State v. Dadney

• Decision Date: 16 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 14–KA–511.,14–KA–511.
• Citation: 167 So.3d 55
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Justin J. DADNEY.

167 So.3d 55

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Justin J. DADNEY.

No. 14–KA–511.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 16, 2014.

167 So.3d 57

Paul D. Connick, Jr., District Attorney, Terry M. Boudreaux, Juliet L. Clark, Assistant District Attorneys, Gretna, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee.

Bruce G. Whittaker, Attorney at Law, Louisiana Appellate Project, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.

Justin J. Dadney, In Proper Person, Kinder, LA, Defendant/Appellant.

Panel composed of Judges FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, MARC E. JOHNSON, and HANS J. LILJEBERG.

Opinion

FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, Judge.

In this criminal proceeding, defendant appeals his guilty plea convictions for two counts of armed robbery in violation of La. R.S. 14:64 and one count of felon in possession of a firearm in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 5, 2011, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of information charging defendant, Justin J. Dadney¹ , with two counts of armed robbery of Luis Ponce (count one) and Cesar Turcios (count two) in violation of La. R.S. 14:64 and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in

violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count five).² Defendant was arraigned on January 11, 2012, and pled not guilty.³

On June 25, 2012, defendant withdrew his plea of not guilty and pled guilty as charged.⁴ Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment at hard labor for each armed robbery charge and fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor for the felon in possession of a firearm charge. As a condition of the plea agreement, the state agreed not to charge defendant as a multiple offender.

On June 25, 2012, defendant wrote a pro se letter to the trial court requesting to withdraw his guilty plea.⁵ On June 28, 2012, defense counsel filed a written motion to withdraw/set aside defendant's guilty plea. On August 14, 2012, the state filed a written opposition to defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On October 31, 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's motion, which the

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trial court denied. On January 14, 2014, defendant timely filed an application for post-conviction relief, and the trial court granted defendant an out-of-time appeal.

FACTS

During the guilty plea colloquy, the state provided the following factual basis for the plea:

On or about October 15th, 2011, Jeau Anthony Torrence, Kentrell Robinson, Orlando McKnight, and Justin Dadney, all went to 2216 Williams Boulevard which is a strip mall wherein is located, The Perfection's Barber Shop. At approximately 9:30 P.m. [sic], at that time, Mr. Torrence, Robinson, and McKnight exited the vehicle while Mr. Dadney remained in the vehicle as a lookout. Those three gentlemen, entered the store. Each armed with a weapon or either a handgun or an assault rifle. At that time, they took money from the two victims in this case, as well as an X Box, from inside the store.

Mr. Dadney, during the course of the robbery, exited the truck as they arrived at the scene to warn the other three that The Police were on their way. At that time, all four fled. They were apprehended shortly. Thereafter excepting [sic] Mr. McKnight, who made good his escape that evening, but was apprehended the following morning. Thus, completing the offense of the 14:64, Judge. [sic].

Also, it should be known for the record that Mr. Dadney has a prior second offense marijuana conviction. Accordingly, he should not have been in possession of a handgun, as he was that night. That's constituting the violation of The Louisiana Revised Statute 14:951 [sic].

The bill of information further states that on or about October 15, 2011, defendant violated La. R.S. 14:64 by robbing Luis Ponce and Cesar Turcios while armed with a dangerous weapon (a gun) and violated La. R.S. 14:95.1 by having in his possession a firearm after having been previously convicted of second offense possession of marijuana in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(C).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, defendant challenges the constitutionality of his guilty plea. In his counseled appellate brief, defendant claims that his guilty plea should be set aside because the trial court failed to inform him of the nature of the charges against him as required under La.C.Cr.P. art. 556.1.⁶ In

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his

pro se supplemental appellate brief, defendant adopts counsel's assignment of error and additionally claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We address each assignment of error in turn:

Constitutionality of the Guilty Plea

In his first assignment of error, defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to explain the nature of the charges against him during the guilty plea colloquy as required under La.C.Cr.P. art. 556.1. He contends that he lacked the understanding that he would be convicted of armed robbery under the circumstances of this case—where he alleges that he remained in the vehicle and was unaware that an armed robbery would occur.

The state responds that the trial court advised defendant of his constitutional rights prior to his guilty plea and that defendant was well aware of the nature of the charges against him. The state further contends that, had defendant been convicted by a jury, the state would have filed a multiple offender bill of information and defendant would have faced a substantial sentencing range of 49 and a half years to 198 years.

As a general proposition, the validity of a guilty plea turns on whether the defendant was informed of three fundamental constitutional rights—his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers—and whether, having been informed of those rights, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived them.

State v. Farinas, 09–396 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/24/09), 28 So.3d 1132, 1139–40, writ denied, 10–0086 (La.6/25/10), 38 So.3d 335 ; State v. Juniors, 03–2425 (La.6/29/05), 915 So.2d 291, cert. denied, Juniors v. Louisiana, 547 U.S. 1115, 126 S.Ct. 1940, 164 L.Ed.2d 669 (2006)citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

A guilty plea normally waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings leading up to the guilty plea and precludes review of such defects by either appeal or post-conviction relief. State v. Riley, 14–98 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/24/14), 145 So.3d 516, 519 ; State v. Howard, 11–1155 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/22/12), 91 So.3d 564, 569, writ denied, 12–1826 (La.3/1/13), 108 So.3d 787. Additionally, once a defendant has been sentenced, only those guilty pleas which are constitutionally infirm may be withdrawn by appeal or post-conviction relief. Id. A guilty plea is constitutionally infirm if it is not entered freely and voluntarily, if the Boykin colloquy is inadequate, or when a defendant is induced to enter the plea by a plea bargain or what he justifiably believes was a plea bargain and that bargain is not kept. Id.

A plea cannot be considered voluntary without notice of the essential nature of the charge or charges. This constitutional requirement is codified in La.C.Cr.P. art. 556.1(A)(1), which provides that the court shall not accept a guilty plea without first determining that defendant understands the nature of the charge against him. However, violations of Article 556.1 that do not rise to the level of

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Boykin⁷ violations are subject to harmless error analysis. Id. To determine whether a violation of Article 556.1 is harmless, the proper inquiry is whether the defendant's knowledge and comprehension

of the full and correct information would have likely affected his willingness to plead guilty. Howard, 91 So.3d at 570.

The test for the validity of a guilty plea does not depend on whether the trial court specifically informed the defendant of every element of the offense. Rather, the defendant must establish that he lacked awareness of the essential nature of the offense to which he was pleading. State v. Howard, supra. This Court has found that “[w]hen a defendant is represented by counsel, the trial court accepting his guilty plea may presume that counsel has explained the nature of the charge in sufficient detail that the defendant has notice of what his plea asks him to admit.” State v. Farinas, 28 So.3d at 1140–1141.

In this case, defendant was represented by counsel at the time of his guilty plea. On June 25, 2012, defendant's counsel informed the trial court that defendant would withdraw his former not guilty plea and plead guilty to “two counts of 14:64, and one count of 14:95.1.” The trial judge in response addressed defendant personally, inquiring, “you are...