State v. DaEria

• Decision Date: 01 December 1998
• Docket Number: (AC 16678)
• Citation: State v. DaEria, 721 A.2d 539, 51 Conn.App. 149 (Conn. App. 1998)
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES DAERIA
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

51 Conn. App. 149

721 A.2d 539

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.JAMES DAERIA

(AC 16678)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 16, 1998.

Officially released December 1, 1998.

Lavery, Landau and Daly, Js.Glenn M. Conway, special public defender, with whom, on the brief, was Alexander H. Schwartz, special public defender, for the appellant(defendant).

Susann E. Gill, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Jonathan C. Benedict, state's attorney, and John C. Smriga, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee(state).

Opinion

LAVERY, J.

The defendant, James DaEria, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49and53a-54a, assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a)(5), attempt to commit larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49,53a-119and53a-123 (a)(2), conspiracy to commit larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-123 (a)(2)and53a-48, attempt to commit larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49,53a-119and53a-124 (a)(1) and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a).¹

On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion to suppress evidence that the police had obtained following a stop of his motor vehicle, (2) admitted into evidence clothing the police seized, without a warrant, as a seizure incident to a lawful custodial arrest and (3) denied both his motion to suppress incriminating oral statements he made to the police and his motion to suppress items the police seized from his vehicle.We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts.On December 14, 1995, the victim, James Grosner, was at the home of his fiancee's parents, which is located on Graham Street in Stratford.At approximately 2:30 a.m., the victim heard a noise, and an alarm sounded almost immediately thereafter.The alarm belonged to a truck that was parked in the driveway.The victim looked out of a window and saw two men running away.

The victim exited the home and pursued the two individuals.When the victim reached the corner of Graham Street and High Park Avenue, he saw the two men enter a parked automobile.After several unsuccessful efforts to start the automobile, a man, later identified as the defendant, exited the car and took several steps toward the victim.The defendant raised his arm, and the victim saw a flash and heard a gunshot.The victim was struck in the leg by a bullet and retreated to the house while the defendant fired four additional shots.

The victim informed a police dispatcher that the perpetrators were driving a small, greenish Tercel² on High Park Avenue.Officer David McNeil of the Stratford police department was on patrol in the vicinity of High Park Avenue when a police dispatcher reported the incident.At the intersection of Stratford Avenue and Bruce Avenue, approximately four blocks from the location of the shooting, McNeil observed a small, gray Toyota with three occupants.McNeil testified that he did not observe any other vehicles on the road from the time he received the dispatch until he observed the Toyota.McNeil activated his cruiser's strobe lights and attempted to pull over the Toyota because it matched the description of the vehicle involved, was the only vehicle in the area, was coming from the direction of the shooting and had several occupants.When McNeil activated his cruiser's strobe lights, the Toyota accelerated and a chase ensued.

When the Toyota struck a median on Washington Avenue in Bridgeport, the three occupants abandoned the vehicle.Officer Charles Johnson of the Bridgeport police department apprehended the defendant.Stratford police officers then arrested the defendant and took him into custody.The defendant was later identified as the owner of the Toyota.

Officer John Steedley transported the defendant to the Stratford police station.When they arrived at the police station, Steedley gave the defendant a form that listed his Miranda³ rights.Steedley asked the defendant to review the waiver form, which the defendant reviewed and signed.Before Detectives Richard Yeomans and Nelson Dennean interviewed the defendant, Dennean read the defendant his Miranda rights.Dennean asked the defendant whether he understood his rights and was willing to waive them, and the defendant indicated that he was willing to speak with the detectives.During his interview with the detectives, the defendant made several incriminating statements.

Dennean also read a "consent to search" form to the defendant and asked him if he would authorize police officers to search his vehicle.The defendant reviewed the form and signed it.During a search of the defendant's vehicle, police officers discovered a flashlight, a dent puller and a screwdriver.At trial, Detective Robert Yakoubian testified that automobile thieves often use a dent puller to remove a vehicle's ignition so that the vehicle can be started with a screwdriver.

Shortly after the defendant arrived at the Stratford police station, Sergeant Christopher Marino removed a hooded sweatshirt and a pair of baggy pants from the defendant.Marino then placed these items on a hook outside the defendant's cell.While the defendant was in the holding cell, Officer Patrick Freer, who was with the victim at the hospital, spoke with Marino.Freer informed Marino that the victim described the shooter as wearing baggy pants and a hooded sweatshirt.Realizing that the defendant's sweatshirt and pants matched the description provided by the victim, Marino seized these items from the hook outside the defendant's cell.

I

We must first determine whether the trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained by the authorities following McNeil's attempted stop of the defendant's vehicle.Specifically, the defendant claims that McNeil's activation of his police cruiser's strobe lights constituted a seizure within the meaning of article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut.⁴Additionally, the defendant contends that this seizure violated his rights under our state constitution because it was not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that his vehicle and its occupants were engaged in criminal activity.

"Our standard of review of a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined.A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record ....[W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision...."(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)State v. Colvin,241 Conn. 650, 656, 697 A.2d 1122(1997).

We must first determine whether McNeil seized the defendant within the meaning of article first, § 7, of our state constitution when he activated his cruiser's strobe lights.The state concedes that "under a reasonable reading of [State v. Oquendo,223 Conn. 635, 613 A.2d 1300(1992)], McNeil `seized'the defendant the moment he activated his [strobe] lights."We will, therefore, assume, without deciding, that McNeil's actions constituted a seizure of the defendant.

We must next determine whether McNeil's seizure of the defendant was permissible under article first, § 7, of our state constitution.The defendant argues, relying on State v. Oquendo,supra, 223 Conn. 635, that McNeil did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that his vehicle and its occupants were engaged in criminal activity.We disagree.

"Under both the federal and state constitutions, police may detain an individual for investigative purposes if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual is engaged or about to engage in criminal activity."State v. Groomes,232 Conn. 455, 467-68, 656 A.2d 646(1995)."Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objective standard that focuses not on the actual state of mind of the police officer, but on whether a reasonable person, having the information available to and known by the police, would have had that level of suspicion."State v. Torres,230 Conn. 372, 379, 645 A.2d 529(1994);State v. Januszewski,182 Conn. 142, 148-49, 438 A.2d 679(1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922, 101 S. Ct. 3159, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1005(1981)."The police officer's decision ... must be based on more than hunch or speculation."State v. Cofield,220 Conn. 38, 45, 595 A.2d 1349(1991).In justifying the particular intrusion, "`[t]he police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that [intrusion].'Terry v. Ohio,392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889(1968)."State v. Groomes,supra, 468."Once a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists, the detaining officer may conduct an investigative `stop' of the suspect to confirm or dispel his suspicions...."State v. Kyles,221 Conn. 643, 660, 607 A.2d 355(1992).

"The determination of whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists involves a two-part analysis: (1) whether the underlying factual findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous; and (2) whether the conclusion that those facts gave rise to such a suspicion is legally correct....The trial court's conclusions must stand unless they are legally and logically inconsistent with the facts."(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Id., 660-61.

The defendant does not maintain that the trial court's factual findings were clearly erroneous.Instead, he claims that the trial court's legal...