State v. Cutler

Citation33 Conn.Supp. 158,366 A.2d 805
Decision Date19 July 1976
Docket NumberNo. CR,CR
CourtCourt of Common Pleas of Connecticut
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. David CUTLER. 3-19517.

Jerrold W. Engelman, Westport, for plaintiff.

Judith A. Maynes, New Haven, for defendant Southern New England Tel. Co.

Maguire, Cole, Bentley & Babson, Stamford, for defendant American Tel. and Tel. Co.

JACOBSON, Judge.

On June 28, 1976, the court heard the following three motions in the above case: (1) an amended motion to preserve and disclose court records; (2) an amended motion for the disclosure of court records and; (3) an objection to the disclosure of court records. To put this court's decision into full perspective, it is necessary to state the history of the incident relating to those motions.

On May 8, 1973, Clarence Marsella, a security agent of The Southern New England Telephone Company, hereinafter referred to as SNET, complained to the Danbury police that toll fraud was being committed through telephone number 743-7445, the number of David Cutler. As a result of that complaint, a search warrant was issued for Cutler's premises. The execution of the search warrant resulted in the seizure of an electronic device, commonly known as a 'Blue Box,' and a large number of documents, many of which related to the use of that device.

In May 1973, a criminal action was instituted charging David Cutler with larceny and criminal mischief. The action progressed through pretrial proceedings, including hearings on Cutler's plea in abatement and his motion to suppress, a memorandum of decision in which was written by Honorable Milton H. Belinkie on April 10, 1975. The criminal action was nolled on June 16, 1975.

By writ, summons and complaint, dated April 28, 1976, Cutler instituted a civil action against the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, hereinafter referred to as A T & T, and SNET. The thrust of Cutler's complaint is that the alleged actions of SNET in monitoring Cutler's telephone service and in filing a complaint with the police were unlawful. The alleged actions of SNET are alleged to have been performed by it as the agent of or in concert with A T & T. Cutler alleges of the civil action that as a consequence of the actions of SNET and A T & T he 'has suffered great damage, including loss of income, loss of employment capability, loss of esteem in the community, incurred substantial legal fees, and loss of earnings potential.'

The complaint in the civil action is in five counts. The first count claims a violation of chapter 959a of the General Statutes. The second count claims that the statute mentioned in the first count is unconstitutional. The third count claims a violation of certain regulations of the public utilities commission. The fourth count claims that SNET 'maliciously procured the arrest and prosecution of the plaintiff.' The fifth count attempts to tie in A T & T by alleging that SNET acted as the agent, servant, or employee of or in concert with the defendant A T & T.

Since the criminal action was nolled on June 16, 1975, under General Statutes § 54-90 the following will happen: (a) Under § 54-90(c), all police and court records and the records of the prosecuting attorney pertaining to the charge will be erased after July 16, 1976, thirteen months after the entry of the nolle in the case. (b) Under § 54-90(e), after July 16, 1976, those records, on the request of David Cutler, ler, may be physically destroyed.

SNET and A T & T are seeking to prevent that by requesting, under the provisions of General Statutes § 54-90(f), that the court order disclosure of all police and court records and records of the prosecuting attorney, or that those records be preserved against physical destruction during the pendency of the civil action. SNET and A T & T feel that the civil action instituted against them by Cutler is an action for false arrest within the meaning of § 54-90(f).

The plaintiff claims that the civil action instituted by him is not an action for false arrest within the meaning of the above statute. He claims that the civil action is one for malicious prosecution.

General Statutes § 54-90(f) reads as follows: 'Upon motion properly brought, the court or a judge thereof, it such court is not in session, may order disclosure of such records to the accused if the court or judge thereof, as the case may be, finds that nondisclosure may be harmful to the accused in a civil action or may order disclosure to a defendant or the accused in an action for false arrest arising out of the proceedings so erased.'

The statute is a remedial one in that it affords a remedy against the consequences of nondisclosure of records to a person made a defendant in a civil proceeding. The statute remedies the decision of the Supreme Court in Lechner v. Holmberg, 165 Conn. 152, 328 A.2d 701, which interprets an earlier version of § 54-90 as precluding any disclosure. The statute protects from the harmful consequences of nondisclosure those persons whose involvement in the arrest in the criminal action causes them to be named defendants in a civil action arising out of the criminal proceeding.

A statute which is remedial is to be liberally construed to effect its purpose. Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Pettison, 112 Conn. 652, 655, 153 A. 789; Bradley v. Fenn, 103 Conn. 1, 4, 130 A. 126; Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143, 146, 93 A. 245. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is that the construction must effect the real purpose for which the statute was enacted. West Hartford v. Thomas D. Faulkner Co., 126 Conn. 206, 211, 10 A.2d 592. 'The intent of the lawmakers if the soul of the statute, and the search for this intent we have held to be the guiding star of the court. It must prevail over the literal sense and the precise letter of the language of the statute. . . . When one construction leads to public mischief which another construction will avoid, the latter is to be favored unless the terms of the statute absolutely forbid.' Bridgeman v. Derby, 104 Conn. 1, 8, 132 A. 25, 27.

In Sturges v. Raymond, 27 Conn. 473, the Supreme Court stated (pp. 476-77) that: 'In construing statutes like the one under consideration, a liberal construction should be given to the terms made use of by the legislature, in order to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy intended; for it is to be presumed, that when the legislature pass a remedial statute, that has for its object the promotion of important public interests, they intend to cover the whole ground, and the terms they make use of should be so construed, if it can be done without doing absolute violence to the language used. Hence, in the construction of such statutes, it oftentimes becomes necessary to go beyond the strict letter of the law, and bring within its provisions what the strict letter would exclude.

Applying this principle to the...

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3 cases
  • Golino v. City of New Haven
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • April 18, 1991
    ...the absence of probable cause. See, e.g., Zenik v. O'Brien, 137 Conn. 592, 596-97, 79 A.2d 769, 772 (1951); State v. Cutler, 33 Conn. Supp. 158, 163, 366 A.2d 805, 808 (1976). Thus, the central question on plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim is whether there is a genuine issue of materi......
  • State v. Anonymous
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • April 3, 1995
    ...54-142a(f) is, however, remedial in nature. State v. Anonymous (1980-1), 36 Conn.Sup. 9, 12, 409 A.2d 150 (1980); State v. Cutler, 33 Conn.Sup. 158, 162-65, 366 A.2d 805 (1976); see also State v. Anonymous (1983-1), 38 Conn.Sup. 661, 663-64, 460 A.2d 494 (1983). 1 "The statute is a remedial......
  • State v. Anonymous (1983-1)
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Connecticut
    • May 28, 1981
    ...(f) is remedial in nature and thus, should be liberally construed. In support of this claim, it relies upon State v. Cutler, 33 Conn.Sup. 158, 366 A.2d 805 (1976), in which the court granted the civil defendant's motion for disclosure under subsection (2) of § 54-142a(f) despite the fact th......

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