exchange,” see § 30–36–2 (defining only “check,” “person,” “draw,” “thing of value,” and “credit”), and so we must interpret the word by applying its ordinary meaning.

[263 P.3d 892]

See Oldham v. Oldham, 2011–NMSC–007, ¶ 10, 149 N.M. 215, 247 P.3d 736 (“ ‘[W]e look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended.’ ” (quoting Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 2009–NMSC–013, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 135)). The ordinary definition of “exchange” includes a broad construction, “[t]o give in return for something received,” and more specific interpretations, such as “trade” and “[t]o give and receive reciprocally,” among others. The American Heritage Dictionary 619 (4th ed.2000). Without any further guidance as to the definition of “exchange,” we may appropriately apply any of the ordinary definitions.

{10} Thus, under a straightforward, textual reading of the Act, its language would appear to embrace the present dispute arising from paychecks issued in exchange for labor. Recall that the Act specifically includes “services” within the definition of “thing of value,” which can only mean that our Legislature intended to cover situations in which workers are paid by check for their “services.” As we will address later, the text of the Act does not condition its protections on whether payment is a “contemporaneous” transaction; the word never appears in the Act. Nor does the Act say that worthless checks issued in exchange for “antecedent or pre-existing debts” are excluded; those words are equally absent from the text of the Act.

{11} Our textual reading of the operative portion of the Act comports with its stated purpose as well. See Lion's Gate Water v. D'Antonio, 2009–NMSC–057, ¶ 23, 147 N.M. 523, 226 P.3d 622 (“Statutes are enacted as a whole, and consequently each section or part should be construed in connection with every other part or section, giving effect to each, and each provision is to be reconciled in a manner that is consistent and sensible so as ‘to produce a harmonious whole.’ ”) (quoting Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 121 N.M. 764, 769, 918 P.2d 350, 355 (1996)). In the words of our Legislature, the purpose of the Act is

to remedy the evil of giving checks on a bank without first providing funds in or credit with the depository on which they are made or drawn to pay or satisfy the same, which tends to create the circulation of worthless checks on banks, bad banking, check kiting and mischief to trade and commerce.

Section 30–36–3.

{12} Applying the Act to worthless payroll checks, with or without a lapse of time between payment and work performed, presumably furthers the purposes of the Act. Worthless payroll checks, no less than any others, go to the heart of the “evil of giving checks on a bank without first providing funds in or credit with the depository.” Id. Worthless checks issued for payroll have the same deleterious effect on the banking system and represent a “mischief to trade and commerce,” id., whether or not the bad checks issue contemporaneously with the last work day, or a week or two later. Thus, reading a strict requirement of “contemporaneous” into the Act's exchange, would appear to undercut the laudable policy goals of the Act.

{13} Perhaps most persuasive is that if we were to exclude common payroll transactions from the Act, then we would narrow significantly the scope of the Act. Indeed, we would render the inclusion of “services” within the definition of “thing of value” practically meaningless. Thus, even aside from the text of the Act, if we focus on an interpretation that fosters, not obstructs, the beneficial goals of the Act, then the direction taken by our Court of Appeals gives rise to considerable doubt.

The Court of Appeals Opinion

{14} How did our Court of Appeals come to such a different conclusion? First, we must acknowledge some of our case law that, quite...