State v. Cummings
| Decision Date | 06 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 510A99.,510A99. |
| Citation | 543 S.E.2d 849 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Daniel CUMMINGS, Jr. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Roy A. Cooper, III, Attorney General, by Ellen B. Scouten, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Janet Moore, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.
On 8 August 1994, Daniel Cummings, Jr. was indicted on one count of first-degree murder of Lena Hales, one count of first-degree burglary, and one count of felonious larceny. Defendant was capitally tried before a jury at the 1 March 1999 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Robeson County. On 16 March 1999, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder under the felony murder rule, and of first-degree burglary and felonious larceny. On 24 March 1999, after a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended death for the first-degree murder conviction, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with that recommendation. The trial court also sentenced defendant to a term of ten years' imprisonment for the larceny conviction and arrested judgment in the burglary conviction.
The State's evidence tended to show that Lena Hales (the victim) was eighty years old at the time of her death. The victim was five feet three inches tall and weighed approximately 117 pounds. She lived alone in her home on Shannon Road in an area of Red Springs, North Carolina, commonly known as the Pecan Orchard. At the time she was killed, the victim had lived at this residence for over fifty-seven years. On the morning of 20 April 1994, Barbara Kinlew, the victim's daughter, received a telephone call from one of her mother's friends, who was worried because she had not heard from the victim. Thereafter, Barbara Kinlew and her son, Gregory Kinlew, went to the victim's house. Upon arriving at the victim's home, Barbara saw that the window to her mother's bedroom was broken, with jagged glass all around it. She and her son raised the window and crawled through it. The victim's bed was on the other side of the window. The bed covers were pulled back, and there was broken glass on the bed.
Barbara saw her mother sitting in her recliner in the living room with her head down. Her mother was wearing her pajamas and her housecoat. She had been badly beaten; the side of the victim's head was bruised and appeared black and blue. In addition, her heavily blood-stained dentures were hanging out of her mouth. The recliner in which the victim was sitting was stained with feces and blood. After Barbara sat down in distress, Gregory stated that he believed he saw the victim move. When Barbara shouted at her, the victim moved her foot. The victim was airlifted to Duke Medical Center, where she was kept alive by machine until the family had the life support removed later that day. Police and Barbara Kinlew later noted that the victim's pocketbook, which she kept on a wardrobe shelf in her bedroom, was on the bed with the victim's change purse on top of the pocketbook. In addition, the wardrobe door was standing open.
Dr. Deborah Radisch, who was accepted at trial as an expert in forensic pathology, performed the autopsy on the victim on 21 April 1994. The autopsy revealed a great deal of external injury to the victim's body, including multiple purple and red bruises with pinpoint areas of bleeding around her face; a torn and bruised lip; blue and purple bruising on her collarbone, left and right shoulders, left ankle, left and right arms, and back; and multiple lacerations and tears in the skin. The victim suffered from a fractured hyoid (neck) bone, apparently as a result of direct trauma, as well as multiple fractured ribs. The victim's brain contained large areas of bruising and swelling, as well as a very large blood clot, or subdural hematoma, which was pressing down on the left side of the brain and affected the victim's ability to breathe. The victim sustained multiple injuries consistent with multiple strikes, blows, or blunt-force inflictions, possibly inflicted by a human fist.
At trial, the State offered the testimony of several witnesses who had seen defendant in the vicinity of the victim's house looking for money in the late evening and early morning of 18 and 19 April 1994. A man fitting defendant's description went to Mary Francis Hughs' front door at approximately 12:05 a.m. on 19 April 1994, asking if a certain person lived on the street. Ms. Hughs responded that no such person lived on the street and slammed the door because defendant began to "look weird" and "inch around." Defendant beat on her door for three minutes until Ms. Hughs' son walked toward her house. Ms. Hughs' son saw defendant walk toward the victim's house, weaving in and out of the neighborhood houses. When Ms. Hughs was shown a picture of defendant, she stated that it looked like the man who had knocked on her door.
James Teague lived approximately three blocks from the victim's house, and he testified that he knew the victim. Teague also knew defendant from performing mechanical work on defendant's car. Defendant went to Teague's house at approximately 2:00 a.m. on 19 April 1994 and asked him for twenty dollars, stating he "needed it bad." When Teague told defendant that he did not have twenty dollars, defendant walked across Teague's property toward Shannon Road in the direction of the victim's home.
Red Springs law enforcement authorities interviewed defendant on three separate occasions, during which time he made three contradictory statements. When police investigated defendant's first two statements, they determined that the statements were not completely truthful. During the third interview, defendant admitted to breaking into the victim's home and robbing her, but did not admit to harming the victim. Defendant described in detail how he broke into the victim's home, using details that the police had not previously disclosed.
During the sentencing proceeding, the State presented evidence that defendant had admitted that, on 22 April 1994, he shot and killed Burns Babson while robbing the convenience store Babson operated twenty-five feet from Babson's home. On 16 December 1994, defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder of Babson and was sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court found no error. See State v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 488 S.E.2d 550 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1092, 118 S.Ct. 886, 139 L.Ed.2d 873 (1998).
Mrs. Julie Babson, Burns' wife, testified during the sentencing proceeding that, in the case noted above, she had run into the yard after hearing shots fired and had seen defendant leaving the store. Tom Hunter, a detective with the Major Crimes Unit of Brunswick County, testified during the sentencing proceeding that he interviewed defendant and that defendant admitted to shooting Babson while robbing his store. During one of these interviews, defendant made reference to Hales' murder by admitting that he had broken into a house in Red Springs to rob it but that there was an old lady home. Defendant told Detective Hunter that he had to strike the old lady in self-defense and that she was still alive when he left.
By assignments of error, defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution when it dismissed six prospective jurors after unrecorded, private bench discussions with them. Defendant also contends the private bench discussions violated his statutory right to recordation under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1241(a).
A review of the jury selection process for this capital trial reveals that, after some jurors had been selected, the trial court asked a new group of prospective jurors questions regarding their qualifications to serve on a jury. Throughout the entire process, defendant and his counsel were present in the courtroom. Specifically, the trial court asked whether any prospective juror: (1) lived outside of Robeson County, (2) was under the age of eighteen, (3) had served on a jury within the last two years, or (4) had been convicted of a felony or been declared mentally incompetent without having his or her citizenship status restored by law. The trial court's questions to the prospective jurors were "obviously designed to insure that the new prospective jurors were qualified to serve under N.C.G.S. § 9-3." State v. Payne, 328 N.C. 377, 388, 402 S.E.2d 582, 588 (1991). N.C.G.S. § 9-3 provides as follows:
After each of the first three statutory inquiries with regard to residency, age, and prior jury service, the trial court asked the jurors to indicate, by raising their hands, whether the specified disqualification applied to them. After conducting the fourth inquiry regarding prior felony convictions and mental competency, however, the trial court stated, "Is there anyone who has been through any of those proceedings who would like to speak to me quietly or privately about it up at the bench?" The record reveals that five prospective jurors responded to the trial court's inquiry and, after private discussions at the bench, were excused prior to voir dire by counsel.
It is well settled that the Confrontation Clause of the North Carolina Constitution guarantees the right of every accused...
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