State v. DA
Decision Date | 04 June 2007 |
Citation | 923 A.2d 217,191 N.J. 158 |
Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. D.A., Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Amira Rahman Scurato, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Scurato and Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
Daniel I. Bornstein, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Stuart Rabner, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).
This case centers on the meaning of the language in the witness tampering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a), that criminalizes a defendant's knowing attempts to silence a witness while "believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted." In particular, we are asked whether a threat by a defendant against a person who has observed him in a crime, with the purpose to forestall official action, will satisfy the above-cited language.
On a motion for a judgment of acquittal, the trial judge answered that question in the affirmative. Thereafter, defendant was convicted of tampering and the Appellate Division affirmed. We now reverse. Because there can be no tampering, within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a), unless the defendant acted, believing that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to be instituted, and because there was no evidence that this defendant held such a belief, his conviction cannot stand.
Defendant, D.A., was charged by an Atlantic County Grand Jury with five separate offenses: (1) second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c); (2) fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b); (3) third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a); (4) fourth-degree child abuse, N.J.S.A. 9:6-3; and (5) third-degree witness tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a). At trial, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the tampering charge on the ground that his conduct did not violate the statute because, at the time he acted, he did not believe "an official proceeding was about to be instituted."
The basic facts surrounding the tampering charge are not in dispute. Defendant lived with his family in the same motel as his victim, Tracie,1 who was thirteen years old. Tracie's closest friend, Jessica, often stayed over at Tracie's and observed defendant's regular sexual advances toward Tracie, including multiple instances of French-kissing.
One day, when defendant and Jessica were in Tracie's room alone, defendant told Jessica that "if she said anything to anybody, he would take full custody of Tracie and Jessica would never see her again." Jessica understood defendant to be making a threat to keep her silent, but did not believe he could carry it out. Also, at the time of the threat, there was no evidence to indicate to defendant that Jessica had any intention of reporting what she saw to the authorities. She did, however, tell her mother about defendant's conduct when she returned home. Defendant's threat to Jessica is the focal point of this appeal.
The trial judge denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the tampering charge. The judge dismissed the child abuse count, and a jury found defendant guilty of the four remaining charges. After appropriate mergers, defendant was sentenced to a custodial term of five years for witness tampering and to a consecutive term of nine years with four and one-half years of parole ineligibility on the second-degree sexual assault count.
Defendant appealed, challenging among other things, denial of the motion to dismiss the tampering count. The Appellate Division rejected that claim, concluding "it is no less an offense to seek to prevent a witness from conveying to authorities information that would trigger an investigation than to seek to prevent that witness from communicating with authorities who have received information from other sources that would justify the commencement of an investigation."
We granted certification solely on the tampering issue, 188 N.J. 220, 902 A.2d 1237 (2006).
Defendant argues that from the evidence presented, the jury could not conclude that he "believed that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to be instituted" when he threatened Jessica; that without such a conclusion, the statutory elements could not be satisfied; and that even if ambiguous, the doctrine of lenity requires that the statute be read in his favor.
The State counters that the tampering statute clearly encompasses defendant's conduct; that to hold otherwise would allow defendant's actions to go unpunished; and that the doctrine of lenity cannot be permitted to thwart the obvious intent underlying a law.
On a motion for judgment of acquittal, the governing test is: whether the evidence viewed in its entirety, and giving the State the benefit of all of its favorable testimony and all of the favorable inferences which can reasonably be drawn therefrom, is such that a jury could properly find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged. State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59, 236 A.2d 385 (1967). See R. 3:18-1; see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979) ( ). The propriety of the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal in this case depends on the meaning to be ascribed to the tampering statute.
In interpreting a statute, the overriding goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005). "The best indicator of that intent is the statutory language," thus it is the first place to look. Ibid. (citation omitted). If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then the interpretive process should end, without resort to extrinsic sources. Ibid. (citations omitted).
We only turn to extrinsic evidence in limited circumstances, such as when "there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than one plausible interpretation." Ibid. In addition, we "may also resort to extrinsic evidence if a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result or if the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language." Ibid.
An added canon is that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14, 17, 519 A.2d 322 (1987) (citations omitted). The strict construction doctrine, and its corollary, the doctrine of lenity, "means that words are given their ordinary meaning and that any reasonable doubt ... is decided in favor of anyone subjected to a criminal statute." 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.3 (6th ed.2001); see also State v. Alexander, 136 N.J. 563, 573, 643 A.2d 996 (1994) ( ).
Simply because a statute can be interpreted in more than one way does not automatically implicate the strict construction doctrine. For example, it "does not prevent a court from reading the statute in relation to the mischief and evil sought to be suppressed or prevent a court from giving effect to the terms of the statute in accordance with their fair and natural acceptation." State v. Meinken, 10 N.J. 348, 352, 91 A.2d 721 (1952). A court may look to extrinsic evidence to clarify an ambiguity and divine legislative intent in the context of a penal statute. See Valentin, supra, 105 N.J. at 19, 519 A.2d 322 ( ); see also State v. Sein, 124 N.J. 209, 214-18, 590 A.2d 665 (1991) ( ).
Only if that search is fruitless, and the ambiguity remains, does the strict construction doctrine apply. See Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 59.3 () . Those are the legal principles that inform our analysis.
In 1978, the Legislature enacted the new Code of Criminal Justice based on the Final Report of the Criminal Law Revision Commission. Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 738, at 1 (May 15, 1978). That revision was intended to replace the "hopelessly antiquated" statutes previously found in Title 2A, defining crimes and disorderly persons offenses. New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, The Final Report; Volume I: Report and Penal Code, § 738, at vi (1971). To guarantee that law enforcement resources would be used as effectively as possible, the Code sought to introduce precision into the statutory descriptions of offenses so that "persons appropriately subject to a criminal sanction will not escape because of a poorly defined crime." Id. at vii-viii. It was against that backdrop that N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5 was incorporated into the Code.
In its present form,2 N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5 provides that:
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