State v. Dallas
| Decision Date | 20 November 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 14935,14935 |
| Citation | 109 Idaho 670,710 P.2d 580 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, Cross-Appellant, v. Claude Lafayette DALLAS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
William L. Mauk, of Skinner, Fawcett & Mauk, Boise, for defendant-appellant, cross-respondent.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., and Lynn Thomas, Sol. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent, cross-appellant.
This appeal arises out of the conviction of appellant, Claude Dallas, for voluntary manslaughter following the fatal shooting of two Idaho Department of Fish and Game conservation officers in January of 1981. The events surrounding the shooting can be summarized as follows:
On the evening of January 4, 1981, Ed Carlin, a trapper, telephoned Idaho conservation officer Bill Pogue to report finding illegal traps in the vicinity of the "45 Ranch" in Owyhee County near the Idaho-Nevada border. Pogue indicated he would be out in a day or two to check the traps. When Carlin responded that a day or two would be too late, Pogue stated he would leave immediately. He then arranged for fellow officer Conley Elms to accompany him and the two men left Boise at approximately 12:00 a.m. that same evening. They arrived at the 45 Ranch early the following morning. Over breakfast at the Carlin residence, Pogue asked if there were any other trappers in the area. Carlin stated that, in addition to some Oregon trappers, there was a trapper named Claude Dallas camped at nearby Bull Camp. Don Carlin, Ed Carlin's son, further stated that on a recent visit to Dallas's camp he had observed several deer carcasses and two bobcat hides. (The seasons for hunting deer and trapping bobcats in Idaho had been closed for some time).
After breakfast, Don Carlin accompanied the officers to the site of the illegal traps. Carlin left them there and the officers proceeded to locate and issue a citation to the owner of the traps. Shortly thereafter, Don Carlin encountered the officers on the road back to the ranch. The subject of Claude Dallas was again mentioned and Carlin gave the officers directions to Dallas's camp.
Bull Camp is located in a remote basin on the banks of the South Fork of the Owyhee River approximately 13 miles east of the Oregon border and 3 miles north of the Nevada border in Owyhee County. A dirt road extends to the rim of the basin above the camp. The camp itself is accessible by following a foot-trail approximately three-quarters of a mile down the rim and into the basin. Claude Dallas had established a trapping camp in Bull Camp in early December of 1980.
On the morning of January 5, 1981, at the same time the officers were investigating the trapping violation nearby, Jim Stevens, a friend of Dallas's, arrived at Bull Camp for a visit. The confrontation which ultimately resulted in the officers' deaths began when Dallas walked up to the rim to retrieve some of Stevens's supplies. There he encountered officers Pogue and Elms. Pogue, Elms and Dallas then walked down the trial to Dallas's camp.
The facts surrounding the shooting are in dispute. At some point, the officers disarmed Dallas of a .22 pistol which he was carrying in a shoulder holster. However, Dallas was also armed with a .357 magnum revolver located in a hip holster and that weapon was not removed. The officers also checked Stevens's pistol and removed the bullets before returning it to him. According to Dallas's version of the incident, Officer Pogue's behavior was aggressive and threatening, causing Dallas to fear for his life. He contends that he shot Pogue only after the officer reached for his revolver, and that he and Pogue shot at the same time. At trial, Dallas described the shooting as follows:
The state contends, on the other hand, that Dallas shot and killed both Pogue and Elms without provocation when it appeared that they were going to arrest him, and that neither officer had a chance to return fire.
It is undisputed that Dallas shot Elms twice and Pogue several times with a .357 magnum revolver. He then obtained a .22 rifle and fired a single shot into the head of each officer. Thereafter, Dallas, with Stevens's assistance, attempted to erase the evidence of the killings.
William Pogue's body was loaded onto a mule and carried from the camp site up the canyon to the spot where Stevens had left his vehicle. Conley Elms's body was also loaded on the back of a mule. Elms's body slipped off the mule, however, and the two men were unable to lift it back on. The body was then dragged behind the mule to the river and dumped in.
After burning some of the evidence of the shooting, Dallas and Stevens loaded Pogue's body into Stevens's Blazer and drove to Paridise Hills, Nevada, several hours away. Their destination was the home of a mutual friend, George Neilson. Dallas borrowed Neilson's truck and went out into the desert to dispose of Pogue's body. (The body was not located until after the trial). Neilson then drove Dallas to Sand Pass Road and Dallas disappeared on foot into the desert.
Dallas was apprehended by the FBI some 16 months later following a high-speed chase across the Nevada desert. He was charged with two counts of first degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, resisting officers in the lawful performance of their duties, and destruction or concealment of evidence. Trial commenced on September 15, 1982 and concluded some six weeks later on October 24. Dallas presented a self-defense theory at trial, largely through his own testimony. The jury acquitted him of first and second degree murder and of the resisting arrest charge. He was convicted on two counts of voluntary manslaughter, two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and a misdemeanor charge of concealment of evidence.
Dallas was sentenced to an indeterminate 10-year term on each of the voluntary manslaughter counts, to run consecutively. The court also enhanced his sentence, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2520, with an additional consecutive 10-year term for the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. In addition, he was sentenced to six months in the county jail for the concealment conviction with credit for the 209 days he had already served. This appeal followed.
Dallas has raised numerous issues on appeal. First, he contends that the two consecutive 10-year indeterminate sentences imposed for the voluntary manslaughter convictions constitute an abuse of sentencing discretion. Second, he contends that the enhancement of the manslaughter sentences with an additional 10-year sentence for his use of a firearm constitutes a further abuse of discretion. Third, he asserts that the trial court violated I.C. § 19-852 and his constitutional right to due process, equal protection and effective assistance of counsel by refusing to provide funds for more than one defense attorney. Fourth, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the voluntary manslaughter convictions. Fifth, he asserts that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victims' character. Sixth, he argues that the trial court should have imposed sanctions on the state for withholding exculpatory evidence in its possession. Finally, he objects to the trial court's disqualification of a venireperson on the basis of his opposition to the death penalty without first allowing individual voir dire. The state has cross-appealed asserting that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the victims' character and in excluding two of the state's exhibits. We will address each issue in turn.
Dallas first contends that the two consecutive 10-year indeterminate sentences he received for the voluntary manslaughter convictions constitute an abuse of discretion. It is well settled that sentencing is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Where a particular sentence is within the statutory maximum, it will not be disturbed on appeal absent a "clear abuse of discretion." See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 102 Idaho 692, 638 P.2d 889 (1981); State v. West, 102 Idaho 562, 633 P.2d 1140 (1981).
Former I.C. § 18-4007 provided that the maximum term of confinement for voluntary manslaughter was 10 years. 1 The sentence imposed in the present case--if fully served, without parole--could equal, but would not exceed, the statutory maximum. Thus, appellant has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that the sentence he received constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.
This Court has articulated four objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). Dallas submits that the sentence he received constitutes an abuse of discretion because it exceeds the maximum necessary to accomplish those goals. He argues that protection of society and rehabilitation are not genuine issues in this case and that general deterrence and punishment could be achieved by a shorter sentence. He further argues that the trial judge abused his discretion by allowing his personal conclusions on the issue of self-defense to influence his sentencing decision and by considering two improper factors in determining the length of sentence. We address each argument in the order stated.
Dallas first asserts that the two consecutive 10-year terms...
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