State v. Cungtion

Decision Date28 January 2022
Docket NumberNo. 20-0409,20-0409
Citation969 N.W.2d 501
Parties STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Christopher Lee CUNGTION, Jr., Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender (argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, and Peter Stiefel (until withdrawal), Victor, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Aaron Rogers (argued), Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Sean R. Berry, Acting United States Attorney, Lisa C. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney, and Ann O'Connell Adams (argued), Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, for amicus curiae United States.

Joshua A. Canterbury, Assistant Attorney General, and Christopher M. Nydle, Lead Prosecutor, for amicus curiae Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa.

Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen, C.J., and Appel, Waterman, Mansfield, and McDonald, JJ., joined. McDermott, J., filed a special concurrence.

OXLEY, Justice.

In 1948, Congress gave the State of Iowa criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against "Indians"1 on the Meskwaki Settlement near Tama. In 2018, Congress took that jurisdiction back. Because Congress's repeal of the state's jurisdiction did not affect criminal cases pending at the time of the repeal, we affirm the judgment against the defendant.

I.

Christopher Lee Cungtion, Jr. got into an altercation with a group of people in the parking lot of the Meskwaki Bingo Casino and Hotel in the early morning hours of July 30, 2017. Cungtion hit one man in the face with a Hennessy whiskey bottle, threw the bottle at his car, and then drove a vehicle towards him. The man jumped out of the way when Cungtion swerved at him. Cungtion narrowly missed the man, sideswiping his car instead.

On November 30, 2018, the State charged Cungtion with intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent to injure, willful injury resulting in bodily injury, assault with a dangerous weapon, and driving while barred. Cungtion entered an Alford2 plea to the charges. He received deferred judgments on the intimidation with a dangerous weapon and willful injury resulting in bodily injury charges. He also received concurrent suspended two-year prison sentences with two-year terms of supervised probation for the other charges.

In July 2019, Cungtion assaulted his girlfriend, quit his job, and smoked marijuana, all in violation of his probation. On July 22, the Tama County Attorney filed an application for entry of judgment on the counts for which Cungtion had previously received deferred judgments.

All of this seems fairly routine except for one critical fact—Cungtion is not an Indian, but his victim is, which means the State's ability to prosecute Cungtion under state law depends solely on congressional authorization. State v. Stanton , 933 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Iowa 2019) (explaining Congress granted Iowa criminal jurisdiction "over offenses committed by or against Indians" on the Meskwaki Settlement when it enacted the Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (1948 Act)). After the court granted Cungtion deferred judgments in November 2018 but before the county attorney sought entry of judgment on those counts in July 2019, Congress repealed the 1948 Act that had given Iowa criminal jurisdiction over the Meskwaki Settlement. The repeal was effective December 11, 2018. Act of Dec. 11, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–301, 132 Stat. 4395 ( Public Law 115–301 ); see also Stanton , 933 N.W.2d at 249.

Cungtion moved to dismiss the application for entry of judgment for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Iowa had lost jurisdiction over the counts for which he received deferred judgments. Without jurisdiction, the court could not revoke his probation or enter judgment on the deferred counts. The district court denied Cungtion's motion, concluding that the State retained jurisdiction over acts committed before the repeal went into effect. The district court also rejected Cungtion's argument that the State lacked jurisdiction because he violated his probation after the repeal, reasoning that Cungtion had committed the crimes for which he received the deferred judgments before December 11, 2018.

The district court revoked the deferred judgments and found Cungtion guilty on the willful injury resulting in bodily injury charge, imposed an indeterminate five-year prison term, which it suspended, and placed him on probation for five years. The court amended Cungtion's probation terms on the intimidation with a dangerous weapon charge. For the other charges, the court extended the probation terms to November 30, 2021.

Cungtion appealed, and we retained the appeal. The only issue is whether the district court had jurisdiction to enter judgment against Cungtion, which we review for errors at law. See Stanton , 933 N.W.2d at 247.

II.

