State v. Culberth, 66728
Decision Date | 10 November 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 66728,66728 |
Citation | 390 So.2d 847 |
Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Walter CULBERTH, Jr. |
Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Louise S. Korns, Thomas Chester, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
Orleans Indigent Defender Program, Robert J. Zibilich, Dwight Doskey, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
On November 5, 1978 Annie Simms was walking with two companions, George Blanks and Warren Minor, toward a bus stop at the corner of Washington and South Claiborne Avenues. The defendant called her, and she walked back toward him. After a few moments the two men turned around to look for Annie, and saw the defendant stabbing her. When Minor approached, the defendant came toward him with his knife and said, "You're next." Minor threw a bottle at the defendant, and retreated behind a car. The defendant returned to the victim and stabbed her again. She died enroute to the hospital. The defendant confessed to the police and was charged with first degree murder. (R.S. 14:30). After a bifurcated trial held on May 30, 1979, a unanimous jury found him guilty as charged and recommended the death penalty.
Defense counsel contests the trial judge's denial of the motion for mistrial he made in chambers. Defense counsel believes that remarks made by the prosecutor in his rebuttal argument called attention to the defendant's failure to take the stand and therefore justify a mistrial under C.Cr.P. 770(3). We do not believe that the prosecutor's comments can be construed as direct or indirect references to the defendant's failure to testify. Defense counsel's argument that the prosecutor's comment "there was no dispute as to the State's case" is an unmistakable reference to the failure to take the stand also lacks merit. This remark is merely a reference to the fact that the defense presented no witnesses.
Defense counsel also calls for a mistrial under C.Cr.P. 775. He alleges that the prosecutor's remarks 1 regarding the defendant's conduct at trial and his appeal for sympathy for the victim's brother violated C.Cr.P. 774's admonition to counsel not to appeal to prejudice. The trial judge thought the prosecutor's remarks about the victim's brother were logical inferences from the testimony, and he admonished the jury to disregard the state's comments about the defendant's conduct sufficiently to correct any error that might have existed.
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), the United States Supreme Court approved the Georgia sentencing scheme which serves as the model for our sentencing procedure. (C.Cr.P. 905-905.9). To ensure that the death penalty is not arbitrarily or capriciously imposed, C.Cr.P. 905.9 requires this court to review every sentence to determine if it is excessive. Louisiana Supreme Court Rule 28, adopted pursuant to that article, states that in its review this court shall evaluate:
"...
(a) whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors, and
(b) whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and
(c) whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant."
Defendant also alleges that the jury's finding of a nonexistent aggravating circumstance constituted prejudicial error, as it could have influenced the jury to recommend the death sentence. In his view, due process requires that an accused be given the opportunity to dispel false information which might influence a court or jury to impose a severe sentence. State v. Trahan, 367 So.2d 752 (La.1978); State v. Bosworth, 360 So.2d 173 (La.1978). At the sentencing hearing both parties stipulated that the defendant had three prior convictions, aggravated battery, theft and manslaughter. The jury apparently misunderstood the stipulation and returned with a finding of three aggravating circumstances, including a finding that the defendant had a previous conviction for an unrelated murder. A portion of the prosecutor's speech in the sentencing phase of the trial might have contributed to the jury's misunderstanding. In examining possible mitigating circumstances, the prosecutor said of the defendant:
"... (Emphasis added).
At trial defense counsel did not object to these remarks nor to the two aggravating circumstances urged by the state and found by the jury. However, he did refuse to accept the finding of an unrelated murder conviction, noting that he had stipulated to a conviction for manslaughter, not murder, and that the statute specified murder.
Defense counsel now contends that none of the three aggravating circumstances found by the jury is supported by the record. Ordinarily, an objection which is not argued at trial is considered waived; however, since this court is empowered by the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure to undertake an independent review of all death sentences, defense counsel's failure to object contemporaneously is not fatal. State v. Sonnier, 379 So.2d 1336 (La.1980). We believe that the prosecutor's comments were prejudicial and may have contributed to the jury's error. However, none of the aggravating circumstances cited by the jury is adequately supported by the record.
C.Cr.P. 905.3 states that the death sentence can only be imposed if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances set out in C.Cr.P. 905.4 is present. 2 In every case where the death sentence is recommended this court must determine whether the aggravating circumstances cited by the jury are supported by the evidence. In this case, the state listed two aggravating circumstances supporting the death penalty. It contended that the defendant, by threatening Minor when he tried to intercede on the victim's behalf, knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person. It also asserted that the infliction of five stab wounds on the helpless victim constituted an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner of killing. The jury found both these grounds, as well as the third mentioned above-prior conviction of an unrelated murder.
The record indicates that the defendant was not convicted of an unrelated murder; he was originally charged with murder but pleaded guilty to manslaughter.
The evidence also does not support the conclusion that the defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person. In State v. English, 367 So.2d 815 (La.1979), this court stated that this aggravating circumstance is established when the defendant by a single and consecutive course of conduct...
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