State v. CSX Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 14-19-09, NO. 14-19-11, NO. 14-19-10,NO. 14-19-07, NO. 14-19-08,14-19-07 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant-Appellee. State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CSX Transportation, Inc., Defendant-Appellee. State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CSX Transportation, Inc., Defendant-Appellee. State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CSX Transportation, Inc., Defendant-Appellee. State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CSX Transportation, Inc., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio (the "State") appeals the February 26, 2019 judgment entries of dismissal issued by the Marysville Municipal Court, which granted the motions to dismiss filed by CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX") regarding five separate complaints alleging CSX violated R.C. 5589.21, also known as "Ohio's blocked crossing statute." On appeal, the State challenges the trial court's determination that the Ohio statute is preempted by federal law, specifically the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 ("ICCTA"), 49 U.S.C. § 10101, et seq .
{¶2} Section 5589.21 of the Revised Code prohibits a railroad company from obstructing public roads for longer than five minutes, to the hindrance or inconvenience of travelers or a person passing along or upon such street, road, or highway, with two limited exceptions: when the obstruction is caused (1) by a continuously moving through train; or (2) by circumstances wholly beyond the control of the railroad company. R.C. 5589.21(A), (C). The statute further specifies that the prohibition "does apply to other obstructions, including without limitation those caused by stopped trains and trains engaged in switching, loading, or unloading operations." Id.
{¶3} During a six month period from May 12, 2018 to November 8, 2018, the Union County Sherriff's Office filed five citations against CSX, charging it with violations of R.C. 5589.21(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree. See R.C. 5589.99(D) (). The citations each indicated that CSX had stopped its train, blocking a public railroad crossing for over an hour with no mechanical issue causing the train to be stationary. The citations further indicated that CSX's conduct hindered traffic and caused inconvenience to motorists. CSX entered a not guilty plea to the charges.1
{¶4} CSX filed a motion to dismiss in each case arguing that the prohibition contained in R.C. 5589.21(A), specifically the prohibition of CSX's conduct of allowing its trains to remain stationary while obstructing a public railroad crossing for longer than five minutes which results in impeding automobile traffic while it services its customer, "is indefensible" because R.C. 5589.21 is preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 ("ICCTA"), 49 U.S.C. § 10101, et seq. , and the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act ("FRSA"), 49 U.S.C., § 20101, et seq. (Doc. No. 33 at 2).
{¶5} CSX attached to its motions the affidavits of Blair Johnson, the Assistant Superintendent of the Midwest Region of CSX, who oversees operating personnel responsible for moving trains in and out of the Honda plant located near Marysville, Ohio.2 Johnson acknowledged that CSX's trains consistently obstruct public railroad crossings while loading and unloading goods and supplies and/or entering and exiting the automotive plant. Johnson averred that CSX was engaged in such activities when it received three of the citations at issue in this case. Johnson further claimed that while servicing the Honda plant in this manner "it is not possible for CSX to comply with the Ohio blocked crossing statute with respect to train speed, length and/or scheduling, the regulations of which are governed exclusively by federal law." (Doc. No. 33).
{¶6} Johnson also stated that the train involved in the citation generating case number 18CRB440 was required to pull onto a side track so that another train traveling in the opposite direction could pass on the single train line, and as a result the CSX train blocked the crossing for longer than five minutes. Johnson further explained that in case number 18CRB606 the CSX train involved was required to stop and block the crossing because another train traveling ahead of it on the same track had come to a stop due to mechanical safety issues. Thus, CSX maintained that two of the incidents underlying the citations were wholly beyond its control.
{¶7} This notwithstanding, CSX argued that the ICCTA and FRSA both contain express provisions regulating the operation of its trains which preempted any attempt by the State to dictate the length of time that CSX's trains could obstruct a public railroad crossing under R.C. 5589.21. CSX further cited to several state and federal case authorities supporting its position that the citations issued by the State for violating R.C. 5589.21 should be dismissed on federal preemption grounds.
{¶8} The State filed a response opposing CSX's motions to dismiss. The State argued that the FRSA expressly allows for state regulation in the area of railroad crossing safety as an exercise of its traditional police powers, and that the ICCTA does not expressly preempt the conduct specifically prohibited by R.C. 5589.21 because the core concern of the ICCTA is to regulate railroad carrier economics and finance rather than the railroad company's use of public railroad crossings. The State highlighted the language of R.C. 5589.20, in which the Ohio Legislature specifically expressed its intent to protect the health, safety and welfare of Ohio's citizens by enacting R.C. 5589.21 et seq., and argued that there is no unreasonable burden placed on CSX to comply with both R.C. 5589.21 and federal regulations. In support of its position that the health and safety of its citizens are of paramount concern under R.C. 5589.21(A), the State attached a diagram to its response demonstrating that at least two fire stations were severed from immediate access to their response areas when CSX obstructed the public railroad crossings.
{¶9} On February 26, 2019, the trial court issued an entry of dismissal in each case finding that Ohio's blocked crossing statute, R.C. 5589.21, is preempted by the ICCTA. Specifically, the trial court found that the ICCTA contained a provision expressly preempting R.C. 5589.21. In addition, the trial court praised the State's efforts to defend the sanctity of its exercise of traditional police powers to protect the health and safety of its citizens, but nonetheless felt obliged to follow the case authority cited by CSX in support of dismissal. Specifically, the trial court stated:
{¶10} It is from these judgment entries of dismissal that the State now appeals, asserting the following assignment of error.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 5589.21 IS PRE-EMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW AND DISMISSING THE COMPLAINTS FILED WITH THE COURT.
{¶11} In its sole assignment of error, the State argues the trial court erred in determining that the ICCTA explicitly preempts R.C. 5589.21.
{¶12} The issue in this case presents a question of law—specifically, whether federal law preempts Ohio's blocked crossing statute, R.C. 5589.21. We review a question of law under a de novo standard of review without deference to the trial court's decision. State ex rel. Yost v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft , 10 Dist. Franklin, 2019-Ohio-5084, 137 N.E.3d 1267, ¶ 12, citing Bailey v. Manor Care of Mayfield Hts. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga, 2013-Ohio-4927, 4 N.E.3d 1071, ¶ 12.
{¶13} It has "long been settled" that a preemption analysis begins with the presumption that federal statutes do not preempt state law. Bond v. United States , 572 U.S. 844, 858, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 189 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014). The presumption against preemption comes from two concepts embedded in the United States Constitution: the Supremacy Clause and federalism. See Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. 387, 398, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012).
{¶14} Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the United States Congress has the power to preempt state laws. In re Miamisburg Train Derailment Litigation , 68 Ohio St.3d 255, 259, 626 N.E.2d 85 (1994). Specifically, the Supremacy Clause provides that "the Laws of the United States * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Constitution, Article VI, cl. 2.
{¶15} However, federalism, which is also "central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect." Arizona at 399, 132 S.Ct. 2492, citing Gregory v....
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