This case marks the second time in two years we have confronted the effects of Congress's 2018 repeal of the 1948 Act. In State v. Stanton , we held that Public Law 115–301 ’s repeal had no effect on the state's jurisdiction to prosecute crimes on the Meskwaki Settlement involving non-Indians. 933 N.W.2d at 249–50. That's because the state's criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians existed before the 1948 Act, so its repeal left that jurisdiction untouched. Id. But with the repeal of the 1948 Act, the state no longer has jurisdiction over criminal acts committed by or against Indians on the Meskwaki Settlement. What about acts committed before the repeal? May the State finish prosecuting charges that were pending on December 11, 2018? Because Congress did not provide otherwise, we conclude it can.

A.

This appeal involves the State's ability to impose its criminal laws in Indian country, so we must consider the statutory repeal against the backdrop of Indian law. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz. , 411 U.S. 164, 172, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973) ; Sac & Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa v. Licklider , 576 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir. 1978) ("Federal Indian law is a subject that cannot be understood if the historical dimension of existing law is ignored." (quoting United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson , 478 F.2d 684, 686 (8th Cir. 1973) )). Indian tribes are semi-independent sovereigns with inherent authority over their people and their land. Congress has broad power, derived from the Constitution, to legislate with respect to Indian tribes, authority "consistently described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’ " United States v. Lara , 541 U.S. 193, 200, 124 S.Ct. 1628, 158 L.Ed.2d 420 (2004). A state has no authority to enforce its criminal laws over conduct involving Indians in Indian country unless Congress provides it. A state's criminal jurisdiction is wholly dependent on, and strictly limited by, the statutory grant of such authority from Congress. See Tyndall v. Gunter , 840 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation , 439 U.S. 463, 470–71, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979) ) ("[I]t is settled that the federal government may grant to the states the authority to regulate matters involving Indians, including criminal offenses."). It is also important to recognize that Congress authorized state criminal jurisdiction involving different tribes in different states at different times. See Robert T. Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority over Indian Country Granted by Public Law 280 , 87 Wash. L. Rev. 915, 928–29 (2012) [hereinafter Anderson] ("Congress has used its power under the Indian Commerce Clause to authorize the exercise of state jurisdiction in haphazard fashion."). We must therefore carefully consider congressional action as it applies to the specific state and tribe at issue.

As we explained in Stanton , Congress conferred criminal jurisdiction on the State of Iowa when it passed the 1948 Act. 933 N.W.2d at 249. The state's jurisdiction was concurrent with federal jurisdiction over conduct covered by the Indian Major Crimes Act, see Negonsott v. Samuels , 507 U.S. 99, 105, 113 S.Ct. 1119, 122 L.Ed.2d 457 (1993) (holding the Kansas Act, which granted similar authority to Kansas as given to Iowa under the 1948 Act, "confer[red] only concurrent ‘legislative’ jurisdiction on the State to define and prosecute similar offenses"), and also concurrent with the Tribe's retained inherent authority, see 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (recognizing and affirming the inherent power of Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians); see also Lara , 541 U.S. at 210, 124 S.Ct. 1628. The 1948 Act was specific to Iowa's jurisdiction within the Meskwaki Settlement, similar to other legislation granting jurisdiction to specific states concerning specific tribes. See, e.g. , Vanessa J. Jimenez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280 , 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 1627, 1656 n.163 (1998) (detailing separate congressional grants of criminal jurisdiction to Kansas and New York over crimes committed on all Indian reservations within their states and to North Dakota over offenses committed by or against Indians on the Devils Lake Indian Reservation).

In 1953, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 1162, commonly referred to as Public Law 280, addressing jurisdiction over Indian country in several states. Public Law 280 required six states, and gave others the option, to unilaterally exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribes in their respective states. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 2, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 ). These laws were enacted during the "termination era" as part of Congress's efforts to remove federal oversight and assimilate Indians into their state communities in the 1940s and 1950s. See Anderson, 87 Wash. L. Rev. at 930 ("In 1953 Congress ... set a goal of removing federal jurisdiction over Indian country and making Indians subject to general state law as quickly as possible."). Congress soon concluded that forced assimilation was...

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