State v. Cupit
| Decision Date | 10 June 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 18650-KA,18650-KA |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Milton Eugene CUPIT, Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Dennis Stewart, Winnsboro, for appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baton Rouge, William R. Coenen, Jr., Dist. Atty., Terry A. Doughty, Asst. Dist. Atty., Rayville, for appellee.
Before JASPER E. JONES, FRED W. JONES, Jr. and LINDSAY, JJ.
The defendant, Milton Eugene Cupit, was convicted on June 7, 1986 of the second degree murder of James Allen Halley, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30.1. On June 13, 1986, the defendant was ordered to serve the mandatory sentence required for that offense, life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The defendant has appealed his conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.
On October 9, 1983, the body of the victim, James Allen Halley, was found on the bank of the LaFourche Canal in Richland Parish. The body was discovered by the crew on a passing railroad train. Halley, a twenty-one year old victim of cerebral palsy, had suffered three gunshot wounds from a .12 gauge shotgun at close range. The wounds were located in the arm, leg, and head. The victim died as a result of shock and loss of blood.
Before his death, Halley had been scheduled to appear for trial on October 10, 1983 on charges of aggravated arson. It was alleged in that case that Halley was discovered behind the Foxfire Lounge in Monroe on June 21, 1983 by the proprietor of that establishment, Carl Gwin. Halley was applying gasoline to the walls of the lounge in preparation to set it on fire. When confronted, Halley stated that the defendant, Milton Eugene Cupit, had instructed him to burn down the lounge. Halley had decided to implicate the defendant in the arson when he appeared for trial.
The defendant was questioned about Halley's death several times in October and November of 1983, but offered no information. On December 3 and 4, 1983, the defendant contacted Ouachita Parish law enforcement officials and gave taped statements concerning Halley's death.
The defendant claimed that on the evening of October 7, 1983, Halley asked the defendant to pick him up in the parking lot of a grocery store in Monroe. From there the defendant drove Halley to the trailer of Jeffrey Wayne Mann. The defendant was at that time living at the trailer with Mann. According to Cupit, Mann suggested that the trio make a drug called "crack." Mann indicated that a "stash" of the materials needed for this endeavor was located in the Russell Sage Wildlife Refuge in Richland Parish.
The defendant stated that he drove the trio in Mann's vehicle to the designated point. Upon arrival at approximately 11:00 p.m., Halley was directed to walk down an embankment to retrieve the drugs. Mann then took a sawed-off .12 gauge shotgun from the vehicle and announced he was about to kill Halley. Mann then shot Halley three times. The defendant and Mann returned to the vehicle and left the scene. The defendant stated that the pair then deposited the shotgun under J.B.'s Produce Stand in Ouachita Parish. The defendant indicated to law enforcement officials that Mann killed Halley because Halley was having an affair with Mann's wife.
The defendant was originally charged with first degree murder, but this charge was reduced to second degree murder shortly before trial. The defendant was found guilty of second degree murder and has appealed his conviction, urging numerous assignments of error. We find no merit in defendant's assignments of error and affirm his conviction.
The defendant contends the trier of fact erred in finding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of second degree murder. We find the defendant's argument to be meritless.
LSA-R.S. 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; ...
LSA-R.S. 14:24 provides:
All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.
The state was, of course, required to prove the defendant guilty of the elements of the crime of second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
In considering the standard of review for sufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Nealy, 450 So.2d 634 (La.1984).
When circumstantial evidence is relied upon, in whole or in part, the court has explained, in State v. Eason, 460 So.2d 1139 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984), writ denied 463 So.2d 1317 (La.1985), the interaction of the Jackson standard with this state's statutory rule concerning circumstantial evidence as follows:
The statutory rule as to circumstantial evidence is that assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La.R.S. 15:438. This statutory rule is not a purely separate test from the Jackson standard to be applied instead of a sufficiency of the evidence test whenever the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of the crime. State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198 (La.1984). Ultimately, the Jackson standard is the objective standard for testing the overall evidence, direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. State v. Wright, supra; State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983). The statutory rule, however, provides an evidentiary guideline for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence and facilitates appellate review of whether a rational juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is, therefore, a component of the more comprehensive reasonable doubt standard, where circumstantial evidence is used to convict. Thus, although the circumstantial evidence rule may not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general reasonable juror's reasonable doubt formula, it does emphasize the need for careful observance of the usual standard and provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases which hinge on the evaluation of the circumstantial evidence. State v. Wright, supra; State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464 (La.1983).
The defendant contends that the state offered numerous witnesses to prove that a crime was committed and that it was committed in Richland Parish, but presented little evidence to connect the defendant with the crime. In fact, the defendant contends that this crime was actually committed by Jeffrey Wayne Mann.
Upon reviewing this record, we find that the state presented ample evidence, both direct and circumstantial, to prove that the defendant was guilty of being a principal to the crime of second degree murder.
The defendant, by his own admission, drove the victim to the site where he was killed. The defendant knew in advance that Mann possessed the specific intent to kill Halley and yet did nothing to stop Mann or warn Halley. The defendant watched as Mann shot Halley three times.
Following the killing, all of the defendant's actions indicate his participation in the crime and his guilty knowledge. These actions constituted evidence which the jury could consider in determining that the defendant was a principal in Halley's murder.
After Halley was killed, the defendant drove Mann back to his residence, stopping along the way to conceal the murder weapon under J.B.'s Produce Stand. The defendant did not report the crime or, at that point, attempt in any way to aid law enforcement officials in the investigation of the offense.
The next day, when the victim's car keys were found in Mann's trailer, the defendant threw the keys into Bayou DeSiard to cover up the commission of the crime. Also, the defendant aided Mann in concealing the vehicle used in the commission of the crime at a neighbor's residence.
Witnesses testified at trial that the defendant and Mann were seen near the crime scene on the day following the crime, leading to the conclusion that they were checking to see if the body had been discovered.
For two months following the commission of this offense, the defendant refused to cooperate with law enforcement officials investigating the crime.
The defendant was questioned by law enforcement officials in October and November of 1983 and denied any knowledge of this offense. In December, 1983, after Mann was incarcerated on other charges, the defendant made two taped statements to law enforcement officials stating that he was present when Mann shot Halley and admitted his part in attempting to conceal the crime. The defendant then directed law enforcement officials to J.B.'s Produce Stand where the murder weapon was hidden.
The state admitted the taped statements made by the defendant and also presented testimony of individuals who established that the defendant had a motive for wanting the defendant dead. Within two days of the date Halley was killed, he was to appear in court on attempted aggravated arson charges and at that time intended to implicate the defendant in those charges.
Therefore, this record contains ample evidence upon which the trier of fact could base defendant's conviction as a principal in the crime of second degree murder. Not only does this evidence prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but it also excludes every reasonable...
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