State v. Cunningham

• Decision Date: 24 October 1977
• Citation: State v. Cunningham, 153 N.J.Super. 350, 379 A.2d 860 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1977)
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bruce CUNNINGHAM, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 350

153 N.J.Super. 350

379 A.2d 860

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bruce CUNNINGHAM, Defendant-Respondent.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Submitted Oct. 12, 1977.

Decided Oct. 24, 1977.

Burrell Ives Humphreys, Passaic County Prosecutor, for plaintiff-appellant (Dante P. Mongiardo, Asst. Prosecutor, on the brief).

Diamond, Diamond & Afflitto, Wayne, for defendant-respondent (Joseph T. Afflitto, Wayne, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges BISCHOFF, KOLE and GAULKIN.

PER CURIAM.

The State appeals, pursuant to leave granted, from an order of the trial judge suppressing evidence as having been obtained as a result of an improper custodial interrogation in violation of defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.

Defendant was a suspect in a carnal abuse case and, at the police station, was given warnings by a detective consistent with the principles expressed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He was then asked if he understood the warnings, to which defendant answered he "did and wished to remain silent." Thereafter, the detective asked defendant where and with whom he was living. Defendant responded with the name of his girlfriend and her address. Under cross-examination at the Miranda hearing, the detective testified he wanted to know where defendant lived so he could continue his investigation. He further testified that when he asked the question he intended to go to the address to look for and obtain specific items of evidence.

The detective went to the address given by defendant and seized articles for use as evidence. At the conclusion of the Miranda hearing the evidence thus obtained was suppressed. The trial judge ruled that, while generally questions as to name and address were proper for ministerial purposes such as booking or bail purposes without prior Miranda warnings, such questions violated defendant's constitutional rights in this case because it was the expressed intent of the detective to use the information thus obtained to continue his investigation. The evidence was suppressed because it was "the fruits of a violation of defendant's right to remain silent under the rule of the Miranda case."

Routine questions asked during the booking process or for bail purposes are generally held to be ministerial in nature and outside the privilege against self-incrimination. People v. Rivera, 26 N.Y.2d 304, 310 N.Y.S.2d 287, 258 N.E.2d 699 (Ct.App.1970); State v. Rassmussen, 92 Idaho 731, 449 P.2d 837 (Sup.Ct.1969); United States v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109 (2 Cir. 1975), cert. den. Hines v. Bombard 423 U.S. 1090, 96 S.Ct. 884, 47 L.Ed.2d 101 (1976); Commonwealth v. Allen, 239 Pa.Super. 83, 361 A.2d 393 (Super.Ct. 1976); State v. Jordan, 506 S.W.2d 74 (Mo.Ct.App.1974); Clarke v. State,3 Md.App. 447, 240 A.2d 291 (Ct.Spec.App.1968).

The trial judge recognized this rule but held that, since the testimony of the detective indicated an intent to use the information obtained from such innocuous questions in order to continue his investigation, it was improper to ask them. He applied a subjective test and, in doing so, we conclude that he erred. The test to be applied in determining whether custodial interrogation has occurred is well stated by the California Supreme Court in People v. Stewart, 62 Cal.2d 571, 43 Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97 (1965), aff'd Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), as follows:

The test which we have described does not propose a determination of the actual intent or subjective purpose of the police in undertaking the interrogations but a determination based upon the objective evidence. Whatever may be the subjective intent of the interrogators, we must, in order to determine if the police are carrying out 'a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements' (citation omitted), analyze the total situation which envelops the questioning by considering such factors as the length of the interrogation, the place and time of the interrogation, the nature of the questions, the conduct of the police and all other relevant circumstances. (43 Cal.Rptr. at 206, 400 P.2d at 102)

This is substantially the test adopted and applied in New Jersey. In State v. Barnes, 54 N.J. 1, 252 A.2d 398 (1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 1029, 90 S.Ct. 580, 24 L.Ed.2d 525 (1970), the police stopped a car in which defendant was riding, arrested and searched her. They were looking for stolen checks and defendant had none on her person. During a cursory search of the car in which defendant was riding, the police saw checks on the floor of the car and asked, ...