State v. Cunningham
| Citation | 144 Wis.2d 272,423 N.W.2d 862 |
| Decision Date | 02 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-0742-CR,87-0742-CR |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert W. CUNNINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
Steven D. Phillips, First Asst. State Public Defender, for defendant-appellant.
Thomas J. Balistreri, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, Donald J. Hanaway, Atty. Gen., on brief, for plaintiff-respondent.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Racine county, Emmanuel J. Vuvunas, circuit judge. The defendant was convicted of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and of resisting an officer in violation of secs. 941.29(1)(a) and 946.41, Stats. 1985-86. The appeal is before this court on certification from the court of appeals. Sec. 808.05(2) and sec. (Rule) 809.61.
The court of appeals stated the issue in its certification as follows: Is confronting the defendant with physical evidence of a crime the functional equivalent of interrogation so that subsequent statements of the defendant must be suppressed if made prior to receiving a Miranda warning?
The defendant asserts that the statements he made to the arresting officers following their seizure of a revolver from his bedroom should have been suppressed because they were the product of custodial interrogation and were not preceded by Miranda warnings. The defendant contends that the police officers engaged in the "functional equivalent" of express questioning by showing him the revolver.
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), the United States Supreme Court set forth the applicable test for determining what conduct or words by a law enforcement officer constitutes the functional equivalent of express questioning. Applying the Innis test, we conclude that a police officer's confronting the accused with physical evidence of a crime may be, but is not necessarily, the functional equivalent of express questioning. Each case must be considered upon its own facts. 1 We conclude that under the circumstances present in this case the police officer's words and conduct in showing the defendant the revolver were not the functional equivalent of express questioning. Accordingly we affirm the conviction.
The facts of this case are undisputed. On April 24, 1986, three officers executed a search of the defendant's apartment for cocaine pursuant to a lawful search warrant. The officers knew the defendant was a convicted felon and that he routinely carried a firearm. When the officers entered the apartment, the defendant ran into the bedroom in an attempt to grab or discard items near the head of the bed. In the course of a struggle with the officers, the defendant scattered cocaine around the room. The officers subdued the defendant, handcuffed him, and placed him under arrest for resisting an officer. The officers did not read him any Miranda warnings.
After the defendant was placed under arrest and removed from the bedroom, two officers returned to the bedroom to conduct a search for cocaine. They found a loaded revolver between the mattress and box spring, two to four feet from the headboard and about one foot from the side of the bed. One officer unloaded the revolver and then showed it to the defendant, advising him where it had been found and saying to the other officer, "This was apparently what Mr. Cunningham was running into the bedroom for." Upon seeing the revolver and hearing the officer's comment, the defendant stated something to the effect that it was his bedroom and that he had a right to have a gun. These statements were made prior to any Miranda warning.
At the hearing to suppress the defendant's statements, the officer denied that he had intended to interrogate the defendant when he showed the defendant the revolver. The officer testified that his intention was to advise the defendant that the officers had recovered the revolver so that the defendant did not later assert that the officers had planted the revolver.
The state and the defendant agree that the defendant was in custody when he made the statements and that he had not been given Miranda warnings. The sole issue is whether the police officer engaged in the functional equivalent of interrogation when he showed the defendant the revolver. If the officer's conduct was the functional equivalent of interrogation, the statements should be suppressed.
We begin by summarizing the relevant legal principles applicable to this case. The Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution provides that no "person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires observance of this privilege in state court proceedings. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Court established that the state may not use a suspect's statements stemming from custodial interrogation unless the state demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Included among those safeguards are the now-familiar Miranda warnings.
The Court clarified the Miranda case in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), by further defining interrogation. In Innis, a murder suspect was arrested and given the Miranda warnings. He asked for a lawyer. While driving the suspect to the police station, the police officers discussed the possibility that children attending a nearby school for the handicapped might injure themselves if they found a loaded gun. Upon hearing this conversation, the suspect said he would show the officers the location of the gun. The Court concluded that the suspect's statements were admissible.
The Innis Court held that interrogation includes not only express questioning of a suspect in custody, but also conduct or words which are the "functional equivalent" of express questioning. Thus, according to Innis, Miranda safeguards are implicated when a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. Not all police conduct that may cause a defendant to speak constitutes interrogation. The Supreme Court explained the functional equivalent of express questioning as follows:
(Footnotes omitted) Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689.
The generally accepted statement of the Innis test is that the "functional equivalent" of express questioning is "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689. This language implies an objective foreseeability test. The test is whether an objective observer could foresee that the officer's conduct or words would elicit an incriminating response. Another way of stating the objective foreseeability test is to ask whether the police officer's conduct or speech could reasonably have had the force of a question on the suspect.
The Court qualified the objective foreseeability standard by stating that "any knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor in determining whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Innis, 446 U.S. at 302, n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 1690, n. 8. An officer's specific knowledge about the suspect may indicate that the officer should have known his or her conduct or words would have had the force of a question on the suspect.
Thus the Innis test reflects both an objective foreseeability standard and the police officer's specific knowledge of the suspect. The Innis test can be stated as follows: if an objective observer (with the same knowledge of the suspect as the police officer) could, on the sole basis of hearing the officer's remarks or observing the officer's conduct, conclude that the officer's conduct or words would be likely to elicit an incriminating response, that is, could reasonably have had the force of a question on the suspect, then the conduct or words would constitute interrogation.
Several rules emerge from the Innis decision that are important to bear in mind when applying the Innis test.
First, administrative routine questioning of all arrestees who are booked or processed is not the equivalent of express questioning. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100...
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